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Abstract
Globalisation has been a dominant theme in much social science text over the last 
two decades. According to this literature, although one of the most significant 
changes in the world economy has been a dramatic increase in the mobility of 
capital, globalisation is not a purely economic phenomenon. Alongside the global 
economic change, there has been a distinct set of political changes, shifting the reach 
of political power and forms of rule.
This economic and political transformation taking place globally redefines the roles 
of both the nation state and cities since a growing amount of mobile capital is 
attracted to particular world cities given the right mix of incentives and attributes. 
Due to changes in the economy of cities, contemporary cities are today being 
managed and governed with more proactive urban strategies of the central and local 
governments.
In the light of these theoretical arguments, the thesis first examines political and 
economic changes in both the Turkish state and the city of Istanbul under the 
conditions of intensifying globalisation process. The thesis then reviews the changing 
authority relationship between the central government and the metropolitan 
municipality of Istanbul with reference to urban policies. Case study chapters 
proceed to explore globally oriented urban policies such as developing a new 
financial centre and hosting the Olympic Games drawing on the evidence collected 
through official documents and semi-structured interviews with the central and local 
actors. The research conducted identifies the roles of various central and local 
government bodies in determining recent urban policies in Istanbul.
The evidence and analysis presented suggests that although accession to “world city” 
status due to globalisation has benefited many cities around the world, the lack of an 
effective role for local government in the case of Turkey has prevented the city of 
Istanbul from achieving its full potential because of inferior urban planning policies.
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
We are living in an era in which the fact of globalisation has become very obvious. 
The world at the beginning of the 21st century faces the influences of an intensifying 
globalisation process. The social and economic issues as part of this process have 
been studied intensively. One of the most important changes in the world economy 
over the last two decades has been a dramatic increase in the mobility of capital 
across the globe. Globalisation is associated with the transfer of capital crossing 
national boundaries, and this mobile capital takes many different forms, such as 
foreign investment, footloose high-tech industries, employment, transnational 
institutions, international events and tourism activities. Furthermore, this economic 
transformation redefines the roles of both the nation state and city since a growing 
amount of mobile capital is attracted to particular world cities, given the right mix of 
incentives and attributes. Therefore, cities are nowadays facing the pressures and 
opportunities of an increasingly competitive and global market and trying to develop 
new urban strategies to survive in this rivalry. This thesis will examine those changes 
in urban policies in the new era with reference to the ongoing economic and political 
transformation in the state and cities taking place globally.
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1.2 The Theoretical Framework
In very general terms, globalisation refers to the combination of varied transnational 
processes and domestic structures, allowing the internationalisation of capital, 
production, services, information, politics, culture and ideology. Global capitalism is 
the common point for most of the arguments emphasising the economic aspects of 
globalisation. Economic globalisation brings about the increasing 
transnationalisation of production under the impact of multinational corporations, 
and the production and trade networks in which these corporations are integrated. 
This signifies the growing integration of various parts of the world into a global 
economy and financial system.
The globalisation of capital and production markets, on the other hand, makes it 
difficult for the nation state to exercise any effective economic policy. Therefore, 
states today have a general propensity to direct their policies in order to attract and 
retain multinational and transnational corporations as part of their economic 
programmes. As a result of this trend, these large corporations have emerged as 
rising dominant actors in the globalisation process.
In addition, since globalisation broadly entails an important shift from autonomous 
national economies to a global market for production, distribution and technology, it 
has, today, some significant political consequences, as well as economic ones, for 
nation states and their policies. Some extreme globalisation theorists like Ohmae 
believe that ‘only two forces matter in the world economy, global market forces and 
transnational companies, and neither of these is or can be subject to effective public
14
governance’; also ‘stateless corporations are the prime actors in the world economy 
and macroeconomic policy intervention by national governments can only distort the 
rational process of resource allocation on a global scale’ (Ohmae, 1990, cited in Hirst 
and Thompson, 1996, p.59 and p. 185).
However, the situation is actually more complex than this. Although central 
governments’ degree of freedom on their economic policy has been dramatically 
reduced by the effects of economic globalisation in the last two decades, ‘the nation­
state has still kept some of its regulatory power and control over its institutions, and 
it is surely far from disappearing’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 170-194; Giddens, 
1999 and Gray, 1998). Castells (1997, p. 269) stresses that ‘the growing role played 
by international institutions and supranational consortia in world policies cannot be 
equated to the death of the nation state, but the price paid by nation states for their 
uncertain survival as segments of states’ networks is that of their decreasing 
relevance, thus undermining their legitimacy, and ultimately furthering their 
powerlessness’1.
Therefore, under conditions of intensifying globalisation, although national states 
today do not have the same level of administrative and political autonomy that they 
once possessed, ‘they remain dominant elements of the contemporary political and 
economic landscape, though they are clearly undergoing deep transformation’ (Scott, 
2001, p. 13). As world capitalism goes through an intense process of restructuring in 
the late 20th and beginning of the 21st century, it simultaneously reshapes the state,
1 For more details, see the second volume (The Power of Identity, 1997) of Manual Castells’ three- 
volume book entitled ‘The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture’.
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but nation states are not about to fade away (Giddens, 1999 and Gray, 1998); instead, 
it still remains as a fundamental institution for regulating and governing people in 
modem society.
On the other hand, the rise of supranational political institutions can be seen as the 
state’s reaction against reduced decision-making power in order to be able to control 
the economic operations of financial flows and multinational companies. Although 
the establishment of the EU was the most significant process in this line, the new 
world order is also being affected by NAFTA, an economic co-operation zone in the 
Pacific region, the G-7 group, the IMF and the World Bank. Similarly, in the 
political environment, institutions such as UN and NATO are taking on an increasing 
number of functions designed to regulate international political relations, with joint 
military intervention when required.
Globalisation, moreover, incorporates contradictory trends too. On the one hand, 
economic globalisation has had important effects on the decision-making power of 
nation states as already mentioned. On the other hand, it has created new roles for 
cities as well. ‘There has been a growing literature on the key roles of certain world 
or global cities in the process of globalisation’ (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; 
Friedmann, 1986 and Sassen, 1991, cited in Dieleman and Hamnett, 1994, p.357). 
According to this literature, there is an association between the increasing 
importance of cities and changes in the global economy. ‘Cities, in a way, are 
becoming more powerful vis-a-vis nation states in the global era’ (Friedmann and 
Wolff, 1982, p.312).
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While cities are increasingly taking on the significant role in political, economic, 
social, cultural and media life, they are also important ‘social subjects which form 
links among local administrations, public and private economic agents, social and 
civic organisations, intellectual and professional sectors and media, in other words, 
between political institutions, business and civil society’ (Boija and Castells, 1997, 
p.4). In addition, most of the significant decisions on economic activities are today 
not taken in administrative capitals, but in world or global cities, which direct the 
international capital. As a result of these economic developments, ‘a cities hierarchy 
has been created in the world scale, in which a few powerful global cities control all 
the global economy’ (Friedmann, 1995 and Sassen, 1991). According to Hall (1995), 
‘the global informational economy is organised on the basis of managerial centres 
capable of co-ordinating, managing and innovating the activities of companies 
structured in networks for interurban, and often trans-national, exchange’.
‘Linked to their control and command functions, global cities develop a rich physical 
and social infrastructure’ (Dieleman and Hamnett, 1994, p.358). The emerging post­
industrial order and world trade agreements are, today, producing new modem office 
buildings, commercial free-trade zones and enterprise development areas in the 
world cities, increasingly connected by sophisticated information and global 
telecommunication systems. ‘Distinct office towers as the image of power and 
prestige, major international airports, super-fast trains and telecommunications 
networks maintain the global reach of a world city, and the social networks are also 
nourished by a large variety of cultural and entertainment facilities’ (ibid.).
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In contrast, being a world city may bring some detriments, as we can see in the 
literature. Several authors have mentioned that ‘world city status can bring 
considerable social costs like increasing inequalities, polarisation , duality and 
crime’ (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Castells, 1989 and Sassen, 1991, cited in 
Dieleman and Hamnett, 1994, p.358). The sharp increase in socio-economic and 
spatial inequalities within major cities of the developed world can be included among 
the harmful effects of the economic globalisation process. According to Sassen 
(1994), ‘this can be interpreted as social and economic restructuring and the 
emergence of new social forms: the growth of an informal economy in large cities in 
highly developed countries; high-income commercial and residential gentrification; 
and the sharp rise of homelessness in rich countries’.
Sassen also claims that ‘the structure of economic activity in global cities, 
particularly the rapid growth of the financial sector and the decline of manufacturing 
industry, has brought about changes in the organisation of work, reflected in a shift 
in the job supply and polarization in the income distribution and occupational 
distribution of workers’ (1991, p.9). The increasing social segregation taking place in 
global cities in parallel with the economic and social restructuring process, however, 
is not just a developed world phenomenon. Though at a different order of extent, 
these kinds of trends also became evident during the late 1980s and 1990s in a 
number of major cities in the developing world that have become integrated into 
various world markets (Sassen, 1994, Knox and Taylor, 1995). Cities such as Mexico 
City, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Sao Paulo and Istanbul can be given as examples of 
these types of cities.
2 See Sassen (1991) for more detail about ‘social polarisation’.
3 See Castells (1989) for more detail about ‘dual city’.
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In the new era, the issue of urban governance has been another important subject area 
related to the globalisation debate, including considerable potential for further 
analytical development, since it has also been transformed in recent years. Harvey 
(1989b, p.5) argues that ‘the transformation of urban governance has had substantial 
macro-economic roots and implications’. According to him, ‘urban governance has 
become increasingly preoccupied with the exploration of new ways in which to 
foster and encourage local development and employment growth’, and ‘such an 
entrepreneurial stance contrasts with the managerial practices of earlier decades, 
which primarily focused on the local provision of services, facilities and benefits to 
urban populations’ (ibid., p.3).
Thomley (1999, p.4) points out that ‘this entrepreneurial attitude includes viewing 
the city as a product that needs to be marketed, and in recent years the rise of city 
marketing in which image is seen to be of supreme importance, has been an 
extensive area of study’. He also adds that ‘the particular image or vision approved 
can determine policy priorities’ underlining that ‘a typical emphasis is on mega­
events and developments that attract media attention’ (ibid.). Harvey (1989b, p. 10- 
11), moreover, indicates that ‘urban entrepreneurialism implies some level of inter­
competition’, and ‘the task of urban governance is to lure highly mobile and flexible 
production, financial and consumption flows into its space’ as a prerequisite of this 
inter-competition. The organization of Olympic Games and all related activities, such 
as the provision of land, buildings and infrastructure required, can be viewed as part 
of the urban entrepreneurialism and city marketing strategies.
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On the other hand, the role of national governments in urban policy area tends to 
change in formal nature, and their relationships with local governments are more 
contractual than hierarchical. Some scholars argue that ‘local governments acquire a 
revitalised political role through the structural crisis of areas of authority and power 
that highly affects nation states in the global system’ (Boija and Castells, 1997, p.5).
Many countries in the world are now facing intense change in the field of governance 
and undertaking extensive state reform, including decentralisation in state structure 
and functions, government and civil service reorganisation, and transitional steps to 
democratisation. There is an increased emphasis on the need to address local 
government more specifically aiming at more effective and efficient government in 
terms of development performance, streamlining public finances and ensuring 
transparency and accountability of actions. This reform process, initiated for the most 
part by national governments, is changing the nature of local administration and 
urban policy in cities.
On the other hand, since local government is the level of government which is closest 
to the people and the agent of social change, it has an important role in the 
development of communities. According to Boija and Castells (1997, p.3-4):
‘Local governments have two important advantages over their national 
guardians. For one thing, they enjoy greater representativeness and legitimacy 
with regard to those they represent: they are institutional agents for social and 
cultural integration in territorial communities. For another, they have much 
more flexibility, adaptability and room for manoeuvre in a world of cross­
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linked flows, changing demand and supply, and decentralised, interactive 
technological systems’4.
With the rise of the global market economy at the end of the Cold War, almost all 
nation states in the world have moved towards the establishment of responsible and 
participatory municipal governments. Political changes during the past decade have 
in addition spurred people’s interest in democratic ideals of freedom and human 
rights, placing increased pressure on governments to give up elements of decision­
making power to bodies that can more closely represent the needs and wants of 
citizens. Therefore, restructuring and strengthening local administrations have 
become priorities for nation states in order to provide efficient and sustainable 
development since the end of the 20th century.
A number of forces at local level have also directed attention to the importance of 
local government. These include the rapid growth in world cities, urban poverty, 
social and ethnic isolation and other social costs of structural adjustment, and the 
incapacities of local governments to meet the demand for basic infrastructure. These 
problems and local service deficiencies have actually helped to focus attention on the 
need to strengthen local government.
There is now increased pressure on local governments to provide a high standard of 
services, efficiencies and quality of life in the cities, and in this way to attract and 
retain multinational and trans-national corporations and their investments. Local 
governments are faced with increased competition for basic services to meet the
4 See Boija and Castells (1997) for more details.
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needs of the general population and the poor, versus investment in those specialised 
services which initially are of use only to more sophisticated international business 
interests.
As well as increasing urbanisation and the need for development, sustainability 
requires urgent solutions for urban problems. Municipalities are vital organisations in 
overcoming problems faced in preserving the quality of life, stimulating the local 
economy and reducing urban poverty. Deterioration of infrastructure often affects 
private investment flows, job creation and productivity. Local economies are thus 
largely dependent on adequate infrastructure and efficient municipal services if they 
are to remain competitive.
Municipalities, furthermore, have become increasingly skilled in such diverse areas 
as urban planning, waste management, transportation and public finance 
management at local level. In addition to everyday local affairs, they are often also 
the first level of government with responsibility to their citizens for quality of life 
and protection of the environment. Effective co-operation between local authorities 
and municipalities also leads to their greater empowerment as they aim to achieve a 
better standard of living for everybody.
On the other hand, local government has usually lacked both political and financial 
power within highly centralised state structures, which has been common in many 
developed and most of the developing countries until recently. Local governments 
have mostly been dependent, in administrative and financial terms, on their nation 
states, and they have had less power and fewer resources than their national superiors
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for controlling global economic and political agents. When we think about increasing 
urban problems and the present impoverishment of city residents, we all agree that 
local government can no longer remain as the neglected partner in this 
intergovernmental relationship. For these reasons, the general trend and political 
pressure toward decentralization of administrative processes and political decision­
making is continuing to grow, and individual countries have reacted in different ways 
to this trend.
In summary, the local aspects of urban global change, including rapid urbanisation, 
increased urban poverty, inequalities and conflicts, together with the incapacities of 
local government to meet the demand for basic infrastructure and the emergence of a 
strong set of actors and local civil organisations in society, have all helped to focus 
attention on the importance of local government. Because local government is closer 
to the people and is a kind of training ground for democracy, the emergence of local 
government is an important issue in the democratisation movement for countries in 
the new era.
Taken altogether, the convergence of these global, national and local aspects serves 
to focus and heighten attention on the local level, which is the ignored branch of 
government especially in the developing world. Highly centralised states have been 
the norm in most of the countries, and local governments have usually been the weak 
side in the relationship between local and central government. But with globalisation, 
cities all over the world have gained greater importance and became more 
competitive. This forces central government to reorganise the role of local
23
government and to make municipalities stronger both financially and 
administratively.
In the light of these arguments, this thesis intends to find out how globalisation has 
affected and is continuing to affect the role of the territorial state, and what kind of 
impact globalisation has had on local government in the determination of the urban 
policy framework with reference to the Turkish example.
1.3 General Objectives of the Thesis
Many countries in the world have undergone similar types of economic and political 
transformation in the last two decades, as we have argued so far, and this has been 
part of a more global process of restructuring in the world economy. Countries have 
differed in terms of the manner in which economic programmes have been 
implemented and the degree of success achieved in objective economic and political 
indicators. The economic globalisation experiment of Turkey is also not unique, and 
it resembles various experiments practiced in developing world. Since 1980, a 
profound shift in policy occurred in Turkey concerning the role of the state in 
economic affairs under the conditions of intensifying globalisation. The new 
economic strategy aimed at decreasing both the scale of public sector activity as well 
as the degree of state intervention in the operation of the market together with 
parallel developments in the world. The orthodox policies of the IMF have been 
heavily applied as part of the economic restructuring and liberalization process.
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The Turkish experiment with liberalization and structural adjustment in the period 
following the military coup of 1980 can be seen as relatively successful in terms of 
opening up the economy. Some thinkers believe that ‘the coup ushered in a regime 
which was not of the earlier type of bureaucratic authoritarian military rule, 
characterized by a more efficient and greater state involvement in the 
industrialization effort’ (Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.40).
Turkey's political economy in the 1980s, however, displayed a fundamental paradox. 
A series of measures in the direction of liberalising the economy, especially in the 
context of the post-1983 period, was accompanied by an ambitious growth strategy 
based on expansion of the public sector. Consequently, the projected retreat of the 
state did not materialise in the Turkish case, although a decisive shift occurred in the 
type of state intervention, and a considerable reduction in the government's 
involvement in the process of market economy. ‘Instead of a retreat of the state, we 
observe a significant re-organisation, as well as further centralisation of the state 
apparatus itself as compared with the previous pattern’ (Onis, 1991).
As a result, the Turkish economy could neither establish macroeconomic balances 
nor retain stability in the last two decades. In addition, the liberalisation process in 
the 1980s and 1990s has been widely criticised as not being a product of Turkey’s 
own social, political and economic dynamics (Berksoy, 2000; Toprak, 1996 and 
Onis, 1997). According to Berksoy, ‘the liberalisation process in the 1980s 
symbolises a sudden and sharp turn rather than a progression of the Turkish system, 
and this model looks like a copy of the prescriptions of capitalism prepared for its 
crisis in the 1970s, which does not contain any characteristics of the Turkish system’
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(2000). In the light of these criticisms, one of my main aims in this thesis is to 
examine the political and economic characteristics of the Turkish globalisation 
process. This will assist in exhibiting the changing role of the state and city in the 
new era.
On the other hand, while the influences of global economic trends on restructuring 
the urban economy and repositioning the city in the global economy have been 
extensively studied, the changing relationship between government levels with 
respect to urban policies, or the relationship between the reorganisation of the state 
and changes in urban policies, have hardly been investigated. The changing 
relationship in authority between different levels of government, and its effect on 
urban policies in the new era, is the second examination area in this study. The 
political effects of economic globalisation on the nation-state have changed the 
nature of the relations between central government and local governments in the last 
two decades. The main question of this research study will be to establish to what 
extent the economic and political globalisation process has affected the state and its 
sub-levels, and how this process has changed the way in which urban policies are 
implemented by these various levels o f government in Turkey.
The first focus will be on the political aspects of global economic change, which 
include the contradiction between the increasing importance of global cities and 
changing role of nation states and national governments. ‘The accelerated, globally 
moving flows are said to represent processes of deterritorialisation through which 
social relations are being increasingly disembedded from territories on sub-global 
geographical scales’ (Brenner, 1999, p.431). The existence of particular locations
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with a prominent orientation to the world market today raises a question about their 
connection with the nation states to which they belong. This is especially valid for 
world cities where the dominant economic sectors are oriented to the global market.
The principal hypothesis in this work is that the globalisation process has brought 
two parallel outcomes for nation states. One of these is the increasing importance of 
world cities vis-a-vis their nation states, as the engines of national and international 
economies. This first outcome is mostly related to the economic aspects of 
globalisation. Secondly, as a political aspect of globalisation, it will be argued that 
there is also an important transformation in the governing relationship between 
different levels of government, and the nation-state is transferring some authority to 
the local level. These two parallel outcomes are especially associated with the 
changing role of the state in the global era, as a result of ‘the reterritorialisation of 
forms of territorial organisation such as cities and states, which must be viewed as an 
essential phase of the current round of globalisation’ (Brenner, 1999, p.432). The 
purpose of the thesis, at this point, is to convey to readers a sense of the simultaneous 
trends in globalisation and decentralisation and especially to demonstrate the 
changing role of sub-national or local governments.
The second hypothesis related to the first one is that there is a clear change in the 
nature of urban policies. Increasing urban competition as a result of the globalisation 
process and the reconfiguration of the nation-state in the new global era have 
together brought a transformation in urban governance in the direction of the 
entrepreneurial approach. Harvey (1989b, p.4) emphasises that ‘urban governments 
have to be much more innovative and entrepreneurial, willing to explore all kinds of
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avenues through which to alleviate their distressed condition and thereby secure a 
better future for their populations’. According to Harvey (1989b, p.5), since ‘the city 
is the relevant unit for understanding the creation of the wealth of nations, the shift 
from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism could have far reaching 
implications for future growth prospects’5.
Central and local governments have started to use this new entrepreneurial approach 
as a tool in order to perform or practice their new roles in the governing relationship 
and to compete at global and national levels. This switch to entrepreneurialism in 
urban governance, in some cases, has helped the local government to maintain 
considerable autonomy of local action. In this transformation of urban governance, 
national governments have also had some important responsibilities in maintaining 
the balance among different levels of governance. However, in some other cases, 
central governments have directly intervened in the process and kept all the 
responsibilities and resources, bypassing local governments and ignoring the other 
local actors.
Within this general framework, looking into the Turkish case, and especially that of 
Istanbul, could give important clues about changing central and local government 
relations with respect to urban policies under the impact of globalisation. The field 
study has therefore been conducted in the city of Istanbul, which is the greatest 
metropolis of Turkey and one of the great cities in the world. The city has been 
rapidly transforming in recent years. This transformation has its roots in the historical 
and cultural dominance of Istanbul over the rest of the country. Throughout Ottoman
5 See Harvey (1989b) for a detailed study on the shift to urban entrepreneurialism.
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and Turkish history, Istanbul’s economic, cultural and societal leadership has had an 
extensive impact on the whole country. However, the recent transformation has 
partly stemmed from globalisation tendencies, which influence developing countries 
as well as the most developed ones.
In this study, I intend to analyse various aspects of this transformation process to 
bring about an understanding of the authority relationship between central 
government in Ankara and the local government in Istanbul. I will mostly take the 
Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul as the representative of local government 
because it is the more powerful local government body when compared to the other 
that is the Governorship. Moreover, although Turkish urban policy has never been 
welfare-oriented, market and outward orientation has never been so dominant. Urban 
policy issues, in relation to this, appear to assist with integration into the world 
economy and to make Istanbul more attractive for foreign capital.
Under these circumstances, this study aims to explore how some special outward- 
oriented urban polices in Istanbul are being shaped under the effect of the changing 
authority relationship between the central and local government, parallel to the 
global transformation process. While the urban policy example which encourages 
new financial and business centre development in the western part of the city, along 
the ‘Levent-Maslak axis’, constitutes my first case study, the routine applications of 
consecutive governments to compete for hosting the Olympic Games in Istanbul as a 
constant urban strategy will be examined in the second case study.
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1.4 The Structure of the Thesis
This research study consists of nine chapters. After this introductory chapter, 
contemporary discussions about the globalisation issue will be examined by dividing 
the globalisation discourse into three broad schools of thought: hyperglobalizers, 
sceptics and transformationalists. In the first half of the second chapter, the economic 
and political aspects of globalisation will be taken under scrutiny. The second half 
will try to address the effects of the globalisation process on cities and the 
transformation in urban governance.
The third chapter will concentrate on the state, and examine how the nation state has 
changed under the intensifying globalisation process. The regulationist approach will 
be used in explaining the changing role of the state, and by using the regulation 
theory, we will try to conceptualize how national-scale regulation entailed qualitative 
changes across time and space. In the subsequent part of the chapter, the effects of 
globalisation on local government will be discussed. In general, I will first explore 
the relationship between globalisation and the changing role of the nation state as a 
response to the globalisation process, and then investigate the transformation of 
urban policies implemented by the central and local governments in the new era.
Central governments in both the developed and developing world, operating under 
structural adjustment programmes and suffering serious debt problems, have 
generally examined ways to decentralise some of their responsibilities to the local 
level. Together with the increasing importance of cities as a result of the 
globalisation process, decentralisation was seen as an effective tool for good and
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efficient municipal management by national governments. Some problems, however, 
have been identified resulting from early decentralisation efforts. For example, while 
authority to deliver services is often transferred from central to local levels of 
government, the financial revenues are generally not. Intergovernmental transfers are 
unreliable, powers to raise revenues locally are not in place and, in general, financial 
autonomy to act on the newly acquired local functions remains weak. The lessons 
from past experience are directing increased attention to ways of strengthening local 
government in order to improve the success rate of decentralisation efforts. Chapter 
Three will therefore include the decentralisation of governmental processes in the 
context of intergovernmental relations, which provides opportunities for promoting 
local actions in the global environment.
The following sections of the third chapter concentrate on changes in urban politics 
and urban regime theory. I will argue that there is a change in the nature of urban 
governance and management in the global era, and urban policies are being highly 
affected by this global transformation. The so-called ‘new urban entrepreneurialism 
mostly relying on the public-private partnership’6 is generally viewed as an 
alternative urban policy tool in finding solutions for those contemporary urban 
problems. On the other hand, urban regime theory will look at the nature of state 
regulation at sub-national levels, examining the existence of informal arrangements 
between public bodies and private interests in order to be able to make and carry out 
governing decisions.
6 Harvey (1989b, p.7-9).
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Starting from the fourth chapter, my attention will turn to Turkey, and I will 
investigate the effects of globalisation on the Turkish state and explore central-local 
relations with respect to urban policies in relation to the ‘restructuration’ process of 
the state. In the fourth chapter, I will firstly focus on the modernisation process in 
Turkey. Then my attention will switch to the economic and political aspects of the 
debate, and I will examine the way in which the nation state has been affected by the 
increasing globalisation process in Turkey. Globalisation and the limitless capital 
movement in the world seem to threaten the concept of the nation-state. In relation to 
this, the idea of “national development” seems old-fashioned. I will investigate 
whether the nation-state is changing or not, and if it is changing, what kind of 
strategies the nation-state applies today. The decentralisation efforts in the 1980s, 
administrative and financial changes together with legislative innovations, will also 
come under scrutiny in this section of the chapter.
Nearly 75 per cent of the population of Turkey today lives within municipality 
borders. Economic activities mostly take place in urban areas. Today's municipalities 
have some political power as well. They are competing with the central government 
for the share of authority and government. Together with the internal dynamics of 
Turkey, which have given strength to the municipality movement, international and 
global developments also force the central government in Ankara to take into 
consideration cities and urban policies more carefully.
Changes in the world political arena also affect political understanding in countries 
and bring about debate on governing models. For example, 'the Europe Local 
Administrations Subsidiarity Condition' agreement, which Turkey has already
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signed, is a result of this tendency to find new models. Turkey has signed this 
agreement despite there being limitations arising from its constitution. It is almost 
impossible to continue with a rigid centralised government model today. 
International relations and agreements constrain central governments more and more. 
Turkey is looking for a rational way appropriate to its structure. When we consider 
that the current local administrations law in Turkey has been is in force since the 
1930s without any change, the transfer of responsibilities from central government to 
local government and administrative reform reorganising local and central 
government relations is a necessity. This is also very important for solving increasing 
urban problems and serving the needs of rapidly growing cities. That is why the 
national government and parliament in Turkey has often sought to implement a new 
and more contemporary local administrative and municipal legislation since the 
1980s.
However, from the civil actors’ point of view, the new local administrations law 
passed by in parliament in July 2004 still seems insufficient and needs to be 
improved. This reform lacks the participation of the actors in society. It merely gives 
a limited right to various professional organisations to explain their views in the local 
parliament. For civil organisations, it is more important to be able to direct the 
activities of local administrations rather than just explaining their thoughts. Within 
this framework, civil organisations want to make a contribution to the related 
decisions and policies of local governments and municipalities. In the fourth chapter, 
we will look into this new legislation in order to understand the state’s restructuration 
process in the new era.
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In Chapter Five, the focus will be on Istanbul, and I will examine how the economic 
globalisation process has affected the city. Decisions concerning economic activities 
today are not taken in administrative capitals but in the world or global cities which 
direct international capital. As a result of these developments in the world economic 
system, a hierarchy of cities has been created on a world level. Under these 
conditions, Istanbul, with its long history, great cultural inheritance and relatively 
strong economic structure, is a candidate for Turkey to find its place in this world 
city hierarchy. After examining economical aspects of the globalisation process in 
Istanbul, my concentration will turn to the political stage and I will investigate 
changing local politics in the city regarding some of the new metropolitan planning 
strategies.
Chapter Six will focus on the planning process in Istanbul. I will firstly look into the 
history of planning in the city, starting from late Ottoman times, continuing with the 
new Republic, and reaching the present day. Following that I am going to look at 
most recent master plans for the Metropolitan area of Istanbul. I will try to find out 
how urban policies are being shaped under the conditions of globalisation, what roles 
different actors play in producing urban policies, and how the national government in 
Ankara affects this decision-making process in Istanbul.
The seventh chapter will concentrate on the first of two specific urban strategies 
analysed in this study. This first strategy has been implemented in order to encourage 
the participation of Istanbul in globalisation. The city of Istanbul, as a result of 
transformations in the world order, has now more responsibilities in both establishing 
relations with international markets and taking the leadership for the economic
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development of Turkey. The national government, on the other hand, takes an 
interest in urban policies in order to raise cities up to the leading world cities’ level 
by improving infrastructure and thereby improving the living conditions of the 
citizens.
The first strategy that I will explore in Chapter Seven is the encouragement of a new 
international financial centre development in the so-called ‘Levent-Maslak axis’ 
located in the western part of Istanbul. This case study will help us to understand 
whether this is a planned strategy used by local and central decision-makers to help 
the city to reach global city status, or just another example of urban policy which 
serves the interests of capitalist speculators who are accountable to no one and have 
no interest in planning policies or adhering to regulations.
Chapter Eight, on the other hand, examines the repeated bids by central government 
to bring organisation of the Olympic Games to Istanbul. The Olympic Games today 
are not only a major sporting event but also a very useful urban tool for city 
governments to promote and market themselves in an attempt to attract inward 
investment and generate a considerable amount of economic multiplier effects. I will 
explore the power relationship between the actors behind this outward oriented urban 
strategy for Istanbul.
Finally, the last chapter will briefly address general conclusions reached at the end of 
the discussions in different chapters of the thesis.
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1.5 Research Methodology
The aims and objectives of this research have brought, in particular, national and 
local policy makers, bureaucrats and civil society members to the centre of the study. 
Ideas and thoughts behind government policies and behaviour have been brought 
under scrutiny in the field research of this study. Therefore, local and central 
government organisations, policy makers and officials in Istanbul have been the 
target groups in the field research. However, I believed that room should be made for 
the people who are being affected by these urban policies. For that reason, the field 
research in this study also includes interviews with civil society and professional 
organisations reflecting the opinions of the general public.
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods have been used in this study. 
There were three stages in the realisation of the field study part of the research. First 
of all, I examined quantitative data and statistics from written official documents and 
reports published by various central and local government organisations. Numerical 
and statistical information such as local governments' share of the GDP, gross 
domestic product and its national share in the metropolitan area of Istanbul, rates of 
annual growth of the sectoral GDP in Turkey and Istanbul, and also detailed statistics 
about the Olympic Games organisation project have been analysed using these 
documents and reports.
Secondly, using a variety of media sources including web sites of daily newspapers 
and magazines, and governmental, non-governmental and business organisations, an 
extensive dossier of Istanbul including news and data has been constructed. This file
36
contains most of the news, short reports and information about Istanbul published in 
the recent past. Some of this collected information is important in reflecting public 
opinion in Istanbul, as we will see in the case study of the Olympic Games 
organization project. Others, however, actually helped me to get some idea about the 
possible outcomes of urban policy and projects, as in the case study of high-rise 
developments in Levent-Maslak axis.
Thirdly, one of the most widely used qualitative research methods, interviewing, was 
frequently used in the fieldwork. Although there are infinite varieties of the 
interview, its basic purpose generally is to collect information. Richardson et al 
emphasises that the interview is the only feasible method and one of the most 
effective ones for acquiring certain kinds of information (1965, p.8). According to 
Robson (1993, p.229), moreover, ‘face-to-face interviews offer the possibility of 
modifying one’s line of enquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating 
underlying motives, and this is the main characteristic which differentiates it from 
other kinds of questionnaires’.
Richardson et al (1965, p.8), in addition, mentions that ‘the use of the interview must 
be based, as well, on an objective assessment of the other methods that might be 
used’. They say that ‘different methods are often used in the same study, either 
concurrently or in sequence, to verify or to supplement the information gathered by
n
any one of them or for the peculiar advantages of each at various stages’ .
7 Richardson et al. (1965) for the comparative advantages o f different methods.
37
There are various reasons for choosing the interview technique in this research 
project. First, it was the most suitable data collection tool for the type of information 
I needed to use in my research area. Since I primarily interest in the opinions, 
attitudes and future expectations of people, bureaucrats or politicians, interviewing 
seemed the most appropriate information-gathering method. It is a very commonly- 
used approach for research purposes, and also appears to be a quite uncomplicated 
and practical method of gathering data.
I believed that a flexible type of interview would be more suitable in my area of 
research because of the type of data that I had planned to collect. In this way, I could 
easily consolidate the findings from the interviews into the text. A structured type of 
interview and its rigid format could have created some difficulties while collecting 
information about people’s thoughts and expectations. According to Robson, 
‘although the lack of standardisation that it implies inevitably raises concerns about 
reliability, interviews have the potential of providing rich and highly illuminating 
material’ (1993, p.229). With these considerations, I have preferred to use the semi­
structured interview method when I was doing interviews with local politicians, 
bureaucrats, officials and professionals because of its relative advantage over other 
types.
On the other hand, one of the main problems in my area of research was to create a 
suitable and adequate time period for interviews. Since interviewing is a time 
consuming activity, and potential interviewees were politicians and bureaucrats in 
my research area, it was very important and sometimes quite difficult to arrange the 
timing and the length of sessions.
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Another important problem area was to obtain productive cooperation with the 
interviewees. It has sometimes been very difficult and tricky for me as an interviewer 
to get the information that I really needed. Politicians, policy makers and bureaucrats 
in central government organisations and municipalities generally preferred to give 
information which was politically more correct for themselves, or more ‘secure’ and 
free of any personal risk to their position. In this kind of a situation, using various 
interviewing tactics such as changing the manner of asking questions, or asking the 
same kind of information using multiple questions were very useful.
Although there are always difficulties in both interviewing and obtaining official 
documents to take information of high quality, I believe that my case studies have 
been very helpful in terms of gaining valuable data, and both sides, myself and the 
interviewees mutually benefited from the interviews we conducted.
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Chapter Two
Globalisation, Global Cities and Urban Governance
2.1 Introduction
A dominant theme in many social science texts over the last two decades has been 
the issue of globalisation. In recent years, there have been many publications 
mentioning the economic, social, political and cultural effects of globalisation and 
the new world order on different geographical scales. This is reflected directly in the 
literature on global cities, and on the globalisation of finance and investment. The 
concept of globalisation also comes out with some other issues such as the 
emergence of trans-national regulatory frameworks, the hollowing out of the nation­
state, development of the new entrepreneurial city and the rise of new urban policies.
There are many different kinds of views to describe the globalisation process and the 
changes in the new world order. Globalisation has today been a theme for serious 
debate in both social and political science literature, and my main concern in this 
thesis is to explore the effects of globalisation on the territorial organization such as 
the state and the city in particular. I will start the discussion by giving a very brief 
summary about this broad globalisation issue in this first chapter. My major interest, 
however, is not to question the validity and accuracy of many strong claims made 
about globalisation. My aim in this chapter is to show that the globalisation is a 
complex process and contains considerable variety of opinions. Many different
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aspects of globalisation can be highlighted. But my focus will be on the economic 
and political dimension of the debate at the beginning.
The chapter consists of four parts. In the first part, I will try to present contemporary 
discussions about globalisation by benefiting from Held and his fellows’ famous 
classification which divides the thinkers on globalisation into three broad schools of 
thought: hyper globalize™, sceptics and transformationalists (Held et al., 1999, p.2). 
In the following part of the chapter, I will address the relationship between the 
nation-state and globalisation by using the same framework in the first part. Then I 
will briefly examine the theory of the global/world city, and concentrate on the 
changes in the world cities under the effects of globalisation. Subsequently, the last 
part of Chapter Two will focus on the changing feature of the city government in the 
new era. And finally, in conclusion, I will try to summarise some important points 
which can be caught from the broad globalisation debate, and this will hopefully 
assist to build up the theoretical framework of this study.
2.2 What does the term ‘globalisation’ comprise?
Definitions of globalisation are particularly difficult to hold down and, where 
explicit, they vary considerably in their form. There is a wide variety of views in the 
academic literature in using the term ‘globalisation’. As Amin suggests, ‘the more 
we read about globalisation, the less clear we seem to be about what it means and 
what it implies’ (1997, p.l). A highly common point in much of this literature,
41
however, is the relationship between recent economic change and the regulatory 
power of the inter-state system.
As one of the most important contributors to the globalisation debate, Giddens 
defines globalisation ‘as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa’ (1990, p.64). For Robertson the term refers ‘both to 
the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as 
a whole’ (1992, p.8). John Gray (1998, p.55), moreover, takes globalisation as 'the 
world-wide spread of modem technologies of industrial production and 
communication of all kinds across frontiers-in trade, capital, production and 
information'. According to Albrow (1996, p.89), globalisation can be seen as ‘the 
most significant development and theme in contemporary life and social theory to 
emerge since the collapse of Marxist systems’. However, I think that one of the most 
precise definitions about globalisation has been given by the political theorist David 
Held and his colleagues. They define globalisation as:
‘a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the 
spatial organization of social relations and transactions -  assessed in terms of 
their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact -  generating transcontinental or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of 
power’ (Held, et al. 1999, p. 16).
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The word globalisation actually is a relatively new in the literature. In one of his 
public lecture series1, Giddens (1999a, p.6) has argued that ‘the history of the word 
globalisation is itself very interesting, and up to about fifteen years ago you hardly 
find this word in the academic literature and you cannot find much reference to it 
certainly in the popular press, up to very little time ago’. However, ‘globalisation has 
been one of the most important debates discussed in social sciences in the last two 
decades, and it has nowadays become a very widely used term not only among 
academics, but also in politics, business environment and even daily life’ (ibid.).
According to Held and his fellows (1999, p.2), ‘there are three different views on the 
notion of globalisation and the reality underlying it’. The globalisation literature can 
also be divided into three main parts according to these separated opinions. One of 
these views has generally been called as the views of the globalisation sceptics (Held 
et al., 1999, p.2; Giddens, 1999a, p.7 and Gray, 1998). Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson can be given as the principal names for the globalisation sceptics. They 
mainly argue that ‘the word of globalisation actually has some ideological meanings 
and it is quite difficult to see its practical outcome in the real life’, and also state that 
‘the world in which we live is not in fact very distinctively different from before’ 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p.2-3, and also Giddens, 1999a, p.7 and Dicken, 2003,
p.10-11).
The globalisation sceptics argue that ‘if you look at statistics on the global economy, 
the level of concentration in the global economy today is not much greater than it 
was thirty or more years ago, and even if you compare the global economy now with
1 The Director’s Lectures: Politics after Socialism, given by Anthony Giddens, on the 20*
January1999, and a printed copy of the lecture has been retrieved from
a hundred years ago, it looks rather similar’ (Giddens, 1999a, p.8). For them, ‘the 
late twentieth century is at most a reversion to the late nineteenth century, and it is 
not something different from what has been known before’ (ibid., and Hirst and 
Thompson, 1996, p.2). David Harvey (1996, p.420) also advocates this argument, 
and says that ‘the process of globalisation is not new, and even much before the 
nineteenth century, the globalisation of capitalism was well under way in part 
through the production of a network of urban places as Marx and Engels emphasized 
the point in The Communist Manifesto\
Giddens (1999a, p.8) argues that ‘according to the sceptics, all the talk about 
globalisation has been invented by right-wing ideologists, who want to attack the 
welfare state, to cut down on funding for welfare systems, and to emphasise 
globalisation as a way of doing this’. The sceptics also argue that ‘globalisation is 
essentially a myth which conceals the reality of an international economy 
increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs in which national 
governments remain very powerful’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).
Secondly, there is a quite different school of thought which David Held and his 
colleagues have called as the hyperglobalizers (Held et al., 1999, p.3 and also 
Giddens, 1999a, p.9). One of the best examples of the hyperglobalizers is the 
Japanese thinker, Kenichi Ohmae . They have quite contrary views to the 
globalisation sceptics, and Thomley (1999, p.2) emphasises that ‘their views have 
been particularly strong in the business and management literature’.
http://www.polity.co.uk/giddens/pdfs.
2 See Ohmae, K. 1995, The End o f the Nation State: The Rise ofRegional Economies, p.5-16.
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For the hyperglobalizers, ‘globalization defines a new era in which traditional nation­
states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy' 
(Ohmae, 1995, p. 5, cited in Held et al., 1999, p.3). This globalization view generally 
favours the neo-liberal economic logic, and according to them, people everywhere 
are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace in the new era. 
‘They also argue that ‘economic globalisation is bringing about a “denationalisation” 
of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of production, 
trade and finance’ (Held et al., 1999, p.3). To them, ‘the declining authority of states 
is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, 
and to local and regional bodies’ (Strange, 1996, p.4, cited in Held et al., 1999, p.3).
Held, who invented the hyperglobalizers terminology, and his fellows emphasise that 
‘many hyperglobalizers share a conviction that economic globalization is 
constructing new forms of social organization that are supplanting, or that will 
eventually supplant, traditional nation-states as the primary economic and political 
units of world society’ (Held et al. 1999, p.3).
The third school of thought on the globalisation issue can actually be seen as a 
medial group between the sceptics and the hyperglobalizers. For Held et al. (1999, 
p.2-7), this group of thought can be called as the transformationalists, and it includes 
some thinkers like Giddens, Rosenau and Castells. The transformationalists argue 
that ‘contemporary patterns of globalization are conceived as historically 
unprecedented such that governments and societies across the globe are experiencing 
a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly 
uncertain world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international
45
and domestic, external and internal affairs’ (Rosenau, 1990 and 1997; Sassen, 1996; 
Giddens, 1990, cited in Held et al., 1999, p.2-7). For Rosenau, the growth of 
“intermestic” affairs define a “new frontier”, the expanding political, economic and 
social space in which the fate of societies and communities is decided’ (1997, p.4-5, 
cited in Held et al., 1999).
According to the defenders of this view, ‘globalisation is a central driving force 
behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modem 
societies and the new world order’ (Giddens, 1990 and Castells, 1996). Castells 
argues that;
‘toward the end of the second millennium, several events of historical 
significance have transformed the social landscape of human life. A 
technological revolution, centred around information technologies, is 
reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material basis of society. Economies 
throughout the world have become globally interdependent, introducing a 
new form of relationship between economy, state, and society, in a system of 
variable geometry’ (1996, p.l).
The transformationalists and the hyperglobalizers in general share the idea that we 
are living in an era in which there is a very important change, and today's radical 
globalisation is quite different than the developments in previous times. This 
differentiates them from the sceptics. On the other hand, ‘both the hyperglobalizers 
and the sceptics try to identify globalisation as merely an economic phenomenon’ 
(Giddens, 1999a, p. 13). They both focus on the international economy and the world 
economic system. The primary concern for these two groups of thought is the
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economic aspects of globalisation and governance in terms of its economic 
necessities and possibilities, and global capitalism is the common point for most of 
the arguments explaining the changes in the world economic system.
In contrast to both hyperglobalizers and sceptics, globalisation is not only an 
economic phenomenon, but it also has social, cultural, technological and political 
aspects. ‘The greater part of social life is, nowadays, determined by global processes, 
in which national cultures, economies and borders are dissolving’ (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1996, p.l). According to Held:
‘Globalisation implies at least two distinct phenomena: First, it suggests that 
many chains of political, economic and social activity are becoming 
worldwide in scope. And, secondly, it suggests that there has been an 
intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and 
between states and societies. What is new about the modem global system is 
the stretching of social relations in and through new dimensions of activity -  
technological, organisational, administrative and legal, among others- and the 
chronic intensification of patterns of interconnectedness mediated by such 
phenomena as modem communications networks and new information 
technology’ (Held, 1995, p.21 and also Chapter 1 in Castells, 1996).
On the other hand, ‘globalisation is a social phenomenon since much of social theory 
is both a product of and an implicit reaction to the globalisation process’ (Robertson, 
1990, p. 15). According to Robertson, ‘as a relatively recent phenomenon, 
globalisation is closely related to modernity and modernisation, as well as to post- 
modernity and post-modernisation’ (ibid., p.20). ‘Globalisation is changing people’s
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everyday lives, because it is just a different thing to live in a world where 
information is instantaneous’ (Giddens, 1999a, p. 13). While Giddens is emphasising 
that ‘globalisation is changing many aspects of people’s lives, including everyday 
life as well as larger structures in the world’ (ibid.), he actually mentions the social 
aspects of globalisation, and according to him, globalisation is about the lives of 
individuals rather than just about the big systems of the world. That is why, for him, 
‘globalisation is also a transformation of everyday life, of the nature of self, of our 
emotions and of how you construct local solidarity, friendships, sexual relationships 
and a relationship between parents and children’ (ibid., p. 15).
Globalisation finally includes some important political aspects since it has important 
effects on the structure of the nation-state apparatus. As Giddens has also 
emphasised, ‘the world nation-state system is in an interesting state of evolution as a 
result of globalising processes, and the nation-state is becoming radically 
transformed’ (1999a, p. 19). There is no doubt that globalisation has some important 
political effects on the nation-state. The state’s role in the new global order has 
considerably changed. In some respects, like national macro-economic management, 
its capacities seem to have weakened considerably. However, the nation-state is still 
a pivotal institution, especially in terms of creating the conditions for effective 
international governance. The focus in the next section will mainly be on the 
changing role of the nation-state under the effects of globalisation.
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2.3 Globalisation and the Nation-State
Since understanding the effects of intensifying globalisation on the nation-state is the 
main concern in this part, my general approach in this section will be similar with the 
discussion of the globalisation debate in the first part of the Chapter. I will again use 
three main groups of arguments looking at the nation-state from the globalisation 
perspective.
The first of these groups of arguments has been called the globalisation sceptics. This 
group generally supports the idea that ‘nation states continue to have some key roles, 
whatever other functions they may gain or lose: they firstly have a significant role to 
play in economic governance at the level of both national and international 
processes’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 170). In this argument, the autonomy and 
decision-making power of the nation-state and the state sovereignty cannot be 
completely diminished by the current economic globalisation or global governance, 
although it is generally accepted that the new globalized economy allows 
transnational companies to run their business without the close state intervention and 
politics.
According to the sceptics, then, ‘while the state’s exclusive control of territory has 
been reduced by international markets and new communication media, it still retains 
one central role that ensures a large measure of territorial control -  the regulation of 
populations’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 171). In addition, ‘the central functions 
of the nation state will become those of providing legitimacy for and ensuring the 
accountability of supra-national and sub-national governance mechanisms’ (ibid.).
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The globalisation sceptics also claim that ‘a world economy with a high and growing 
degree of international trade and investment is not necessarily a globalized economy, 
in the former sense. In it nation states, and forms of international regulation created 
and sustained by nation states, still have a fundamental role in providing governance 
of the economy’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 185).
Hirst and Thompson argue that ‘nation states are still of central significance because 
they are the key practitioners of the art of government as the process of distributing 
power, ordering other governments by giving them shape and legitimacy’, 
emphasising that ‘nation states can do this in a way no other agencies can: they are 
pivots between international agencies and sub-national activities, because they 
provide legitimacy as the exclusive voice of a territorially bounded population’ 
(1996, p. 190).
Moreover, for sceptics, ‘in a system of governance in which international agencies 
and regulatory bodies are already significant and are growing in scope, nation states 
are crucial agencies of representation’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 190), and ‘the 
state as the source and the respecter of binding rules remains central to an 
internationalised economy and society’ (ibid., p. 194).
On the other hand, the status of the nation-state in the global era for the second group 
of thinkers, the hyperglobalizers, is completely different than the globalisation 
sceptics. According to the hyperglobalizers, ‘the rise of the global economy, the 
emergence of institutions of global governance, and the global diffusion and
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hybridization of cultures are interpreted as evidence of a radically new world order, 
an order which prefigures the demise of the nation state’ (Albrow, 1996 and Ohmae, 
1995, cited in Held et al., 1999, p.4). For Horsman and Marshall (1994), ‘the era of 
the nation state is over, and that national level governance is ineffective in the face of 
globalise economic and social processes, and changes in the structure of the 
international economy, technological advance, and the end of the Cold War together 
force a realignment of the relations among states, their citizens and the international 
economy’.
Ohmae also contends that ‘only two forces matter in the world economy, global 
market forces and transnational companies, and that neither of these is or can be 
subject to effective public governance’, and ‘the global system is governed by the 
logic of market competition, and public policy will be at best secondary, since no 
national governmental agencies (national or otherwise) can match the scale of world 
market forces’ (Ohmae, 1990, cited in Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 185).
In the hyperglobalist account, according to Held and his colleagues:
‘since the national economy is increasingly a site of transnational and global 
flows, as opposed to the primary objective of national socio-economic 
activity, the authority and legitimacy of the nation state are challenged: 
national governments become increasingly unable either to control what 
transpires within their own borders or to fulfil by themselves the demands of 
their own citizens. Moreover, as institutions of global and regional 
governance acquire a bigger role, the sovereignty and autonomy of the state 
are further eroded’ (1999, p.4-5).
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According to Ohmae (1995, p. 149, cited in Held et al., 1999, p.5), ‘economic and 
political power are becoming effectively denationalised and diffused such that 
nation-states, whatever the claims of national politicians, are increasingly becoming 
“a transitional mode of organization for managing economic affairs’” . In other 
words, the nation-state can only provide those social and public services that 
international capital thinks essential and at the lowest possible cost rather than being 
an effective economic manager.
The third school of thought in the debate on the nation state is the 
transformationalists, as in the globalisation debate. According to transformationalists, 
‘although the nation state is becoming transformed, it is certainly not disappearing’ 
(Giddens, 1999a, p. 19; Gray, 1998 and Castells, 1997, p.307). They believe that 
‘contemporary globalisation is reconstituting or transforming the power, functions 
and authority of national governments’, and in arguing this, ‘the transformationalists 
reject both the hyperglobalizers’ rhetoric of the end of the sovereign nation state and 
the sceptics’ claim that nothing much has changed’ (Held et al., 1999).
‘The argument of the transformationalists is that globalisation is associated not only 
with a new sovereignty regime but also with the emergence of powerful new non­
territorial forms of economic and political organization in the global domain, such as 
multinational corporations, transnational social movements and international 
regulatory agencies’ (Held et al., 1999). For the transformationalists, there is no 
doubt that the interdependence of financial and currency markets and an increasing 
dependence of governments on global capital markets are some of the most
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important characteristics of the new world order. As a result of this, the nation state 
seems to be losing control over fundamental elements of its economic policies. 
Because of the increasing difficulty of government control over the economy, the 
national governments today are financially more and more dependent on global 
capital markets and foreign lending.
Moreover, the transformationalists argue that the globalisation of production and 
investment mainly threatens the welfare state, a key element in the policies of the 
nation state in the past half-century. Castells debates that, ‘we observe the direct 
impact of globalisation and capitalist restructuring on the legitimacy of the state, 
through the partial dismantlement of the welfare state, the disruption of traditional 
productive structures, increasing job instability, extreme social inequality, and the 
link up of valuable segments of economy and society in global networks, while large 
sectors of the population and territory are switched off from the dynamic, globalized 
system’ (1997, p.297).
To most transformationalists, however, although the degree of freedom of 
governments’ economic policy has been dramatically reduced in the 1990s, ‘the 
nation state still has some regulatory capacity and relative control over its subjects’ 
(Castells, 1997, p.254). Castells argues that ‘nation states may retain decision­
making capacity, but, having become part of a network of powers and 
counterpowers, they are powerless by themselves: they are dependent on a broader 
system of enacting authority and influence from multiple sources’ (ibid., p.304-305). 
‘The nation state is increasingly submitted to a more subtle, and more troubling 
competition from sources of power that are undefined, and, sometimes, undefinable.
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These are networks of capital, production, communication, crime, international 
institutions, supranational military apparatuses, non-governmental organizations, 
transnational religions, and public opinion movements. And below the state, there are 
communities, tribes, localities, cults, and gangs. So, while nation-states do continue 
to exist, and they will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, they are, and they 
will increasingly be, nodes o f a broader network ofpower’ (Castells, 1997, p.304).
According to the transformationalists, ‘the model of hyperglobalisation is wrong on 
its argument that sovereign states are marginal institutions. For multinationals, 
sovereign states are not marginal actors in the world economy whose policies are 
easily circumvented, and they are key players whose power is well worth counting’ 
(Gray, 1998). Gray also argues that ‘sovereign states will remain decisive mediating 
structures which multinational corporations compete to control, and this pivotal role 
of them makes non-sense of the claims of hyperglobalists, business Utopians and 
populists who maintain that multinationals have supplanted sovereign states as the 
real rulers of the world’ (ibid.).
In general, the transformationalists argue that ‘globalisation has encouraged a 
spectrum of adjustment strategies and a more activist state rather than bringing about 
the end of the nation state. Accordingly, the power of national governments is not 
necessarily diminished by globalisation, but on the contrary it is being reconstituted 
and restructured in response to the growing complexity of processes of governance in 
a more interconnected world’ (Rosenau, 1997).
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As we have seen in the globalisation literature so far, on the one hand, the power and 
operations of nation-states are changing under the conditions of globalisation. On the 
other hand, globalisation brings some important roles for different forms of territorial 
organisation. In relation to this, issues of globalisation such as capital and 
technological mobility also place tremendous pressure on cities. In the next part, we 
will briefly examine how the globalisation process affects cities with reference to 
‘the world/global city’ theory.
2.4 The effects of globalisation on cities with reference to ‘the world/global city’ 
theory
Since the 1970s, ‘capital has become arguably more mobile, enterprises dispersed 
their components around the globe, and national borders appeared to lose their 
meaning in the realm of economics. In the advanced capitalist countries, 
manufacturing has declined or moved offshore, eclipsed by sophisticated services 
and finance, and the ability of multinational firms to execute their will independent 
of national governments grew’ (White, 1998, p.451-452).
The intensifying globalisation process and changing economic system together with 
the developments in information and telecommunication technologies have redefined 
the roles of cities in the new world order. ‘The city has been rediscovered as the 
powerhouse of the globalized economy, and it has become more important as the key 
creative, control and cultural centres within globalising economic, cultural and social 
dynamics’ (Amin and Graham, 1997).
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‘In recent decades a group of urban researchers have identified various ‘global cities’ 
as key spatial nodes of the world economy, the localised basing points for capital 
accumulation in an age of intensified globalisation’ (Brenner, 1998, p.2). In other 
words, the emerging global system of production, finance, telecommunications, 
culture and politics has become spatially articulated through a network of world 
cities. ‘Since the initial formulation of the ‘world city hypothesis’ in the early 1980s 
by Cohen (1981) and Friedmann and Wolf (1982), world city theory has been 
consolidated as a major framework for critical research on contemporary cities and 
on the changing spatial organisation of the world economy’ (Knox and Taylor, 1995, 
cited in Brenner, 1998, p.2).
For global/world city theorists, the changing structure of the international economy 
has led to the current changes in the geography and composition of the world 
economy, and as a result of this process, today we see the rediscovery of urban 
centrality. ‘The changes in the geography and composition of the world economy 
have actually created a dual structure in economic activity: while economic activities 
are spatially dispersed, they have a globally integrated organisation and structure as 
well’ (Sassen, 1991, p.3). ‘One of the main economic outcomes is that increased 
globalisation along with continued concentration in economic control has given a key 
role to major cities in the management and control of the global network’ (ibid.).
According to Sassen, ‘the more globalized the economy becomes means the higher 
the agglomeration of central functions in a relatively few sites, that is, the global 
cities’ (1991, p.5). Sassen describes the main functions of global cities: ‘first, as
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highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy; 
second, as key locations for finance and for specialized service firms, which have 
replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors; third, as sites of production, 
including the production of innovations, in these leading industries; and fourth, as 
markets for the products and innovations produced’ (ibid., p.3-4). Friedmann, 
however, has five criteria to define the global city: ‘that the global city is an 
organizing node of a global economic system; that ‘global’ does not mean it 
encompasses the entire world; that the global city is an urbanized space of intense 
economic and social interaction; that global cities are arranged hierarchically; and 
that the global city is controlled by a transnational class’ (1995, p.25-26).
The top-level management of the industries and rapidly growing agglomeration of 
finance and advanced services has mostly concentrated in a few leading financial 
centres in major world cities. The world city theory has been deployed extensively in 
studies of the role of major cities such as New York, London and Tokyo as global 
financial centres and headquarters locations for trans-national corporations (Sassen, 
1991 and 1994).
For Lash and Urry, ‘what appears to be new about the ‘global city’ is the rise of a 
new political economy driven by new forms of capital that are transferable across the 
globe, the rise of new classes that appropriate these forms of capital, and the new 
modes through which these classes organize power and engage in politics’ (1994,
p.220-222).
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The global/world city theorists, moreover, have analysed the shift toward a city- 
centred configuration of capitalism with reference to two intertwined politico- 
economic transformations of the last three decades. Firstly, ‘the emergence of a new 
international division of labour resulted in large measure from the massive expansion 
in the role of transnational corporations in the production and exchange of 
commodities on a world scale’ (Dicken, 1998, p.2). Whereas the old international 
division of labour was based upon raw materials production in the periphery and 
industrial manufacturing in the core, the new international division of labour has 
entailed the relocation of manufacturing industries to semi-peripheral and peripheral 
states in search of inexpensive sources of labour power.
In addition to the deindustrialisation of many core industrial cities, this global market 
for production sites has also entailed an increasing spatial concentration of business 
services and other administrative-coordination functions within the predominant 
urban centres of the core and semi-periphery (Brenner, 1998). These upper-tier cities 
have become major nodes of decision making, financial planning and control within 
globally dispersed commodity chains and, therefore, the central basing points for the 
worldwide activities of transnational corporations (Cohen, 1981). This intensified 
urban concentration of global capital flows has been further enabled through the 
development of new informational technologies, closely tied to the agglomeration 
economies of cities, that accelerates communication and coordination on a global 
scale (Castells, 1989).
Second, contemporary processes of the world city formation have also been closely 
related to the growing obsolescence of the technological, institutional and social
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foundations of the Fordist regime of accumulation, grounded upon mass production, 
mass consumption, nationally induced Keynesian demand-management policies and 
redistributive social welfare policies (Aglietta, 1979; Jessop, 1992 and Lipietz, 
1987).
As a result, we see the increasing importance of large metropolises as key command 
and control centres within the interconnected globalising dynamics of financial 
markets, high-level producer services industries, corporate headquarters and other 
associated service industries like telecommunications, business conferences, media, 
design and cultural industries, transport and property developments (Sassen, 1991 
and 1994; Castells, 1989 and Friedmann, 1995).
Since the economic and social composition of cities in the globalisation process is 
considerably changing in this way, we also have to mention the increasing 
responsibilities of local governments in the new era. This causes a different kind of 
pressure on local governments in terms of managing their affairs, of governing cities, 
and also bringing into question the issue of urban governance. Urban governance is 
one that is in constant challenge today, and it will be examined briefly in the 
following section.
2.5 Globalisation, City Competition and Urban Governance
As we have seen in this chapter so far, ‘globalisation takes place in cities, 
particularly large metropolises, and cities embody and reflect globalisation’ (Short
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and Kim, 1999, p.9). In other words, world cities in which globalisation takes place, 
constitute the engines of the rapidly globalising economies. Contemporary urban 
dynamics are the spatial expression of globalisation, while urban changes reshape 
and reform the processes of globalisation.
Global economic and political changes have radical effects in restructuring cities 
around the world. According to Sassen (1995, p.44), ‘the finance and producer 
services complex in each city rests on a growth dynamic that is somewhat 
independent from the broader regional and national economy’. This is an important 
change from the past, when a city was supposed to be deeply connected with its 
hinterland. A major factor underlying urban change is that cities, today, are 
increasingly open to global influences, and more independent from their nation states 
in determining and implementing the urban policy and projects. This is also one of 
the reasons of intensified competition between cities to attract mobile capital and 
rising entrepreneurial urban politics.
The past decade has seen increased competition between cities around the world over 
these mobile investments. According to Gordon, ‘among the forms of competition, 
the most significant involve rivalry within product markets, and that for inward 
investment, the attraction of desirable residents, and contests for funding or events 
from higher levels of government and in each case, competition may be concentrated 
among a few (identifiable) rivals or may involve many, and the field within which it 
occurs may be local, regional, national, continental or global’ (1999, p. 1001). He 
adds that ‘each of these fields has always been involved but, for many key urban 
functions, the likelihood of competition across national borders has been
60
substantially increased by the growth of multinationals, rapid information exchange 
and the liberalisation of trade and capital flows’ (ibid.). According to Harvey, ‘cities 
can compete to become centres of finance capital, of information gathering and 
control, of government decision-making, and competition of this sort calls for a 
certain strategy of infrastructural provision’ (1985, p.217). Harvey also mentions that 
‘efficiency and centrality within a worldwide network of transport and 
communications is vital, and that means heavy public investments in airports, rapid 
transit, communications systems, and the like’ (ibid.).
To sum up, there is a growing global competition among cities for global financial 
activity and investment. Competition between cities accordingly has been intensified 
by the growth of multinational enterprises; by city governments taking on an 
increased role in promoting and marketing themselves to attract inward investment; 
by the emergence of new world-wide economic sectors such as financial and 
producer services; by competition for international institutions to locate within cities; 
and by competition for global spectacles such as major sporting events, cultural 
festivals and trade fairs, which generate considerable amount of economic multiplier 
effects.
In this rising competition, the way for the success of cities is to reshape their image 
with some creative activities, to improve their physical and social infrastructure, and 
as a result of these improvements, to make their business climate attractive for 
transnational capital and foreign investors. Local governments seem to have 
important roles in this new era of global competition. Since the cities are considered 
as the nodal points for command and control functions, production and investment
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activities, the issue of city governance and urban management strategies are even 
more important before. There are a couple of important questions needed to be 
answered at this point: What are the new challenges that cities face as they relate to 
governance? Who are the new actors in governing cities today? And, what kind of 
strategies can the city governments develop under the conditions of intensifying 
globalisation today?
Since the early 1970s, identified by many as the time when post-war Fordism came 
to an end in the West, cities started to experience increasing economic uncertainty 
caused by global, national and regional economic and political restructuring. The 
increasing economic uncertainty faced by cities, and the rising dominance of political 
discourses promoting a belief in the economic and social efficiency of the free 
market and competitiveness, have presented cities with a mix of pressures and 
opportunities (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). Although a few cities, such as New 
York, Paris or London, are large and diverse enough to live through economic 
uncertainty well, many other cities have found it increasingly difficult to maintain 
their competitive position and have actively been seeking new investments and 
industries. Yet uncertainty has also created new opportunities for cities to prosper 
under inter-urban competition, as new places develop and new locations become 
favoured.
On the other hand, the globalisation process in cities brought some pressure on urban 
policy-makers to take responsibility for improving the competitiveness of their city, 
and they started to develop more active entrepreneurial strategies and create new 
institutional structures for urban governance, commonly referred to as ‘urban
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entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989b, p.8). Under these circumstances, city 
governance is one of the key issues for national governments. The main reason for 
governance becoming a key issue in the global era may be that cities are on the one 
hand growing fast, and on the other hand breaking down. While city populations are 
rising at a rapid rate, cities are not being able to absorb this urban population 
increase, and in relation to that, the old systems of governance and the instruments 
that cities have had for long periods, are losing their relevance, and becoming 
obsolete.
Then we see the overwhelming importance of decentralisation, both in developed 
and developing countries in the last two decades. There is a tremendous shift from 
central to local control, and power is increasingly being delegated to local, urban and 
regional governments. The trend towards decentralisation may not necessarily be a 
result of demand from the local government, because it is also coming from the 
resource crunch that many central governments are facing. They are decentralising 
some of their expenditure responsibilities to local governments. Most of the time, 
this is not necessarily being accompanied by a fiscal revolution, but it is simply the 
transfer of expenditure responsibilities, which may be causing a major crisis at the 
local level.
For Castells decentralisation, as a systematic and global phenomenon, is the result of 
‘the growing inability of the nation-state to respond simultaneously to the vast array 
of demands coming from the local level’ (1997, p.271-72). According to him ‘local, 
provincial, and state governments in some developing countries, such as Mexico, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Chile, benefited, in the 1980s and 1990s,
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from decentralization of power and resources, and undertook a number of social and 
economic reforms which have transformed Latin America’s institutional geography’, 
and this ‘created the basis for a new political legitimacy in favour of the local state’ 
(Castells, 1997, p.272-73). ‘In Latin America, the restructuring of public policy to 
overcome the crisis of the 1980s gave new impetus to municipal and state 
governments, whose role had been traditionally overshadowed by dependency on the 
national government, with the important exception of Brazil’ (Castells, 1997, p.272).
Finally, another influential factor in rising importance of the urban governance may 
be the global emphasis on issues such as democratisation, accountability and 
transparency at the local level. There are more pressures for the elected councils at 
the local level, and civil society today has some important controlling role on these 
kinds of issues. Local councils are being asked that, whatever they do, it should be 
transparent, accountable, which means that even though a city might be better 
governed in terms of the provision of services, accountability and transparency, the 
city may rate low.
Local governments have traditionally played a significant role in managing cities 
because they have been responsible for performing four major types of function, 
which relate to ‘public health and safety, public works and public order’ (Mathur, 
1996, p.67). However, the autonomy of municipal governments is still very limited 
today. According to Mathur, ‘the fiscal power of municipalities in the 
intergovernmental distribution of resources is extremely limited and inelastic’ (ibid., 
p.67). This lack of autonomy has always affected, and continues to affect the 
functioning of local government in almost every country. ‘Although city authorities
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have a major stake in city governance, the limits within which they can operate are 
narrow, and that is imposing major constraints on both infrastructure and service 
provision, and the performance of other functions’ (ibid., p.67). On the other hand, in 
the provision of local government functions, most cities derive their powers from the 
centralised legislation and not from a constitutional right to exist and provide urban 
services. This results in a joint occupancy of functions between national and local 
levels. This situation brings into question the issue of city governance and who is 
responsible for determining the future of cities, working with their stake-holders.
On the other hand, to some scholars, ‘under various neo-liberal regimes of central 
government, local government structures and institutions in the global city have been 
radically transformed from democratic and representative into increasingly 
professionalized, marketized, entrepreneurial and managerial forms’ (Ruppert, 2000, 
p.275). He emphasises that ‘the ostensibly new economic significance of global cities 
has not translated into greater political power as state practices and strategies for 
regulating and administering local governments have increased’ (ibid., p.275). 
According to Ruppert, ‘analyses of state-local relations in many countries have 
revealed a relative decline in the powers and authorities of city governments, and 
even the need for democratically elected governments at the local level has been 
questioned in light of the greater central control of local finance and the inability of 
local governments to deal with the impacts of global economic change’ (ibid., 
p.276). Ruppert also underlines that ‘what has changed is the mode of state control, 
which could be described as a change from government to management, or a shift 
from liberal technologies to neo-liberal technologies of government, and as opposed 
to less government, states have supported and advocated neo-liberal approaches
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which represent a shift in the techniques, focus, priorities and rationality of 
government’ (ibid., p.276).
‘Some state practices, such as state control of the local property tax base, reductions 
in state transfers to municipalities, state-enforced municipal restructuring, and the 
fragmentation of local service delivery to numerous non-elected agencies, have also 
weakened local government institutions in the global city’ (Ruppert, 2000, p.276). 
Ruppert believes that ‘these state practices have given rise to local government 
practices which have increased the influence of the private sector in the management 
of the city: entrepreneurial strategies focused on competitive economic development 
leading to greater reliance on private sector funding and cooperation, and market 
strategies focused on the privatization of municipal services and the adoption of 
private sector service delivery and management practices, and these practices 
represent a shift away from the government of the city by the welfarist public sector 
to the management of the city by the entrepreneurial private sector’ (ibid., p.276).
2.6 Conclusion
The most significant development in the world economy during the past few decades 
has been the increasing globalisation of economic activities. Contrary to the 
globalisation sceptics, we live through a global process, in which there are many 
dramatic changes in every comer of the world, and these changes are not just 
economic. According to Giddens, this is ‘not only new, but also in many respects
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revolutionary, and globalization is political, technological and cultural, as well as 
economic’ (1999b, p. 10).
Alongside global economic change, there has been a parallel but distinct set of 
political changes, shifting the reach of political power and the forms of rule. On the 
one hand, the power and operation of national governments are changing. As Held 
(1998, p.26) underlines, ‘a new regime of government and governance is emerging 
which is displacing traditional conceptions of state power as an absolute, indivisible, 
territorially exclusive form of public power’.
The global economy, on the other hand, has definitely not replaced the world of 
nation-states, political power and policies. Far from globalisation leading to “the end 
of the state”, which hyperglobalizers believe, it is stimulating a range of government 
and governance strategies and, in some fundamental respects, a more “activist state” 
(ibid., p.26 and Giddens, 1999). Nations, as Giddens (1998) also mentions, ‘will 
continue to keep, for the foreseeable future, considerable governmental, economic 
and cultural power, over their citizens and in the external arena’. ‘Sovereign states 
will remain decisive mediating structures which multinational corporations compete 
to control, and even the protective function of states is likely to expand, as citizens 
demand shelter from the anarchy of global capitalism’ (Gray, 1998).
Moreover, in the age of modernity, the city economy came to symbolise the 
powerhouse of capital accumulation. The ‘Fordist’ city, as a locus of mass 
production, mass consumption, social interaction and institutional representation, 
became the growth centre of a national economy (Scott, 1988). It was a centre of
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agglomeration -an integrated and self-reproducing economic system. Today, the city 
economy is a thing of fragments, composed of many parallel sectoral logics with few 
interconnections between them. Thus, the city continues to attract entrepreneurship 
and investment, but no longer constitutes a cohesive local economic system. In the 
case of global cities such as London, New York and Tokyo, it exists as a ‘central 
place’ in global economic networks and connections (Sassen, 1991 and Castells, 
1989). In the case of national cities such as Milan, Paris and Frankfurt it exists as a 
central node in national administrative, financial, commercial and consumption 
networks, but not as the industrial power-house which strengthens these networks. In 
the case of the post-war regional centres of mass production such as Turin, Chicago 
and Birmingham, it exists as a mosaic of de-industrialisation, new inward 
investment, secondary service activities, regional consumerism and provincial 
administration (Amin and Thrift, 1995).
In general, the city economy has become increasingly fractured internally, and 
absorbed into wider networks of global capital accumulation. In parallel with these 
developments in the economy of cities, the contemporary city also looks different 
from its predecessors, as urban theorists and researchers are simultaneously seeking 
to draw attention to the fact that cities are now being managed, organised and 
governed in different ways, leading some to proclaim the emergence of a ‘new urban 
politics’ (Cox and Mair, 1988 and Kirlin and Marshall, 1988). The influence of the 
economic globalisation and neo-liberal ideas bring the pressure on urban policy 
makers to formulate urban strategies for improving the competitiveness of their city.
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According to Ruppert, ‘a neo-liberal interpretation of global competitiveness 
obviously required the weakening of local democracy and citizenship and the 
strengthening of central control, and in relation to that we see fragmentation, 
entrepreneurialism and marketization of local government’ (2000, p.279). Firstly, 
local government has become fragmented, because ‘there is a shift in the distribution 
of local power away from municipalities to a number of fragmented agencies’ (ibid., 
p.279), and since ‘the “corporatist localism” seeks to involve a number of local 
interests in decision making, the institution of local government have been 
weakened’ (ibid., p.281). Then, it is entrepreneurial, because ‘globalization and 
economic competition have demanded that global cities redefine their roles in a 
global context and emphasize entrepreneurial or proactive strategies in order to be 
competitive and market their cities’ (Boija and Castells, 1997; Hull and Hubbard, 
1998, cited in Ruppert, 2000, p.281). Lastly, the local government is being 
marketized, because ‘municipal governments have also developed strategies to 
increase their revenues and decrease costs through a greater reliance on the private 
sector in terms of service delivery and management practices, and the adoption of 
these strategies have changed the governing culture, in which the language and 
techniques of business management have become the answer for deficit-focused and 
cash-strapped governments’ (ibid., p.283).
The new entrepreneurial strategies as part of the urban governance also include 
viewing ‘the city as a marketing product’ (Thomley, 1999, p.4), and particular urban 
strategies adopted can determine policy priorities in the urban area. ‘’’Place 
marketing”, “urban growth coalitions” and “urban regimes” have become 
emblematic of a shift from a municipal welfarist (bureaucratic, managerial) politics
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to that of a dynamic and charismatic (entrepreneurial) business leadership’ (Ruppert, 
2000. p.281). Ruppert also emphasises that ‘the marketing of the city to business is 
also extended to the state’ (ibid., p.282). ‘With the loss of provincial transfers, 
particularly for major infrastructure projects, cities must now compete and find other 
ways of leveraging financial support from the state, and indeed, a prominent method 
that cities use to leverage funding is that of bids to host the Olympic Games’ (ibid.,
p.282).
On the other hand, despite their concern to analyse the changing interconnections 
between urban-scale and world-scale processes, most world city researchers have 
neglected the role of state-scale transformations in the current round of globalisation, 
including reconfigurations of the state itself as an institutional, regulatory and 
territorial precondition for accelerated world-scale capital accumulation (Brenner, 
1998). Building upon these criticisms, the next chapter will concentrate on processes 
of reterritorialisation as an essential part of the current round of globalisation.
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Chapter Three
Territorial Restructuring of the State and the City
3.1 Introduction
We presently observe a growing concern about the future of the nation-state with the 
rising globalisation trend. The concept of nation-state, today, faces serious challenges 
due to dramatically changed political, economic, and social environment. A great 
number of states are strongly involved in globalising major fields of traditional state 
activity. Such fields as markets, law, and politics have become denationalised, in that 
they are no longer under the sovereign control of the states concerned.
Politicians are also becoming concerned about the serious loss of state authority, both 
externally and internally. Indeed, there are indications, which could suggest that the 
nation-state, the universally realised form of political organisation of societies, may 
become obsolete. The first development that may justify doubt as to the persistence 
of the state concerns the diminishing relevance of state power. With regard to the 
external dimension of statehood, one may well ask whether the concept of the state is 
still adequate and viable in an era of regional institutional integration and 
globalisation of most of the essential fields of state responsibility. Instead, 
globalisation may well require new concepts of political organisation.
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Under these circumstances, this chapter examines the reorganisation of forms of 
territorial organisation such as states and cities from the regulationist perspective. I 
have chosen the regulationist approach, since ‘it presents an account of the changing 
character of capitalist economies and of the role of cities within them, and it thus 
provides a context against which to discuss urban political change’ (Painter, 1995, 
p.276). ‘For regulation theory, economic change depends upon, and is partly the 
product of, changes in politics, culture and social life’ (ibid.). Therefore, the 
regulation approach will provide a theoretical framework for contextualising the 
changes in the state and urban governance within the constraints and possibilities 
thrown up by the broader restructuring of the world economy described as economic 
globalisation.
In the next part of the chapter, we will concentrate on the re-scaling of the state as an 
essential moment of the globalisation process. The third part will concentrate on the 
changing role of the nation-state in the new era. Related to that, we will examine the 
changes in the relationship between centre and local in the fourth section. Then, the 
fifth part of the chapter will address the changes in local politics, and I will look into 
the new aspects of urban politics under conditions of intensifying globalisation. After 
that, urban regime theory will be examined shortly. Finally the last part of Chapter 
Three will reach a general conclusion by closing the theoretical section of the thesis 
before going to examine the Turkish case study in subsequent chapters.
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3.2 Re-scaling of the State
In the growing literature on the current transformation of world capitalism, relatively 
little attention has been given to the state, its role and processes of state re-scaling. 
According to Brenner:
‘Despite their concern to analyze the changing interconnections between 
urban-scale and world-scale processes, most world cities researchers have 
neglected the role of state-scale transformations in the current round of 
globalization, including reconfigurations of the state itself as an institutional, 
regulatory and territorial precondition for accelerated world-scale capital 
accumulation. World cities research has generally presupposed a zero-sum 
conception of spatial scale which leads to an emphasis on the declining power 
of the territorial state in an age of intensified globalization: the state scale is 
said to shrink as the global scale expands’ (1998, p.2-3).
As we have seen in Chapter Two, most of the globalization theorists, whether they 
are hyperglobalizers, transformationalists or sceptics, had an agreement on capital’s 
greater geographical mobility and increasing difficulties of the state to regulate 
economic activities within its boundaries. ‘On the other hand, among those authors 
who emphasise the continued importance of state institutions in the current 
configuration of world capitalism, territoriality is frequently understood as a 
relatively static and unchanging geographical container that is not qualitatively 
modified by the globalisation process’ (Brenner, 1999, p.438). ‘From this statist 
point of view, the state is said to react to intensified global economic
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interdependence by constructing new forms of national socio-economic policy, but is 
not itself transformed qualitatively through these new global-national interactions’ 
(ibid.)
Brenner also emphasises that;
‘Both arguments fail to appreciate various ongoing transformations of state 
territorial organisation through which: qualitatively new institutions and 
regulatory forms are currently being produced on both sub- and supranational 
scales; and, the role of the national scale as a level of governance is itself 
being radically redefined in response to the current round of capitalist 
globalisation. This re-scaling of state territorial organisation must be viewed 
as a constitutive, enabling moment of the globalisation process’ (1999, 
p.439).
On the other hand, one of the most important outcomes taken from the globalization 
discourse of the previous chapter, has been that the nation state has not disappeared, 
instead has handed over its sovereignty by passing it to the upper level of regulatory 
bodies, downwards to the local and regional governments, and also to the market 
through privatization and deregulation. One remarkable institutional and political 
tendency over the past decade or so has been the simultaneous internationalisation 
and decentralisation or devolution of key regulatory and economic issues. Jessop 
(1994a) argues that ‘the state is undergoing a fundamental restructuring and strategic 
reorientation in some respects’. There is a tendential ‘hollowing out’ of the national 
state, with state capacities, new and old alike, being reorganised on supranational, 
national, regional or local, and trans-regional levels. According to Jessop,
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‘The national state is now subject to various changes which result in its 
hollowing out. This involves two contradictory trends, for, while the national 
state still remains politically important and even retains much of its national 
sovereignty [...], its capacities to project its power even within its own 
national borders are decisively weakened ... by the shift towards 
internationalised, flexible (but also regionalized) production systems [...]. 
This loss of autonomy creates in turn both the need for supranational 
coordination and the space for sub-national resurgence’ (1994a, p.264).
As a result, while ‘some state capacities are transferred to a growing number of pan- 
regional, plurinational, or international bodies with a widening range of powers; 
others are devolved to restructured local or regional levels of governance in the 
national state; and yet others are being usurped by emerging horizontal networks of 
power -local and regional- which bypass central states and connect localities or 
regions in several nations’ (Jessop, ibid.).
This process involves the active rearticulation of the various functions of the nation 
state. Specifically, whilst the nation state retains a large measure of formal national 
sovereignty rooted in the continued mutual recognition of national states and remains 
an important site for political struggles, its substantive capacities to project its power 
domestically to promote accumulation have been decisively weakened both by the 
shift towards more internationalised, flexible but also regionalised production 
systems and by the growing challenge posed by risks emanating from the global 
environment (ibid.).
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Consequently, the level of the national state, which used to be the essential scale for 
negotiating and implementing urban and regional development policy as well as 
regulating a host of socio-economic and even cultural tensions and relations during 
the post-war period, is not only profoundly redefined, but its discretionary powers 
have been eroded. In short, the denationalisation of policy-making has altered the 
influence and diminished the relative importance of the national institutional level. 
This can be demonstrated by the Europeanisation of important regional, social and 
economic policy initiatives and programmes and devolution of state power to 
decentralised local or regional institutions, often newly created. This new both 
international and local oriented state configuration parallels important changes in the 
nature and organisational structure of these local institutional frameworks.
The re-scaling of the state, therefore, does not suggest a diminishing role of the state 
mechanism. In fact, these new global and local institutions, in close co-operation 
with business and capital, launch the redevelopment largely on the basis of public 
funds and state capital. However, the power and control over this social capital are 
increasingly diverted to a group of elite, which shapes the urban and regional fabric 
in its own image and fashion and defines the very content of the restructuring 
process. The ‘hollowed out’ state is characterised, therefore, with a decidedly 
undemocratic and double authoritarian touch, both at the supra-national and local 
urban and regional levels.
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3.3 The New Role of the Nation-State
Despite various upward, downward and outward shifts in political organisation, a key 
role still remains for the national state as ‘the most significant site of struggle among 
competing global, triadic, supranational, national, regional and local forces’ (Jessop, 
1999, p. 12). ‘The “hollowed out” national state retains crucial general political 
functions despite the transfer of other activities to other levels of political 
organization, and in particular it has a continuing role in managing the political 
linkages across different territorial scales, and its legitimacy depends precisely on 
doing so in the perceived interests of its social base’ (Kazancigil, 1993, p. 128, cited 
in Jessop, 1999, p. 12).
According to Jessop:
‘The national state is currently still best placed to deal with social conflicts 
and redistributive policies, social integration and cohesion. Although 
supranational bodies seem preoccupied with the internationalisation of capital 
and promoting (or limiting) the structural competitiveness of triad regions 
and their various constituent national economies, they are less interested in 
social conflicts and redistributive policies. These concerns are still mainly 
confined within national frameworks and it is national states that have the 
potential fiscal base to change them significantly in this regard’ (1999, p. 12).
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It is certainly hard for most of the local and regional government bodies to achieve 
much without central government support. This situation creates a dilemma for the 
national state. ‘On the one hand, it must become actively engaged in managing the 
process of internationalization; on the other, it is the only political instance which has 
much chance of halting a growing divergence between global market dynamics and 
the conditions for institutional integration and social cohesion’ (ibid.).
On the other hand, ‘the re-scaling of the state has entailed a profound transformation 
of the relationship between states, capital and territory, and therefore, today the 
state’s role is no longer merely to reproduce territorially based production 
complexes, but continually to restore, enhance, intensify and restructure their 
capacities as productive forces’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 15). According to Cemy, ‘the state 
itself becomes an agent for the commodification of the collective, situated in a wider, 
market-dominated playing field’ (1995, p.620). ‘From public-private partnerships, 
labor retraining programs, science parks, conference centres, waterfront 
redevelopment schemes, technology transfer projects, military spending, information 
sharing, venture capital provision and market research to technopoles programs and 
enterprise zones, these state-organized economic development policies can be 
construed as concerted strategies for the intensification of the productive capacities 
of the cities and regions in which they are based through the construction of 
“territorially rooted immobile assets’”(Amin and Thrift, 1995, p. 10, cited in Brenner, 
1998, p. 16).
‘In short, there remains a central political role for the national state, but this role is 
redefined due to the more general rearticulation of the local, regional, national and
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supranational levels of economic and political organization’ (Jessop, 1999, p. 12). 
‘Unless or until supranational political organization acquires not only governmental 
powers but also some measure of popular-democratic legitimacy, the national state 
will remain a key political factor as the highest instance of democratic political 
accountability’ (ibid.). ‘How it fulfils this role depends not only on the changing 
institutional matrix and shifts in the balance of forces as globalization, triadization, 
regionalization, and the resurgence of local governance proceed rapidly’ (ibid., and 
also Jessop, 1994a, p.275).
3.4 Changing Relations between Central and Local Government
For a long time cities have been seen as simple sub-units in the national economic 
area. In relation to that, a close connection has been established between urban 
dynamism and the growth of the national economy. ‘The cities of the older 
industrialised world served as the engines of Fordist mass production and the urban 
infrastructure of a global system’ (Brenner, 1999, p.432). It was widely assumed that 
the industrialisation of urban cores would generate a dynamic of growth that would 
eventually lead to the industrialisation of the state’s internal peripheries, and thereby 
counteract the problem of uneven geographical development. Similarly, as 
coordinates of state territorial power, Fordist-Keynesian regional and local regulatory 
institutions functioned primarily as transmission belts of central state socio-economic 
policies. Their goal was above all to promote growth and redistribute its effects on a 
national scale (Brenner, 1998).
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On the other hand, within the Fordist mode of regulation, the state has been used to 
play a key role by meeting a variety of needs, which the market failed to provide for, 
becoming involved in widespread planning and regulatory activity. The post-war 
period has seen a significant expansion in the role of states in economic 
management, and in the provision of social services. National and local state 
institutions have become major employers in most capitalist societies, either directly 
or indirectly through subsidised private provision. This growth is most marked in the 
large cities, both because they stand at the top of service hierarchies and because they 
tend to contain the greatest concentration of client groups for state services.
According to Painter, ‘in most countries in which the Fordist mode of regulation 
developed, governmental and state institutions operating at the urban scale played a 
key role in the operation of the Keynesian welfare state, and the Fordist mode of 
regulation involved an increased degree of government planning of economic and 
social life’ (1995, p.284). He underlines that ‘urban government was one of the 
primary agencies through which this planning took place, and related to this, the 
Fordist mode of regulation involved state intervention to provide vital human and 
physical infrastructure, such as transportation, environmental improvement, 
education and health care’ (ibid., p.284). Painter also adds that ‘under Fordism, these 
were vital to the private sector but were often unprofitable for individual firms to 
provide, at least on a universal basis’ (ibid.).
After the recession of the early 1970s, demands for these services continued to rise, 
but resources were constrained and the provision of services in large cities became 
particularly crisis-prone. On the other hand, states have become involved in the
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economic problem of urban decline, as the social impact of recession in the 1970s 
and 1980s was spatially concentrated in inner cities. State policy has thus come to 
have a major impact on the economic fortunes of the major cities, through social 
expenditures, and consequent employment in state services, through transfer 
payments to city residents, and through infrastructure investments and projects for 
urban regeneration (Buck et al., 1992).
‘Since the 1970s the nationally scaled collection of city-state-capital interconnections 
has been substantially rearticulated and rehierarchised toward the global, super- 
regional, regional and local scales’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 18). ‘Aside from the increasing 
globalisation of capital and the institutional-regulatory shifts, the scales of 
urbanisation have also been reterritorialized’ (ibid.). ‘Global city formation signifies 
the emergence of an urban hierarchy on both global and super-regional scales, 
defined through the scale of urban command and control functions, the scale of inter- 
urban exchange relations, and the scale on which inter-urban competition occurs’ 
(ibid.). ‘As nodes of accumulation, therefore, cities are no longer enclosed within 
relatively auto-centric national economies, but embedded ever more directly within 
trans-state urban hierarchies and inter-urban networks’ (ibid.).
Brenner (1998, p. 19) also emphasises that;
‘this wave of spatial restructuring has also had major implications for the role 
of cities as coordinates of state territorial power. It is in this context that the 
rise of the glocal territorial state must be understood. The glocalization of 
state territorial organization enhances the role of urban-regional scales in 
promoting capital accumulation. This re-scaling of state territorial power
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toward the regional and local levels can be viewed as a state-directed attempt 
to propel cities and regions upwards in the urban hierarchy. This form of 
“urban entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989b, p.8) is evident with reference to 
both dimensions depicted, the industrial structure of the city’s productive 
base and the spatial scale of its command and control functions’.
By the early 1980s, moreover, central and local relations started to be transformed 
radically throughout the world. The new, so-called post-Keynesian welfare national 
state approach is far more oriented to the development of local endogenous growth 
potential through more active supply-side measures which are organised through 
regional and local states in partnership with regional and local players (Jessop, 
1994a). This general trend is closely linked to the rediscovery of cities and regions as 
key sites of economic activities with major impacts on the competitiveness and 
development potential of surrounding economic spaces.
According to Jessop, ‘the strengthening of local and regional governance is linked 
with the reorganization of the local state as new forms of local partnership emerge to 
guide and promote the development of local resources’ (1999, p.9). Thus, ‘local 
unions, local chambers of commerce, local business enterprise capital, local 
education bodies, local research centres, and local states may enter into arrangements 
to regenerate the local economy’ (ibid.). ‘In this sense we can talk of a shift from 
local government to local governance’ (Jessop, 1994a, p.272). ‘This trend is also 
reinforced by the central state’s inability to pursue sufficiently differentiated and 
sensitive programmes to tackle the specific problems of particular localities’ (ibid.).
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‘It therefore devolves such tasks to local states and provides the latter with general 
support and resources (Dyson, 1988, p.l 18).
On the other hand, ‘effective political decentralisation on a territorial basis requires 
an adequate allocation of responsibilities between communal, regional and national 
authorities as well as a proper coordination of their actions’ (Perrin, 1988, p.422). 
This is especially important where economic initiatives involve not only different 
tiers of government but also business associations and private bodies. ‘Thus it is 
essential to establish new institutional arrangements and allocate specific roles and 
complementary competences across different spatial scales and/or types of factor, 
and thereby to ensure that the dominant strategic line is translated into effective 
action’ (Przeworski, 1986, p.428; Kawashima and Stohr, 1988; Perrin, 1988, p.423). 
'Without such coordination top-down policies can lead to implementation failure and 
bottom-up policies to wasteful and ineffective “municipal merchantilism’” (Young, 
1986, p.446; Fosler, 1988).
3.5 Changes in Urban Politics
Changes in social, economic and spatial structure of the urban area are reflected in 
and reinforced by considerable changes in the way cities are governed and organised. 
Many changes have affected local politics over the last two decades, some of which 
seem to have set into patterns common across national and regional distinctiveness. 
Following the regulationist approach, Mayer focuses on ‘shifts in local governance 
within a broader context of macroeconomic and state restructuring’ (1995, p.235). In
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parallel to the neo-liberal strategies implemented by national governments, Painter 
argues that ’urban policy tends to shift away from an explicit concern with social and 
spatial equity, full employment and welfare programmes towards initiatives aimed at 
promoting workforce flexibility and the economic competitiveness of the private 
sector’ (1995, p.286-287).
Structural changes, on the other hand, transform the range of both possibilities and 
constraints within which a new local governance is constructed. According to Mayer: 
‘at least three such parallel trends have been identified in the recent literature 
on urban politics: First, in all advanced nations local politics have gained in 
importance as a focus for proactive economic development strategies. The 
specific local conditions of production and reproduction required by globally 
mobile capital cannot be arranged by the central state, but only by local 
political systems. Second, in recent years, urban governance has become 
increasingly preoccupied with the exploration of new ways in which to 
promote and encourage local development and employment growth. 
Therefore, there has been an increasing mobilisation of local politics in 
support of economic development and a related subordination of social 
policies to economic and labour market policies. This shift in emphasis 
between different policy fields has often been labelled as a shift towards the 
‘entrepreneurial’ city, and it goes hand in hand with a restructuring of the 
provision of social services. This constitutes the third new trend in urban 
governance, namely the expansion of the sphere of local political action to 
involve not only the local authority but also a range of private and semi­
public actors’ (1995, p.232-237).
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Under these circumstances, to provide the coordination of all these policy fields and 
functional interests, new forms of public-private relationship have become common 
in the local ground. In those partnerships, the role of the local authority both in 
respect to business and real-estate interests, and to the voluntary sector and 
community groups, started to become redefined. The term ‘governance’ now directs 
attention to the proliferation of service delivery mechanisms and regulatory systems, 
which exist to devise and implement policies. It expresses the shift from provision by 
formal government structures to the contemporary fragmentation of agencies, and of 
responsibilities between public, private, voluntary and household spheres. The 
delivery structure of the hierarchical welfare state is increasingly replaced with new 
forms and practices of urban governance. ‘The result has been an increasing 
fragmentation of agency responsibility within the urban arena’ (Stoker, 1991).
Brenner, in addition, emphasises that;
‘it is ultimately on the urban scale that the productive capacities of territorial 
organisation are mobilised. Today, municipal governments throughout 
Europe are directly embracing this goal through a wide range of supply-side 
strategies that entail the demarcation, construction and promotion of strategic 
urban places for industrial development’ (1999, p.446).
The new financial districts including high-rise office centres and smart buildings, 
industrial parks, transport and shipping terminals and various types of retail, 
entertainment and cultural facilities can be given as products of those kinds of 
strategies. These emergent forms of “urban entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989b and
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Mayer, 1994) have been analysed extensively with reference to the crucial role of 
public-private partnerships in facilitating capital investment in mega-projects situated 
in strategically designated locations of the city.
Harvey indicates that ‘state-financed mega-projects are designed primarily to 
enhance the productive capacity of urban places within global flows of value, rather 
than to reorganise living and working conditions more broadly within cities’ (1989b, 
p.7-8). The Docklands in London is perhaps the most spectacular European instance 
of this type of massive state investment in the urban infrastructure of global capital, 
but it exemplifies a broader strategic shift in urban policy that can be observed in 
cities throughout the world. It is important to point out that similar kind of 
considerations has been behind some state-financed mega-project examples in 
Turkey, and the city of Istanbul has experienced huge amount of globally oriented 
state investments in the last decade. We will examine some of those project examples 
in the following chapters.
3.6 Urban Regime Theory
One last subject that we have to examine in this chapter before concluding is the 
urban regime theory. Since regime theory provides a new conceptual framework and 
more particular theoretical statements about causal relationships and behaviour in 
urban politics, it has been very useful for the study of urban politics and in particular 
to the issue of power (Stoker, 1995, p.54). It will have some positive contribution to 
this study in explaining the power relationship between different levels of 
government in relation to some particular urban policy and strategies.
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According to Stone, an urban regime can be defined as ‘the informal arrangements 
by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to 
make and carry out governing decisions’ (Stone, 1989, p.6). ‘Urban regimes regulate 
the relationship between cities and the global economy’ (Short et al., 2000, p.323), 
and in the current era of globalization, many of the governing decisions reflect an 
atmosphere of competition among cities and thus constitute an “entrepreneurial 
model” of regime (Harvey, 1989b). ‘An entrepreneurial city seeks to “facilitate 
privatization and the dismantling of collective services” in order to take advantage of 
the opportunities of connecting with the global economy’ (Lauria, 1997, p.7, cited in 
Short et al., 2000, p.323). ‘Developing urban regime theories in studies of 
globalization, then, is to "note local and national political differences that are capable 
of exerting significant influence on the way globalization affects city development"’ 
(Leo, 1997, p.78, cited in Short et al., 2000, p.324).
Burbank and his colleagues believe that ‘at the heart of regime theory is a set of 
“informal arrangements” between political leaders and members of the city’s 
business establishment, and these informal arrangements are essentially a network of 
relatively enduring connections that are built upon shared concerns and trust between 
individuals in business and those in public office’ (2001, p.21). ‘The informal 
network of connections between business and political elites is substantively 
important because it is the mechanism for bringing resources together to accomplish 
common goals’ (ibid., p.22).
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In contrast to other approaches to urban politics, ‘regime theory emphasizes that a 
regime is a mechanism for overcoming the obstacles to exercising power at the local 
level, and therefore, a regime is a way to create policy stability and ensure urban 
governance’ (Burbank et al., 2001, p.24). ‘The emphasis on getting things done is a 
fundamental feature of how power is understood in regime theory’ (Stoker, 1995, 
cited in Burbank et al., 2001, p.22).
According to Burbank and his associates, ‘in the abstract, the power to get things 
done in a city could be dedicated to any number of goals -  improving the quality of 
neighbourhood life, better housing for the poor, or encouraging citizens to take an 
active part in political life, to name just a few’ (ibid.). ‘In practice, though, the task 
the regime sets for itself is local economic development, and economic development 
is a policy that politicians and business leaders regard as a priority’ (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987 and Stone, 1987, cited in Burbank et al., 2001, p.24). Local 
businesses benefit from local economic growth, since it creates new job 
opportunities, and increases the customer base and the price of fixed assets such as 
land. In relation to that, political leaders prefer to seek growth because it provides tax 
revenues to keep the city solvent without the need to raise taxes or cut services. 
Burbank and his fellows add that ‘the desire for growth impels cooperation because 
businesses need the formal authority of government to carry out large development 
project and because elected leaders gain the opportunity to distribute tangible 
rewards to supporters and to solidify their public support by demonstrating 
leadership’ (2001, p.24). In other words, public-private cooperation is necessary 
because each partner brings some part of the means necessary to get things done: 
government supplies authority and business provides capital and resources.
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3.7 Conclusion
The global economy requires political regulation, which takes a spatial form 
reflecting the territorial organization of the state. As we have seen in this chapter, the 
regulationist approach provides a theoretical framework for contextualising the 
changes in the state and urban governance within the constraints and possibilities 
thrown up by the broader restructuring of the world economy described as economic 
globalisation. Regulation theory conceptualizes how national-scale regulation 
entailed qualitative changes across time under different national capitalisms.
In addition, there is a close relationship between national scale of state regulation and 
the city. While states are rapidly restructuring themselves to take place in global 
competition, cities try to enhance their conditions within the world urban hierarchy. 
Brenner argues that;
‘global city formation and state re-scaling are dialectically intertwined 
processes of reterritorialization that have radically reconfigured the scalar 
organization of capitalism since the global economic crises of the early 
1970s’ (1998, p.3).
Global city formation has mostly been linked both to the globalization of capital and 
to the regionalization or localization of state territorial organization. On the one 
hand, as nodes of accumulation, world cities are sites of reterritorialization for post- 
Fordist forms of global industrialization. On the other hand, as coordinates of state
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territorial organization, world cities are local-regional levels of governance situated 
within larger, reterritorialized matrices of “glocalized” state institutions (Brenner, 
1998, p.3).
Under these circumstances, the role of local and regional levels of the state is being 
significantly redefined in the new era. Contemporary local and regional states no 
longer operate as the managerial agents of nationally scaled collective consumption 
programmes but serve as entrepreneurial agencies of “state-financed capital” oriented 
towards maintaining and enhancing the locational advantages of their delineated 
territorial jurisdictions (Mayer, 1994 and Brenner, 1999). There is also a growing 
trend and political pressure toward decentralisation of administrative processes and 
political decision-making, to which individual countries react in different ways. In 
this connection, new ways of governance and cooperation between the public sector, 
the private sector, and civil society are being developed at national, regional, and 
local levels for building a stronger economic and social structure, but the national 
government still plays important role for the successful action at the local level.
This chapter, on the other hand, revealed that urban regime theory is another 
significant instrument examining the nature of regulation at sub-national scales. 
Processes of globalization after Fordism, it is argued, are resulting not only in a new 
form of regulation, but also in a rescaling of regulation. ‘Regime theory emphasizes 
that a regime is a mechanism for overcoming the fragmented power and limited 
resources characterising local governments, and a regime enables a city to pursue a 
coherent policy agenda’ (Burbank et al., 2001, p.22-23). ‘It is useful because it 
provides a way to understand how things get done and why economic development is
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so central to urban politics’ (ibid., p.28). According to Burbank and his colleagues, 
‘regime theory can also be functional to explain why cities pursue mega-events such 
as the Olympic Games’ (2001, p.28). ‘Mega events such as Olympics are 
quintessential growth regime endeavours and that the initiation of a mega-event 
strategy is largely inexplicable outside the context of regime politics’ (ibid.). While 
saying that, I have to add that we will look for the hints of this kind of an urban 
regime while examining the Olympics adventure of Istanbul in Chapter 8.
Starting from the following chapter our concentration will switch to the Turkish case, 
and the way in which the globalisation process affects the Turkish state in different 
levels will be examined in a detailed way.
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Chapter Four
Turkey in the Globalisation Process
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines how the economic and political globalisation process has 
affected Turkey in the last two decades. Before looking into the economic 
globalisation process which has been intensifed in recent years, I will first explore 
the Turkish modernisation process starting towards the end of the Ottoman Empire in
tlithe last part of the 19 century. Because of its unique characterisitcs, Turkish 
modernisation helps us in understanding the overall globalisation process of the 
country. Since this process starts with economic liberalisation, I will then look at the 
liberalisation of the Turkish economy since 1980, and examine economic policies 
and reforms which are based on the country’s structural adjustment strategy.
After that, my concentration will turn to the response of the Turkish state to this 
economic liberalisation and globalisation process in the following section of this 
chapter. Steps taken in the direction of a market-oriented economy have been 
accompanied by a significant concentration of political power in the Turkish case. 
Therefore, my focus will be on the changing relationship between different levels of 
government with respect to administrative and political decisions. After I have 
presented decentralisation efforts in the 1980s, I will examine changing relationships 
between central and local government with respect to financial policies. I will
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disclose the rising tension between centre and local after the implementation of 
particular legislations including some articles of the current Constitution. Those 
articles and bylaws have considerably affected decision-making process in large 
urban areas in the last two decades. I will also briefly analyse the recent 
administrative legislation for local administrations. Finally, the conclusion section 
will summarise issues rised in this chapter aiming at understanding how globalisation 
process affected the traditional centralised state structure in the Turkish Republic.
4.2 The Modernisation Process in Turkey
thThe modernisation process in Turkey started towards the end of the 19 century in 
the final years of the Ottoman Empire. To some colleagues, ‘modem Turkey 
emerged out of the ashes of the Empire that had dominated Europe, Asia, and Africa 
for centuries’ (Ergil, 2000, p.49 and Isin, 2001, p.356). For some others, ‘the Turkish 
Revolution targeted the values of the ancien regime, in particular Ottoman Islam, 
which was perceived as an obstacle to progress’ (Heper, 2000, p.71-72), and ‘the 
new Republican elite’s passion for modernization, seen as an escape from 
backwardness, translated itself into a total dislike and distmst of all things associated 
with the ancien regime and the old way of life’ (Barkey, 2000, p.89). On the other 
hand, there are several lines of continuity in the Ottoman and the Republican 
political cultures. In other words, against to its radical appearance, the Turkish 
Revolution was in many aspects a continuation rather than a break with the Ottoman 
past. To some colleagues, ‘this revolution [Republican] actually aimed to transform
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values without significantly changing other parts of society’ (Rustow, cited in Heper, 
2000, p.72).
Like the Ottoman reform period with major political and administrative reforms 
leading to the first Ottoman constitution of 1876 and to a short parliamentarian 
experience between December 1876 and February 1878, the new Republican reforms 
of the 1920s and 1930s followed the same way of imposing top-down modernity. 
Both the Ottoman and Republican reforms were initiated and sustained by the 
military-bureaucratic elite and aiming at securing the state against external and 
internal threats.
On the other hand, the security and integrity of the Ottoman Empire was 
continuously threatened by its involvement in the European power struggle and by 
internal separatist movements. Likewise, the early Turkish Republic was bom out of 
a disastrous security situation: the Ottoman defeat in the First World War, the 
subsequent parcelling out of the Ottoman territories between the allies and the 
Turkish war of independence against the Greek occupation of Anatolia between 1919 
and 1922.
This legacy, a security focused top-down modernisation against external and internal 
threats and the leading role of the military-bureaucratic elite in the modernisation 
process itself, is still clearly visible in Turkey’s polity. In addition to the institutional 
continuities between the authoritarian Ottoman and later Republican state, both the 
state-elites of the Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic were mainly 
derived out of the military-bureaucratic part of the society. According to the figures
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of Weiker, ‘85 per cent of the bureaucrats and 93 per cent of the officers in the early 
Turkish Republic had already acquired their positions in the late Ottoman Empire, 
and this is another clear sign of the elite continuity’ (1981, p.21).
In general, ‘the Republican modernization effort, similar to the preceding Ottoman 
attempts, was elite, state driven and quite alien as far as the rural population of the 
new state was concerned’ (Barkey, 2000, p.89-90). However, another resemblance 
between latter Ottoman rulers and following new Republicans has been that the 
founders of the Turkish Republic in 1923 were also keenly concerned with making 
the country a full and equal member of a western community of nations and the 
nation-state programme was aimed at this goal. Just like ‘Ottomans who tried to 
reform first their public bureaucracy and then their military, by emulating their
thcounterparts in Europe from the end of the 18 century onward’ (Heper, 2000, p.64), 
the Republican elite modernisation since the 1920s has become synonymous with 
westernization or Europeanization. In contrast to this background, the rejection of 
Turkey as a candidate for full membership in the European Union, which took place 
on the EU-summit in December 1997 in Luxembourg, has come as a total shock. It 
was not just a disappointment of Turkey’s political aspirations, but also a rejection of 
her ‘Europeanness’ and, therefore, of the Turkish modernisation project as a whole.
The EU-summit justified the rejection of the Turkish application on the basis of the 
commitment to and the fulfilment of certain political, economic and legal standards 
required from all possible future member states. In meeting these standards there is 
certainly a deficit with which Turkey has to cope and the major economic and 
political obstacles to Turkey’s full-membership in the EU comprise issues such as
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high inflation, large proportion of agriculture, chronic budget deficit and the ethnic 
question. Although the deficiencies of Turkey, regarding to the catalogue of required 
standards for full membership in the EU, were obvious, the discussion following the 
Luxembourg summit has been tending into a direction to question Turkey’s 
application in a more general way. More and more arguments of culture and religion 
have been raised to ask whether Turkey could at all be considered as a part of 
Europe. And also in Turkey herself it has been argued that the rejection of the 
application was not due to political or economic deficiencies, but the result of deep 
rooted religious and cultural prejudices on the side of some EU member states.
As a matter of fact more than 90 % of the land of Turkey belongs to Asia, and the 
Bosphorus serves perfectly as a geographical demarcation line between Asia and 
Europe. Furthermore, the globalisation of the economy -breaking the view of 
production, distribution and consumption as confined to particular territories-, the 
shrinking of the world by modem means of communication, and rising of global 
cities are transcending natural national borders. ‘Transnationalised microeconomic 
links have been creating a non-territorial region in world economy’ (Ruggie, 1993, 
p. 172-174) and the nation-state defined by its mutually exclusive and fixed 
territoriality seems to be replaced by the ‘rise of the virtual state’, a state ‘that has 
downsized its territorially based production capability’ (Rosecrance, 1996, p.46). 
Taking these global developments into account, political conceptions no longer 
coincide with organisational devices of geography. Against this background it would 
be obsolete to define the borders of Europe just according to geographical features 
and exclude Turkey because of the mere existence of the geographical thresholds.
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On the other hand, according to Samuel Huntington the future of the international 
system will be characterised by a clash of civilisations, and the world will be 
subdivided by distinct cultural borders.1 Though geographical borders have the 
advantage of visibility, cultural divisions are hardly visible. Generally understood, 
culture is the demarcation between human and nature, and it is very difficult to draw 
the cultural boundaries of Europe.
While geography and culture do not provide sound arguments to claim a clear 
distinction between Turkey and Europe, history also reinforces the idea that Turkey 
has been and is a part of Europe. For centuries the Ottoman Empire was an important 
player in the European power game and centuries before the Turkish Republic was 
established it was the Ottoman conquest primarily oriented towards Europe. In the 
nineteenth century the Ottoman reformers were following the European example in 
their administrative and military reforms. While the attempts to centralise the state- 
administration, to monetise and formalise the fiscal system and to reorganise and 
train the Ottoman army according to European standards of scientific knowledge 
were aiming at strengthening the power of the Ottoman state against its external and 
internal enemies.
The historical and political integration of Turkey with Europe and the U.S. has 
furthermore been materialised in a number of institutional relations. As a founding 
member of the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation in 1948, as a 
member of the Council of Europe since 1949 and of NATO since 1952 as well as 
with the Ankara association agreement with the European Community from 1963
1 For more details see: Huntington, S. 1996, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, New York: Simon & Schuster.
and the customs union with the European Union signed in 1996, Turkey has been a 
part of Europe for a long time. However, to be a part of Europe does not 
automatically mean to be in the European Union.
On the other hand, whether Turkey becomes a full member of the EU is not a 
question of Turkey’s geographical location, cultural background or history, but a 
question of economic interests and political strategies as well as of her ability to 
achieve the required economic, political and legal standards as fixed by the EU 
member states in Copenhagen 1993. That is why, the examination of the economic 
and political globalisation process of Turkey with parallel to the modernization 
practice can give important clues about the deficits of the country to meet the 
contemporary standards of modem societies. In the next two parts of this chapter, we 
will first look into the economic globalisation process of Turkey and then we will 
examine the administrative and political components of this transformation process.
4.3 The Economic Globalisation of Turkey
Turkey has actually postponed integration into the world economy constantly in the 
1970s due to shifting domestic and international conditions. It was difficult for 
different the national governments to take some radical decisions deeply affecting 
people’s lives to change the closed structure of the economy until the 1980s. In this 
respect, the year 1980 has to be seen as a break point for the Turkish economy and its 
global adjustment process. ‘Following the collapse of the import substitution model
2 Some of the preconditions stipulated in Copenhagen are the guarantee of a democratic order by 
stable political institutions and the protection of human and minority rights.
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of development during the late 1970s, Turkey embarked on a major economic reform 
period in 1980, with strong support from transnational financial institutions’ (Onis, 
2000, p.288). The new market-oriented and outward-looking growth strategy was a 
fundamental shift from the previous protectionist, import-substitution growth 
strategy, and the belief behind this shift was that the country’s development was 
becoming severely constrained by the inefficiencies of the domestic economy.
Therefore, ‘the objective of the reform process was to correct the severe inward 
orientation of the previous era and create an economy that would be fully integrated 
and competitive with the world market’ (Onis, 2000, p.288). In other words, the 
national developmentalist strategy based on the extensive state intervention in 
economy of the previous decades has been left behind. Similar to structurisation 
attempts in other developing countries positioned in the world economy likewise, the 
main policy and strategies for the economic reforms in Turkey can be summarised as 
reducing government intervention, liberalising import regulations, increasing 
exports, encouraging foreign capital investment, deregulating financial markets,
privatising State Economic Enterprises, and decentralising government activities.
\
In 1980, a profound shift in philosophy occurred in Turkey concerning the role of the 
state in economic affairs. The new economic strategy aimed at decreasing both the 
scale of public sector activity as well as the degree of direct government intervention 
in the operation of market. The policy-makers of the post-1980 period introduced a 
policy framework encouraging new developments in the economic environment. The 
impacts of this framework can be observed in various sectors of the economy and in 
the economic structure itself. A positive approach to foreign capital, growth and
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variety of consumer goods, and restructuring the retail industry are important. As a 
result of this, there was a dramatic increase in the number of branches of 
multinational companies and in the number of partnerships of foreign firms with 
Turkish corporations.
Foreign investment in the pre-1980 period was extremely limited by international 
standards due to a host of restrictions and bureaucratic constraints. In the 1980s, 
these restrictions were substantially eliminated. Furthermore, the foreign investment 
Code was made consistent with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) norms, in the sense that foreign investors became entitled to 
the same set of investment incentives and allowances as their domestic counterparts. 
With the exception of domestic tax obligations, the new legislation also enabled 
foreign investors to transfer their profits abroad without any restrictions. An 
additional step to encourage foreign investors involved the establishment of free 
trade zones.
Between 1954 and 1980, total foreign direct investment in Turkey was only $288 
million. As a result of the liberalisation in foreign direct investment regulations after 
1980, foreign investment started to rise. According to Henze (1993, p. 17), ‘after a 
disappointing beginning with an average of less than $100 million a year until 1988, 
net foreign investment reached $783 million in 1991, and the total for the decade of 
the 1980s was $2,369 million’. Foreign direct investment statistics show that Turkey 
has totally issued over $25 billion foreign investment permits by December 1999, 
and approximately 5,000 foreign companies actively participate in different sectors 
of the Turkish economy by 2000 (State Institute of Statistics, 2000).
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A research done by Tokatli and Erkip (1998, cited in Erkip, 2000, p.372) ‘on foreign 
investment in producer services in Turkey indicates that 95 % of the producer service 
firms receiving foreign capital were established after 1984, and almost 75 % of them 
were located in Istanbul’. ‘Before 1980, manufacturing was the main investment area 
of foreign capital, whereas the service sector attracted foreign investment in 
increasing amounts after that date due to the abovementioned structural changes in 
the Turkish economy’ (Erkip, 2000, ibid.). ‘The service sector enormously increased 
its share in the economy, and 81 % of foreign investment went to services in 1996’ 
(Foreign Investment Directorate, 1996, cited in Erkip, 2000, ibid.). ‘While foreign 
investors preferred to invest in non-manufacturing areas such as tourism and 
producer services including consultancy, banking and insurance, non-banking 
financial and information services have been the other favourite investment areas’ 
(Erkip, 2000, ibid.). In addition, ‘commercial activities which are supported by 
globalizing consumption patterns, also attracted corporate and foreign capital at the 
expense of a number of losers among small retailers, and increasing social inequality 
among citizens’ (Tokatli and Boyaci, 1999, cited in Erkip, 2000, ibid.).
‘The development in favour of the service sector has been consistent with the 
decrease in the investment in manufacturing sector, and the shift from manufacturing 
to service sector both serves as a basis for the integration with the world economy, 
and creates a new employee group consisting of the high-paid, high-educated 
professional segment of the population’ (Erkip, 2000, ibid.). On the other hand, 
‘although the value produced by manufacturing decreases, the employment rate in
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this sector has been quite stable, indicating a serious decrease in the share of wage- 
eamers in manufacturing sector’ (Aksoy, 1996, cited in Erkip, 2000, ibid.).
Another important shift has happened in the industrial sector. Turkey started to 
develop a diversified industrial base producing a variety of products during the 
economic transformation period. From 1980 to 1999, the share of agricultural 
products in exports declined from 57 to 10 percent, while industrial exports rose 
from 36 to 88 percent, signalling a wholesale shift from an agrarian to an industrial 
economy (State Institute of Statistics, DIE, 2000). Respectively the private sector has 
boomed the foreign trade in a short period, ‘about 10 times between 1980 and 1993’ 
(Toprak, 1996, p.33), and in addition business has started to invest on infrastructure 
sectors such as health, education, transportation and communication. This profound 
transformation started in the early 1980s was parallel with the progressive 
withdrawal of the public sector from manufacturing into infrastructural activities. 
Under the effects of the increasing urbanisation, both public and private sector 
investments on urban infrastructure of rapidly developing cities have been very 
important as we will see in the following chapters.
The first serious attempts in the direction of privatisation have also been taken during 
the period following the economic reforms in the 1980s. The privatisation of State 
Economic Enterprises appeared on the government’s agenda from 1984 onwards, and 
has been a major structural objective of the Turkish government since then. More 
important than the privatisation of some public investments, the laws and 
foundations of privatisation were prepared. Although a formidable task, numerous 
state companies have been privatised. Over the last ten years, the state has
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completely withdrawn from a number of industrial sectors such as food processing 
and cement production. Similarly, more than half of government shares in the 
tourism, textile and forestry sectors have been privatised. Privatisation of public 
banks has also begun at the end of the 1990s.
On the other hand, although the 1980 structural adjustment programme was generally 
successful in liberalising the economy, it was not able to establish macroeconomic 
balances. During this transition period, Turkey’s positive economic accomplishments 
have been offset by some factors such as ‘persistent high inflation, widening budget 
deficits, mounting external debt’ (Henze, 1993, p. 16), and high interest rates 
stemming from structural inadequacies. According to Onis, ‘during the early years of 
stabilization and reform in the 1980s, some success was achieved in containing the 
budget deficit and reducing the inflation rate, but as a result of populist pressures for 
redistribution, the fiscal crisis of the state intensified in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s’ (2000, p.290).
This period ended with a huge financial crisis in 1994. The government’s primary 
job in 1990s became to find the balance between market economy and society’s 
demands. In other words, relatively stable society was being adapted to the rapidly 
liberalised economy. Therefore, the high numbers of the 1980s in terms of economic 
growth started to decrease. The limited tax capacity of Turkey was not enough to 
finance government expenditures, and governments started to heavily rely on 
domestic debt to be able to finance the increasing gap between revenue and 
expenditure. Several plans have been prepared by different governments to reduce 
public borrowing requirement, but they have not been implemented efficiently.
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In order to right these macroeconomic imbalances, Turkey continued to embark on 
structural adjustment and stabilisation programs of the IMF during the latter half of 
the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s. Even before signing the Stand-by 
Agreement with the IMF in 1999, the Turkish government took strong action to 
improve the institutional framework by introducing key reform laws and long- 
delayed constitutional amendments such as the social security reform law, the new 
banking and capital market law, the tax law, and most importantly, the constitutional 
amendment, which paves the way for international arbitration and dispute-free 
privatisation activities. The aim of this structural adjustment program was ‘not only 
to reduce chronic inflation, but also to achieve structural transformations, mainly in 
public finance and in other areas of the economy’ (Akat, 2000, p.278).
The picture presented so far is consistent with the liberal vision of retreating states 
and expanding societies. However, a closer examination of the Turkish experience in 
the last two decades reveals a more complex pattern. The steps taken in the direction 
of a market-oriented economy have been accompanied by a significant concentration 
of the economic and political power in the centre. When we look into the public 
sector itself, we observe several elements, which contrast sharply with the original 
objective involving the withdrawal of the state from economic affairs in the last two 
decades. First, public investment continued to be a dominant form of capital 
accumulation in the Turkish economy in spite of the fact that the composition of 
public investment has shifted dramatically from manufacturing to infrastructural 
activities. Secondly, in spite of a decline in the share of public sector in 
manufacturing production, the contribution of state economic enterprises’ gross
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national product did not decrease during the post-1980 period. Thirdly, the public 
sector continued to be dominant in the financial system. ‘While the share of public 
banks among the total bank deposits expanded during the 1980s, around 90 per cent 
of the securities issued on the Istanbul Stock Exchange have been public sector 
issues, showing the degree of control exercised by the public sector over the capital 
market’ (Onis, 1991).
Under these circumstances, our focus will turn into the political side of the story, and 
the state’s political and administrative response to the economic globalisation 
process in Turkey will be examined in a detailed way in the following part of this 
chapter.
4.4 Political Responses to the Globalisation Process
The young Turkish state in the beginning of the 1920s inherited a very centralised 
and authoritarian Ottoman state structure. ‘The early Republican years had witnessed 
the intensification of the centralized system in administration, in contrast to the 
(relatively) liberal approach observed in the economy’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.327). 
However, ‘the economic liberalism of the new regime did not last long as the 
deteriorating world economic conditions at the end of the 1920s pushed the 
government to adopt rigid state-directed industrialization policies’ (Barkey, 2000, 
p.90). During the period until 1945, the single-party regime continued to follow the 
etatist system, and ‘the extent and pace of Westernization dominated the political 
agenda’ (Heper, 2000, p.71). Under the following multi-party system after 1945,
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Turkey had high levels of economic growth with the exception of the period 
following the OPEC crisis of 1974, when economic growth rates started to decline 
under various coalition governments. To some colleagues, ‘the emergence of 
political parties in this period has done much to reduce the authoritarianism of the 
military-bureaucratic centre under one-party governments’ (Erguder, 1995). 
However, ‘from 1945 to 1980, there has been a confrontation between those who 
emphasized Republican values and those who stressed the particularistic interests of 
the people’ (Heper, 2000, p.71).
‘In the post-1980 period, economic and social issues, on which compromise could be 
reached more easily, took precedence over political and cultural issues such as 
Westernization, Islam and nationalism’ (ibid.). The liberal transformation movement 
of the 1980s has led to a broader consensus between political parties and social 
forces, and a solid cultural ground has emerged to establish the democratic form of 
government. ‘At the end of 1983, the new administration announced that philosophy 
of government derived from the principles of liberalization, private ownership and 
democratization, and promised substantial legal changes to this end’ (Ersoy, 1992, 
p.328). ‘Local governments were to be strengthened and centralistic tendencies 
would be curbed’ (ibid.). For the first time, the sphere of the state began to be 
narrowed down and that of politics expanded. It was as part of this opening up of the 
system that political as well as administrative decentralisation of the government 
came on the agenda.
However, neither the economic transformation started in the early 1980s, nor the 
multi-party democracy were succesful enough to change the powerful position of the
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centre and its relationship with local. As we will see in the following parts of this 
chapter, relative improvements with the extensions of new legislation that aim to 
democracy were often accompanied by widespread governmental and financial 
control by the central government. The strong subordination of local government 
units under the tutelage of the centre generally continued, and ‘the multi-party 
system did not necessarily alter the central-local government relationship and the 
tendency to view municipalities and local administrations as provincial organizations 
of the central government prevailed’ (Keles, 1988, cited in Ersoy, 1992, p.327).
4.4.1 Decentralisation Efforts Since the 1980s
The principle of the totality of central and local units has been put into the Turkish 
administrative system in the 1982 Constitution. Autonomous local governments 
function with reference to the principle of decentralization, and can take decisions 
and actions independent of the central government according to the Constitution. 
Ersoy emphasizes that;
‘Central administration is divided into provinces, and provinces into further 
subdivisions, as the field organization of the central government, and if 
deemed necessary, the central government can use discretionary power over 
local governments’ (1992, p.329).
Erguder (1989, p.30) believes that ‘one of the most important reforms of the post- 
1980 period in Turkey has been the decentralisation of local government’. ‘Giving 
more power, resources, responsibilities, and authority to local governments not only 
had the aim of improving the delivery of services to the citizens but also had
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important implications for the development of Turkish democracy, and, perhaps, also 
signalled important changes in Turkish political culture’ (Heper, 1986 and 
Kalaycioglu, 1989, cited in Erguder, 1989, p.30).
On the other hand, local autonomy and decision-making capabilities have been 
increased in the early part of the 1980s, first by means of laws promulgated by the 
National Security Council during the 1980-1983 period and chiefly by means of 
decree laws thereafter. The fact that most of the important changes affecting 
municipalities were introduced by executive decrees or regulations, reflected the 
significantly subordinate status of the legislative branch as compared with that of the 
executive branch. 'One piece of legislation (Act 3030 of 1984), which introduced an 
innovative two-tiered metropolitan municipality system, stands alone as a singular 
example of a law concerning local government that was promulgated by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly during this period' (Kalaycioglu, 1988, p.61-62). With the 
establishment of this metropolitan municipality system in a number of urban centres 
in 1984 by the liberal ANAP (Motherland Party) government, important powers were 
actually deconcentrated to the metropolitan municipal governments.
However, there is no evidence that any steps taken towards decentralisation after 
1984 were the result of the active support of a legislative majority. As an example of 
decentralisation by executive decree, the Turkish case may be said to resemble more 
a process of deconcentration than devolution of authority’ (Kalaycioglu, 1994). In 
other words, despite the new liberal administration announced that local governments 
would function autonomously, and adopted a new administrative system, strong 
tutelage relations between central and local governments continued in the new era.
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The centre's continued tutelage on local government was reflected in various 
practices in the 1980s.
First of all, inspectors of the Ministry of Interior Affairs were investigating every 
operation and action of municipalities. Secondly, any actions by municipalities that 
fell into the policy domains of cabinet ministries, such as the Reconstruction and 
Settlement or the Health and Social Security, required prior approval from those 
ministries. Thirdly, decisions by municipalities concerning some personnel matters 
must also have been approved by the cabinet. The Ministry of Interior Affairs had 
been authorised to change local government organs and their members who were 
under legal probation on matters relating to their functions, until a final decision was 
reached by the courts, and ‘this rule, vulnerable to political bias, remained effective 
until 1989’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.328). Finally, metropolitan or district municipalities 
could establish new service units only with the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ approval 
of the municipal council’s decisions on the issue. On certain matters, municipalities 
were even required to seek the approval of the Council of Ministers.
‘The liberal administration was nevertheless not satisfied with these allowances, and 
the authority of the Ministry was further extended with an article added into law no. 
3394 in 1987’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.329). According to this addition, ‘the Ministry of 
Public Works and Resettlement was temporarily authorized to change plans prepared 
by municipalities, and this includes metropolitan plans down to residential block and 
plot details’ (ibid.). In addition, there were also some other exceptions, which restrict 
the power of municipalities in planning. According to Ersoy:
109
‘with an important exception introduced to the basic principle of totality of 
central and local administrations, local governments have been hierarchically 
organised under the central government, which is against constitutional rule. 
Article 9 of the Planning Law stipulates that the related ministry can revise 
development plans in the case of disasters; implement mass housing projects 
and gecekondu (squatter housing) laws; and implement metropolitan plans 
concerning more than one municipality and urban development plans for 
areas where major highways are planned, where there is an airport and/or an 
airway or waterway connection’ (ibid.).
The number of examples on these kinds of exceptions can be increased easily. These 
types of implementations against the planning power of municipalities have actually 
been so many that it has been quite difficult to talk about the concept of independent 
local administrations after the 1980s.
Then, as a parallel process to the accession to the E.U., Turkey has put in effect the 
European Charter of Local Self Government, and the Board of Ministers ratified it 
with the law numbered 3723 in 1992 (Official Gazette, 3 October 1992, No: 21364). 
The central government, however, has placed certain drawbacks while accepting this 
Charter. Some of those drawbacks were related to the matters concerning the 
monetary aspects which mostly increase the financial liberty of local authorities. 
Other arrangements subject to drawback had also similar characteristics which seek 
decentralisation in local government. While one was connected to local authorities’ 
free determination right for the organisation of inner structures, the other was related
110
to their participation in the decision-making and planning processes in subjects of 
their concerns.
Moreover, the decentralisation movement in Turkey at the beginning of the 2000s 
continued to become one of the central issues. Since many activity and policies 
conducted by the national government and business organizations started to be global 
in scope, involving interactions among multiple countries and international 
organizations, decentralisation did not produce an exception as well. There have been 
many changes in legislation organizing the authority and responsibilites of the local 
governments under the guidance of the international institutions such as IMF, the 
World Bank and the European Union. New legislation of Provincial Local 
Administrations, Municipalities and Metropolitan Municipalities have been put into 
effect in 2004 and 2005 by the current AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
government. While the duty, authority and responsibilities of the central government 
have been diminished, and the control power of it has almost been demolished with 
these new acts, the authorities of local governments have significantly been 
increased. However, this increase of the administrative authority has not been 
supported by a parallel growth in income of local administrations and municipalities. 
Instead of creating their own income resources, they have been encouraged to get 
into debt from international financial organizations.
In general, the economic liberalisation movement from the 1980s until today did not 
practically change the administratively strong central government and did not bring a 
financially independent local government in Turkey.
I l l
4.4.2 Changing Intergovernmental Relations with Respect to Financial Policies
A new period with the military coup of 1980 was in a short time challenged with the 
financial problems as a result of the increasing financial crisis of local governments. 
All municipal administrators that had been elected were removed from their posts 
and fresh appointments were made. Urban life was organized with restricted 
municipalities under surveillance, which turned into bureaucratic and hierarchical 
systems. This mechanism of functioning froze every aspect of the pre-1980 crisis. 
New legislation was prepared with financial considerations, which appeared to aim at 
solving the revenue shortages of municipalities. These once again facilitated the 
control of municipalities by the central government.
During the military government between 1980 and 1983, relatively substantial funds 
were channelled to the municipalities. In 1981, a new law (Act 2464) was adopted by 
the government, which gave the municipalities other than the metropolitan ones new 
sources of stable income. ‘Between 1982 and 1984, 5 percent, and later up to 8.5 
percent, of the national tax revenues were allocated to the municipalities’ (Nadaroglu 
and Keles, 1991). Municipalities were authorised to require the beneficiaries of the 
newly installed water supply projects to participate in their financing. Cost sharing of 
municipal investments by the local communities was preserved. The new law also 
authorised the municipalities to collect new taxes, including those from the residents 
of neighbouring areas outside the municipal boundaries who benefited from 
municipal services. The overall consequence of the new law was to increase the 
revenues of the municipalities by almost threefold from 1981 to 1984 (Nadaroglu 
and Keles, 1991).
112
Before the local elections in 1984, development legislation provided for a steady 
increase in authority and supervision by the central government. In the months 
following the 1984 local elections, ‘the new Motherland Party government enacted a 
new legislation to increase the authority and financial resources of local governments 
and entrusted the preparation and follow-up of master plans to them’ (Tekeli, 1994, 
p. 167). ‘First, the 5 per cent share allotted to municipalities -besides the metropolitan 
ones- from the national revenues in 1981 by law no.2380 was gradually increased to
10.3 per cent in 1984 (law no.3004)’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.335). ‘For the metropolitan 
municipalities, however, it was specified, in law no.3030, that 3 per cent of the 
national revenues collected in the provincial centre of the municipality be allotted to 
that municipality, and this proportion was raised to 5 per cent in 1985’ (ibid.). ‘An 
additional income source for local governments was also provided with nine distinct 
funds that were formed under the control of the central government’ (ibid.). As a 
result of this legislation, municipal incomes increased considerably in 1985.
Moreover, two other acts have been prepared in the same year, aiming at increasing 
local governments’ own resources. With law no.3239, the municipal tariffs were 
increased by about ten-fold. While the central government was authorized to set the 
minimum and maximum amount of these tax and user-charge tariffs, municipalities 
were given the authority to collect property taxes within their boundaries. ‘The idea 
behind this new legislation was to reduce the share of central government 
contributions to municipal income and to expand the municipalities’ own income 
resources, and while this was achieved, care was also taken to maintain dependence 
on the central government’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.335).
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The legal framework of the income structure discussed above has survived to the 
present day with undergoing small changes. ‘With respect to the financial policies, 
we have not observed a relaxation in the strict control of the central government, 
even during the ‘liberal’ period started in the 1980s, which is claimed to have 
strengthened local government’ (ibid.). In addition, ‘the central government began to 
reduce the share from national revenues by adding articles to the budget laws in the 
period between 1987 and 1990, amounts thus reduced are mostly appropriated as 
funds under the discretion of Ministry of Finance, and this was a powerful financial 
device to discriminate local governments according to the political preferences of the 
central government’ (ibid.). Then, as we have mentioned in the previous part, as a 
result of both increasing financial deficiencies of local governments and developing 
international financial systems under the effects of globalisation, the local 
governments have been encouraged by the central government to borrow from the 
international financial institutions in the last decade.
4.4.3 Legislative Developments Organising Relations Between Central and 
Local Government
As we have seen in this chapter so far, tutelage relations between central and local 
governments continued in the post-1983 era. What is interesting is that this has come 
at the same time as ‘authority and supervision were left to the jurisdiction of local 
governments together with the new Development Law passed in 1985’ (Tekeli, 1994, 
p. 180). Contrary to these positive developments, new legislative changes have given 
extensive powers in physical planning to the national government at the end of the
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1980s and in the 1990s. Ersoy believes that ‘most of the planning activities in areas 
specified as ‘disaster areas’, ‘special environmental conservation and tourism areas’, 
‘village settlement areas’, ‘national parks’, ‘mass housing areas’ and ‘cities of GAP 
(Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi -  Southeastern Anatolia Project) region’ continued to 
be carried out by the central government organs’ (1992, p.329), adding that ‘in fact, 
all physical planning activity in the country could be carried out directly by the 
central government whenever “deemed necessary’” (ibid., p.330). The following sub­
sections will examine some of the legislative renewals introduced by the central 
government, which affect the relationship between the central and local governments 
in Turkey.
The 1982 Constitution and local governments
Article 123 of the Turkish Constitution accepted upon submission to public vote in 
1982 regulates the integrity of government and the basis of central and local 
governance. According to this article, ‘public administration constitutes a unified 
whole in terms of its establishment and functions and was regulated by law; the 
establishment and duties of public administration are based on central government 
and decentralization bases; and public legal entity can only be established by virtue 
of law or on the basis of authority granted by law’ (quoted from The Constitution of 
the Republic of Turkey, retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr).
Article 127 of the Constitution regarding local governments further designates that 
‘the central administration has the legal authority to practice administrative tutelage 
over local government within the framework of principles and procedures set forth
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by law with the objective of ensuring the functioning of local services in conformity 
with the principle of the integral unity of the administration, securing uniform public 
service, safeguarding the public interest and meeting local needs in an appropriate 
manner’ (ibid.).
In other words, the central government can use its power of administrative tutelage 
on local governments. ‘In this sort of control, the central government approves or 
rejects decisions of local governments, or postpones their implementation, but it 
cannot take a new decision itself (Ersoy, 1992, p.329). Control over organs of local 
authorities is exercised on the issues such as the starting of the functioning of 
deliberative and executive organs, procedures for calling them to extraordinary 
meetings, and terminating their activities. According to the Constitution, the 
procedures dealing with objections to the acquisition by elected organs of local 
authorities of their status as an organ, their loss of such status, are resolved by the 
judiciary. Control over acts and omissions of local authorities would be exercised 
usually for determining whether the acts and omissions would be in conformity with 
law. However, sometimes the degree of appropriateness of the performed work could 
also be the supervised.
On the other hand, the establishment and duties of the local governments are 
regulated by law in accordance with the decentralization principle. Elections for local 
authorities shall be made once every five years in accordance with the principles set 
forth in Article 67 of the Constitution. However, general or by-elections regarding 
the organs of local authorities or members of such organs required to be made within
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one year before or after the elections for parliament members. The law can also bring 
special administration forms for major residential areas.
Solution of the objections regarding awarding of the title of the elected local 
authority organs and loss or supervision thereof shall be through jurisdiction. 
However, the Minister of Interior, as a temporary measure, can recall the local 
authority organs or members of such organs against whom investigation or 
prosecution is initiated due to a crime in relation to their duties until a final 
judgement is taken.
Increasing involvement of the central government by the “Tourism 
Encouragement Law (No. 2634)”
One of the most important legislative innovations in the last two decades, increasing 
the tension between the centre and local governments, has been the Tourism 
Encouragement Law (No. 2634) enacted in March, 1982. Article 1 of the Law states 
the purpose of it as ‘to ensure that necessary arrangements are made and necessary 
measures are taken for the regulation and development of the tourism sector and for 
giving this sector a dynamic structure and mode of operation’ (Official Gazette, 
Issue: 16th of March 1982, No. 17635, retrieved from
‘http://www.kulturturizm.gov.tr/portal/’). Article 3 of the Law defines cultural and 
tourism preservation and development regions as ‘the regions having a high potential 
for tourism development, and intensive historical and cultural importance, that are to 
be evaluated for the purpose of preservation, utilisation, sectoral development and 
planned improvement and the boundaries of which are determined and declared by
117
the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism’
(ibid.).
The Law also defines tourism centres as ‘the parts or places specified to be 
developed on a priority basis within or outside the cultural and tourism preservation 
and development regions, and are of importance for tourism movements and 
activities, locations, sites and the boundaries of which are determined and announced 
by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism’. According to Article 4, ‘in the determination of cultural and tourism 
preservation and development regions, tourism areas and tourism centres, account 
shall be taken of the natural, historical, archaeological and socio-cultural tourism 
assets of the country and her potential for winter, hunting and water sports, for health 
tourism and for other types of tourism’ (ibid.).
When we first look into the purpose and the scope of the Law, it seems to set the 
legal basis for the acceleration of the development of inbound tourism in Turkey by 
providing a number of vital instrumental incentives to both Turkish and foreign 
tourism investors. However, the implementation of this Law by the central 
government has had some crucial effects in cities and urban planning activities of 
those cities.
First of all, although the Tourism Encouragement Law is expected to introduce the 
declaration of some areas in different cities or regions having a tourism development 
potential as the ‘special tourism areas’, it has been quite difficult to find out the 
central government’s main criteria behind the determination process of these tourism
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areas, since many of the selected areas have not any historical, archaeological, socio­
cultural or natural tourism assets. As a matter of fact, the metropolitan city of 
Istanbul and its newly developing central business district has been the primary 
implementation area for the Law. According to Ekinci, ‘this law, which singles out 
places where natural, historical and environmental riches are located as primary 
targets for touristic construction, with no regard for whether or not they are 
“protected” areas, gives all the authority for such construction directly to the 
Ministry, thus initiating a process in which the country is planned and shaped 
entirely by “government decisions”4 (1994, p. 13).
In addition, the most important effect of this Law has been that the areas subject to 
the Tourism Encouragement Law have been exempted from the provisions of the 
Urban Planning Law (No.3194). In other words, construction plans for these areas 
are prepared in accordance with the Tourism Encouragement Law and relevant 
regulations, rather than the Planning Law, and these areas are exempted from the 
provisions of the Planning Law. The construction permission must be obtained from 
the central government organisations, both the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and 
the Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement. In order to get construction plans 
approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement in the natural and 
historical tourism zones, the view of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism on the 
related project must be obtained. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism has also been 
vested with the authority of examining, approving and amending the construction 
plans in the tourism zones.
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By declaring an area as a "special tourism area" subject to Tourism Encouragement 
Law, the central government actually became the only authority able to execute the 
final decision. In this way, all the local government organisation and local 
communities have been excluded from the decision making process. There are many 
examples of special tourism areas in different regions of Turkey, but Istanbul is 
definitely the one, which accommodates the most. In Chapter Seven, I will look into 
the various implications of this decision of the central government on the city in a 
more detailed way.
The Urban Planning Act (No. 3194) and its democratic deficits
The Urban Planning Act numbered as 3194 adopted in 1985 has been an important 
attempt to change urban planning practice in Turkey. According to Senihi Kitapci, 
the ex-chairman of the Chamber of City Planners, ‘before this Act, planning was 
strictly a centralised effort’ (1999, p.l). ‘While as a national government 
organization, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement was in charge of the 
planning preparation and approval process, implementations and controls of the plans 
within municipal boundaries were under the duties of municipalities’ (ibid.).
Together with this Act, however, all planning preparation, approval, implementation 
and controlling rights and responsibilities within municipal borders have been given 
to the municipalities. Planning outside these areas are still made and approved by 
governorships. However, this power of municipalities is not unlimited. ‘Master’ and 
‘implementation’ plans have to be in accordance with any regional and 
environmental development plans prepared by the central government. Thus, co­
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ordination is targeted between local and higher level plans. ‘It seems that practising 
administrative tutelage in this sense is not against local government principle for the 
central government’ (Unal, 1990, cited in Ersoy, 1992, p.329).
Moreover, ‘the Development Act numbered 3194 brings the allocation of powers 
within the planning hierarchies’ (Kitapci, 1999, p.l). Kitapci underlines that;
‘The right of preparation and approval of regional and sub-regional plans in 
1/500.000 and 1/100.000 scales are under the control of the State Planning 
Organisation. The preparation and approval of the development plans for 
coastal zones, major industrial development areas and environmentally 
critical areas in 1/25.000 scale, are under the responsibility of another 
national organisation, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. 
While the responsibility of preparing and implementing detailed development 
plans in 1/5000, 1/1000 and 1/500 scales are given to municipalities within 
the municipal boundaries, the responsibility of preparation, approval and 
control of the implementation plans are belonged the local branches of the 
central government Ministry out of those boundaries’ (ibid.).
On the other hand, this radical change by the Planning Law in the 1980s could be 
defined as a positive contribution to the planning practice of Turkey, within the 
perspective of decentralisation. However, this Act has had damaging effects on 
general planning practice in the country. Although the new planning law appears to 
have a more democratic approach compared to the former one since it gives planning 
approval rights to local authorities, a legal mechanism for widespread public 
participation has still been missing. Kitapci argues that ‘the general practise showed
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that local interest groups have had a dominating role on urban planning process, and 
as decision-makers their main concern has been to increase the rent from the urban 
land, using the opportunities given by the new law’ (1999, p.l).
In conclusion, the urban planning law of 1985 was not enough to find solutions for 
the local level problems, and the tension and power struggle between central and 
local governments have continued in the last two decades. Increasing problems in the 
administrative structure have led different national governments to look for a new 
system for local administrations starting from the second half of the 1990s. Although 
various reform proposals have been discussed in the parliament for years, the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly adopted new legislative reforms on local governments in 
2004 and 2005. In the next part, it can be useful to look into the new local 
administrations legislation very briefly in order to see the point reached on the issue 
of organization of local administrations in Turkey.
4.4.4 The New Local Administrations Legislation
Nearly eighty percent of the population in Turkey lives within the municipality 
borders today (DIE, State Institute of Statistics, 2000). Economic activities are 
mostly taken place in urban areas. Today's urban municipalities have political power 
as well. They are competing with central government for their share of authority and 
government. Together with the internal dynamics of Turkey, which have given 
strength to the municipality movement, the international or global developments also 
force central governments to take into consideration cities and urban policies more
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carefully. As we have already seen in previous chapters, globalisation and limitless 
capital movement in the world threaten the concept of nation-state. In relation to this, 
the national development notion seems an old-fashioned idea. Some important 
decisions on economic activities, now, are not taken in administrative capitals, but in 
the world or global cities directing the international capital. As a result of these 
developments in the world economic system, a hierarchy of cities has been created in 
the world scale.
The new situation forces national governments to reorganise the administrative 
structure of the state. The government system consisting of central and local 
administrations needs to be transformed to a structure based on co-operation and co­
ordination between different levels. The complementary administrations are aimed in 
this system while the unitary state structure remains same, and the role of local 
administrations increases. For a more efficient urban service production, local 
administrations need to become a competent working organisation and to have more 
financial and administrative power and responsibility.
In the light of these issues, administrative reform attempts in Turkey go back to the 
1960s. Since then, the problem of local administrations has continuously been 
addressed in various platforms. Differing national governments having highly 
diverse ideological bases have all taken subject of the new local administrations 
legislation on their government programmes since the beginning of the 1980s. 
According to a report published by TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association), ‘1980s’ waves in Western countries favouring smaller 
state had an impact on Turkey, resulting in an elevated official agenda for redefining
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the role of the state, downsizing public sector, and increasing efficiency of public 
service delivery’ (TUSIAD, 2004, p.l).
The issue of local government reform in Turkey, moreover, gained a new momentum 
in the last three years, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted new 
legislative reforms on local governments in 2004 and 2005 after a long wait. The 
general idea behind the new local administration law is to re-territorialise the 
administrative power and dominance of the central government on the municipalities. 
One of the most important aspects of the reform is to decrease the decision making 
power of the central government on local issues. The new local administrations law 
in Turkey is actually trying to bring an administrative and municipal reform with 
parallel to increasing decentralisation trends in the world countries. While the new 
legislation prepared by central government organizations is mostly aiming to make 
'the huge state' smaller and give larger authorisation to the local administrations, it 
also foresees that there will be a responsibility transfer from central to local in some 
crucial areas like education, health services, and intra-urban traffic. The new law also 
includes a change on the act of Provincial Local Administrations (act no. 3360 dated 
1987), and redefines the functions and duties of the local administrations.
With the new local administrations reform, the Municipality Law (no. 1580 dated 
1930), the Metropolitan Municipalities Law (no. 3030 dated 1984), the Municipality 
Revenues Law and the Real Estate Tax Law have been reorganised. Since the share 
of municipalities in the general state budget, real estate tax revenues and government 
fees have been increased, a rise in income of municipalities has been provided. The 
municipality tariffs have also been aimed to save against inflation.
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In addition, this new law mainly aims to give large responsibilities to municipalities. 
On the one hand, organisation of the intra-urban traffic, the school construction and 
providing land for schools are given under the responsibilities of municipalities with 
reference to the private education law. This can be seen as privatisation in education. 
Together with private schools, decision-making in opening hospitals is also given 
under the municipalities' authority. On the other hand, municipalities will be able to 
establish their private security organisations to provide security service for their 
cities and citizens. Then, the state land within municipality borders will be given to 
municipalities. Additionally, the municipalities will have a right to take their own 
labour and personnel. They also take the responsibility of hygienic controlling of 
food products and giving official documents to food producing firms.
Furthermore, this local administration reform is not only restructuring municipalities, 
but also city governments. According to the new legislation, the Provincial General 
Council will be replaced by the local parliament, and city governors and district 
officials will take some responsibilities of the central ministers. With this reform, the 
structure of the General Directorate of Village Works, which is the biggest central 
government institution, also changes and villages gain the opportunity to benefit 
from the municipality services.
There are, however, some criticisms about the new local administrations reform. 
According to TUSIAD, ‘the law lacks a coherent strategy that would enable local 
governments to generate and use new local resources’ (2004, p.4). TUSIAD also 
stresses ‘the fundamental importance of ensuring concrete mechanisms for civic
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participation in the government decision-making in the reform process’ (ibid., p.3). 
The civil society organisations such as the Chamber of Urban Planners, and the 
Chamber of Architects also share the similar concerns with TUSIAD, and they 
emphasise that local administration reform should find a solid community to the 
extent it encourages citizen and civil society participation together with the 
professional organizations.
4.5 Conclusion
The globalisation process of Turkey is closely related to its modernisation practice, 
which has been inherited from the Ottomans. One of the main products of this 
chapter in terms of the modernisation process has been that there are ‘several 
continuities between the Ottoman and the Republican political cultures’ in which 
‘modernization efforts are elite and state driven’ (Heper, 2000, p.63 and Barkey,
it.
2000, p.89-90). By the end of the 20 century, this modernisation project prepared 
by the state elites nevertheless seems to be no longer sustainable. Even though 
Turkey’s experiments with the economic liberalisation and structural adjustment in 
the 1980s and 1990s have been relatively successful in terms of opening up of the 
economy and the fast economic development of the country, the growth of the 
population’s grievances caused by the regional development differences, social 
inequalities and unfair distribution of wealth and income is an important sign of the 
decline in the power of the state elite.
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On the one hand, as a result of economic reforms based on free market rules and a 
global orientation, the Turkish economy has experienced a relatively high growth 
rate over the last two decades. According to Onis (2000, p.289), ‘in spite of the 
qualifications concerning the quality of economic growth, Turkey has managed to 
grow at an average rate of 4 to 5 percent since 1980’. On the other hand, although 
Turkey has been relatively successful in establishing democratic institutions and a 
liberal market economy, the majority of her population has still been excluded from 
real participation in economic and political potentials. The long tradition of top-down 
modernisation led to a group of elites almost exclusively controlling the resources of 
the Turkish society. Moreover, the authoritarian and paternalistic mind-set of this 
establishment prevents description of a real democratic, pluralistic and socially more 
just society.
Berksoy (2000), moreover, criticises the liberalisation process after 1980 such that; 
‘it is not a product of Turkey’s own social, political and economic dynamics. 
The liberalisation process in the 1980s symbolises a sudden and sharp turn 
rather than a continuous progress of the Turkish system. This model is a copy 
of the prescriptions of capitalism prepared for its crisis in the 1970s, which 
does not contain any characteristics of the Turkish system’.
In other words, different versions of liberal economic models implemented by 
international finance institutions such as IMF seem not working for some developing 
countries, and the dependency to the international organisations aiming to be more 
attractive for foreign investments may even be resulting with a destructive
3 The newspaper article of Berksoy (2000) has been translated by E.Zibel from Cumhuriyet, Issue: 
02.03.2000.
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environment for the capital. Turkey can be given as one of the good examples for 
this group of countries.
What happened in the last two decades actually is a significant restructuring of the 
state, that is, centralisation of government as well as a state-induced concentration of 
private power, parallel to the steps taken in the direction of establishing a market- 
oriented economy. The Turkish governmental system, similar to its Ottoman 
precedent, has generally shown strong centralism. Moreover, through their political 
and administrative influence on the state bureaucracy, the political elite also wished 
to control tightly local government politics from the national capital, Ankara in the 
last two decades. ‘While the state performing the traditional functions of distributing 
welfare and justice, the concentration of power at the centre and the control of the 
periphery through the distribution of patronage to local persons of influence have 
been important aspects of the state tradition’ (Erguder, 1987, p. 10). As a political 
result of this state tradition, ‘the central government has been the target of most 
political pressures, from local as well as national interests and influence has been 
concentrated in the hands of actors at the centre, including national political leaders, 
top bureaucrats, and major economic interests’ (Danielson and Keles, 1985, p.99).
Liberal governments, however, tried to adapt some political and administrative 
reforms to improve the state’s very centralistic structure, with parallel to the 
economic liberalisation and globalisation processes. One of the most important 
developments in this process was a new approach to local government, which clearly 
represented to desire for a break away from the centuries-long tradition of the highly 
centralised structure. Liberal governments in the 1980s tried to give municipalities
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some higher degree of both administrative and financial independence. Their laws 
and decrees ensured that local governments had at their disposal reliable and 
sufficient sources of revenue to carry out the services expected of them. At this point, 
we have to add that central governments have been considerably affected by the 
conditions of the global world such as the general decentralisation trend, which 
forces central governments to give up some authority in favour of local governments.
On the other hand, the local government system of the Turkish provinces has always 
been closely connected with the centre. Although the mayors and municipal councils 
have been elected popularly, municipalities have mostly remained subject to the 
close supervision and control by the central bureaucracy. Therefore, relations 
between central and local governments in Turkey during the last two decades can be 
identified as structural. Although there is this new approach of decentralisation, the 
relationship has kept of a centralistic, authoritarian and paternalistic nature. In other 
words, local governments were never allowed to develop independent policies free 
from the strict control of the central government.
‘The two-tier system of local government structure with greater and district 
municipalities in the 1980s, was proposed as a decentralisation effort, and although it 
seemed to be a managerial attempt to provide services more efficiently, the 
performance has been disappointing as the service responsibilities were shared 
between greater and district municipalities on the basis of service size, rather than the 
characteristics of the services and the citizens’ (Erkip, 2000, p.374). ‘The impact of 
decentralization on the representation of citizen groups at local government level 
however, was and is not a concern despite the changes in legal and organizational
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structures that caused such expectations’ (ibid.). ‘Now, it is clear that the new 
distribution of power between central and local governments made urban land more 
available for big construction companies instead of squatters’ (ibid.).
We also have to emphasise that legislative changes in the last two decades have 
given even wider powers in physical planning to the central government in Turkey. 
As Ersoy (1992, p.330) emphasises, ‘the governmental practice of the so-called 
liberal period post-1983 far from establishing strong, democratic and independent 
local governments, has even ignored the 1982 Constitution, specifying that the 
central government can have tutelage control over local governments’. As we have 
seen in this chapter in a detailed way, the use of discretionary powers of local 
governments by the central government has entered into legislation by particular 
regulations such as the Tourism Encouragement Law and Urban Planning Law as 
well as the 1982 Constitution itself. These types of central government involvement 
in local urban policies, today, are still continuing together with similar kinds of by­
laws which are implemented very specifically for selected areas.
On the other hand, the new local administrations legislation aiming at the 
decentralisation of government, so far, turned out to be an effort not to promote the 
local political participation but to reduce the influence of the traditional bureaucratic 
elites. According to the new legislation, the decentralisation of government only 
consists of restricting the tutelage powers of the central government over the 
metropolitan municipalities. Therefore, the new local administrations legislation 
seems distant from providing the participation for local actors and diminishing the 
involvement of the central government in local policies.
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To summarise, the complexity of Turkey's recent political economy relates to the 
apparently contradictory trends involving centralisation and decentralisation 
simultaneously. While there is an expansion in the discretionary power available to 
the central government, significant amount of administrative auhority and 
responsibilities have been granted to local authorities at the same time, and this was 
directly encouraged by the central government itself.
Moreover, the fact that major local authorities like Istanbul, having financial income 
deficiencies, could emerge as significant borrowers in international financial markets 
was due to the explicit guarantees provided by the central government in the first 
place. Hence, the increasing responsibilities and activities of local authorities does 
not necessarily mean increased autonomy of local government as we will see in the 
following chapters. Our concentration will turn to the city of Istanbul and its 
globalization adventure in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five
Globalisation and Changing Local Politics in Istanbul
5.1 Introduction
After having presented the economic and political globalisation process of Turkey in 
the last two decades, changing local politics in the metropolitan city of Istanbul will 
be taken into consideration in this chapter. There are some features which make 
Istanbul distinctive when compared to other world cities. Fist of all, it is a city 
bridging two continents: locating on the Bosporus, it links the regions associated 
with the Black Sea, with those that relate to the Marmara and Mediterranean Seas, 
and it is placed along the land bridge between Europe and Asia. Not only trade and 
commerce have moved along these channels for thousands of years, so have ideas 
and concepts of civilization and culture.
Then, it is a nodal point for international transportation, and a core for international 
communications, business and commercial activities. Finally, it is the engine that 
drives the Turkish economy being the primary location of industry and economic 
activities with an urban population of more than 10 million. With these 
characteristics, in attracting international trade, finance and tourism activities, it is 
the symbol and only candidate of Turkey in order to compete in the global arena.
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Figure 5.1 Istanbul from the satellite
Note: The picture has been retrieved from http://www.wikipedia.org.
The city of Istanbul, having a history of over 2600 years, has been the capital of the 
Roman, the Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire, which ended with the establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey. Having been the meeting point of a variety of 
civilizations, it still bears the mark of these different cultures. The city as the venue 
for an unmatched inventory of historical and cultural wealth that belongs to the 
world, maintains an important responsibility. This characteristic of the city is as 
important as its economy and geography in determining its status in the global arena. 
Therefore, the brief history of Istanbul will be focused at the beginning of this 
chapter, before starting to examine the economic development in the next section. As 
we have already seen in the previous chapter, the economic liberalisation started in 
the 1980s has a central role in the restructuring process of the Turkish government 
organisation. Istanbul, as the greatest metropolis of Turkey has been rapidly 
transformed in recent years. In the third section of this chapter, economic aspects of
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the globalisation process in Istanbul will be explored because economic globalisation 
is often seen as the most challenging phase of the globalisation discourse.
Then, the political dimension of globalisation will be taken into account in the fourth 
section, since economic and social changes take place within a political context. The 
local political developments have especially been shaped by the economic 
globalisation process in Istanbul during the last two decades. In relation to this, 
changing local politics in Istanbul will be examined in the fifth section. The central 
government’s new governance model for the city will be addressed, since this model 
has considerably affected both the local decision-making process and the degree to 
which the forces of globalisation is controlled in the city since the 1980s. The policy 
of creating new financial resources for the metropolitan government in the same 
period will also be included in this section. Because it appears to be a policy in order 
to promote certain projects under the name of globalisation, it will be crucial to see 
the results of the implementation of it. After that, urban entrepreneurship as another 
new strategy changing priorities in Istanbul will be explored. Finally, all issues 
related to the globalisation process of Istanbul will be summarised in the conclusion 
section of this chapter.
5.2 Istanbul: Brief History of a World City
Istanbul has experienced a very long and rich history. Having a history of over 2600 
years, Istanbul no doubt has some potential to be a world city. It has been the centre 
of three different civilisations: Roman, Byzantium and Ottoman, and the city always
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had a primary role in its region. The role as the capital city to numerous empires 
throughout its development has also left Istanbul with exclusive architectural and 
urban features. The history of Istanbul will concisely be examined by being separated 
into two sections: pre-republic and republic periods.
5.2.1 Pre-Republic Period
Istanbul’s recorded history goes back to the 7th century BC (Kuban, 1996, p. 10). The 
initial core settlement, Byzantion, was established on the hill at the edge of today’s
thHistorical Peninsula. In 193 AD, the Romans conquered Byzantium. In the 4 
century, the Emperor Constantine renamed it as Constantinople establishing it as 
Capital of the Roman Empire and subsequently the Capital of the Eastern Roman 
Empire, once the Empire was legally parted in two. Conquered by the Crusaders, the 
city was subsumed into the Latin Empire in the 13th century. The city thus weakened 
was never fully able to recover and was finally conquered by the Ottomans in 1453.
After the conquest, the city gained a new identity in development and reached its
thpeak, as did the Ottoman Empire in the 16 century. ‘When he conquered 
Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmet II began massive rebuilding effort that in 
time increased the population of the new Ottoman capital and added to the landscape 
hundreds of mosques, colleges, markets, government offices and public facilities, 
many of them of a monumental order’ (Manners and Marcus, 2002, p.l). In the 
following centuries, Istanbul and its monuments were greatly affected both with the
thfires and the uneasy conditions of the Empire. The late 18 century marked a new
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turn for Istanbul, and the city’s modem articulation began with the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire and the growth of modem European capitalism.
tViDuring the 19 century and even until the 1920s, its role in transit trade increased 
with the growth of world commerce, and it acquired a new commanding position in 
the world economy with respect to financing of trade, banks, and insurance. ‘Foreign 
businessmen started to live and organise in chambers of commerce, commodity 
exchanges were established, and regional centres of foreign banks were also located 
in the city’ (Keyder, 1999).
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Istanbul did acquire all the 
requirements of a port city evolving without the support of its imperial polity 
(Keyder et al., 1993). However, ‘it was not only a simple port city such as Izmir, 
Beirut, or Alexandria in the Empire that collects goods from its hinterland and 
conveys them to distant markets, but also an importing and consuming city like all 
imperial capitals in the world’ (Keyder, 1999, p.7).
‘Istanbul became a populated cosmopolitan metropolis of a million inhabitants just 
before the World War I, with 130,000 foreign subjects which were attracted by 
economic opportunity’ (Toprak, 1982, p.65). The city also kept its regional position 
being the largest market in the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Middle East region.
136
5.2.2 Republic Period
A new era started with the establishment of the Turkish Republic under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal in 1923. Istanbul, which had been a capital city for 
centuries, started to struggle in keeping this identity when the new Republican 
regime decided to move the capital to Ankara. According to Keyder (1999, p.3-11), 
‘Istanbul suffered disproportionately from the evolution of the new Turkish state 
after the World War I, since it was the capital and symbol of the Ottoman Empire’. 
‘Not only there was the global impact of the erosion of the constituent coordinates of 
a world economy based on free trade, but also adverse regional developments; and, 
finally, the advent of the new Turkish republic whose founders actively isolated the 
city’ (ibid., p.7). The political movement leading to the birth of the modem Turkish 
Republic in the 1920s was actually a movement towards modernisation of Ottoman 
culture and the making of a Turkish national identity based upon European models of 
the nation state and citizenship. This peculiar nationalist project had an ambivalent 
attitude towards Istanbul in which it was identified with the old Ottoman order as 
opposed to the new Turkish national identity and citizenship symbolised by Ankara.
Some characteristics of Istanbul also started to change in the first period of the 
Republic. Losing its administrative power, the city entered into a new socio­
economic and spatial transformation period. ‘In the period from 1923 to 1950, the 
nationalist project of the Ankara elites was imposed on Istanbul’ (ibid., p. 10). Keyder 
underlines that ‘the founders of the new Republic in the new and culturally 
uncontaminated capital were hostile to any urban autonomy based on the 
institutionalisation of market operations, and they were anxious to bring the economy
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under their control’ (ibid.). In relation to this, import substitution model was 
supported with a strict planning system to balance the regions of the country, and 
then Istanbul has lost its attractiveness with a number of political decisions of the 
national government.
The 1950s brought the governmental change in the political arena. According to 
Keyder:
‘in this new era, as a result of the new and relatively liberal approach, private 
sector has become important. The planning system was still on but not so 
rigid. Thus, investments to Istanbul started again together with a dense 
migration from rural to urban areas’ (ibid., p. 12).
In the national political arena, however, scarce financial resources have been diverted 
to agricultural subsidies of various sorts, and such subsidies accelerated the rural 
transformation since the principal theme was the incorporation of peasantry into 
electoral politics. One of the main consequences of rural transformation in Turkey in 
the 1950s has been rapid urbanisation and the growth of ‘gecekondu’ (shantytowns) 
in especially big cities like Istanbul.
While the ambivalent attitude of various national governments remained unchanged
tfifor most of the 20 century, Istanbul re-emerged in the 1980s as the pioneer of the 
Turkish culture and economy, together with the introduction of a radical neo-liberal 
regime of national governance. Structural adjustment, liberalisation, and privatisation 
programmes signalled that internationalisation of capital was an inescapable reality 
for the city. Political authorities were also aware of this and aimed to attract capital
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and to accommodate it specifically in Istanbul. The Turkish experience with 
economic liberalisation and structural adjustment still continues today although there 
have been various periodical economic crises. However, as we are going to see in a 
detailed way in the following sections and other chapters, Istanbul, even today, has 
not been very successful in breaking the hegemony of the nation state.
5.3 Economic Restructuring in Istanbul in the Last Two Decades
Istanbul has been the primary geography of economic liberalisation and globalisation 
as the heart of the Turkish economy with its incredible contribution to the national 
economy. Therefore, the city’s economic transformation in the last two decades has 
been remarkable.
‘As the largest metropolis of Turkey, the city of Istanbul carries most of the 
population and performs cultural, financial, commercial, industrial, tourism and 
service functions simultaneously, ans as a result of this, major capital accumulation 
concentrates within the metropolitan area’ (Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.4). ‘Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) share of Istanbul is about 21 percent of Turkey. While 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in Istanbul is US$ 4286, this rate is US$ 2888 for 
Turkey in general (State Institute of Statistics (DIE), 1996, cited in Karaman and 
Levent, 2001, p.4-5).
‘In the review of the sectoral division of GDP, it is significant to note that Istanbul's 
shares in imputed bank service changes, financial institutions, business and personal
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services, trade and manufacturing are comparably higher than Turkey’s share in 
general (see Table 5.1)’ (ibid., p.5). These high sectoral shares clearly show the 
weight of Istanbul in the Turkish economy. ‘The sectoral distribution of GDP 
presents that 30 percent of industrial production and 30 percent of trade activities, 
making up 60 percent in total have been generated in Istanbul metropolitan area’ 
(ibid.). ‘The transportation, communication and imputed bank service sectors follow 
the others with 15 percent’ (ibid.).
As already seen in the previous chapter, the economic liberalisation project in the 
1980s has immediately brought a deregulation process which has very important 
effects on the national economy. Economic liberalisation and structural adjustment 
policies were counselled by the IMF, and applied in the hope of restructuring the 
economy towards greater openness. It entailed attempts both to dramatically reduce 
the scope of the state sector and to situate the Turkish economy within the unitary 
logic of the global capitalism (Keyder, 1999).
This deregulation process, moreover, has dramatically affected the economic 
structure of cities in Turkey. Istanbul, demographically and economically, once again 
became the primate city of the country. This primacy started an effort to carry the 
city above national level, and compete with other cities in the international arena. 
One of the main attempts together with the economic liberalisation project became to 
position Istanbul as a global city to attract foreign capital and investment. The 
application for Customs Union and eventually for the full membership of the 
European Community also foresaw an international role for Istanbul and its business 
community (Keyder, 1999).
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Table 5.1 GDP by Economic Activity (1996)
Economic activity
Istanbul Turkey I s t ’s 
share in 
Turkey 
(%)GDP (in purchasers' 
value-million)
Sectoral
share
(%)
GDP (in 
purchasers' 
value-million)
Sectoral share 
(%)
l Agriculture 31 1.00 2.490 16.85 1.26
A Agriculture and 
livestock prod.
15 0.49 2.334 15.80 6.63
B Forestry 2 0.07 83 0.56 2.68
C Fishing 14 0.44 73 0.49 18.86
2 Industry 965 30.7 3.717 25.16 25.97
A Mining and quarrying 7 0.23 183 1.24 3.89
B Manufacturing 889 28.3 3.123 21.14 28.46
C Electricity, gas, water 69 2.21 410 2.78 16.93
3 Construction 162 5.16 858 5.81 18.87
4 Trade 955 30.4 3.022 20.46 31.59
A Wholesale and retail 817 26.0 2.539 17.19 32.16
B Hotels, restaurants, 
services
138 4.40 483 3.27 28.60
5 Transport, and 
communic.
490 15.6 1.942 13.14 25.25
6 Financial institutions 300 9.56 732 4.96 41.00
7 Ownership of dwelling 134 4.25 443 3.00 30.15
8 Business and personal 
services
223 7.09 554 3.75 40.16
9 Imputed bank service 
changes
378 12.0 709 4.80 53.27
10 Sectoral total (1-9) 2.882 91.8 13.048 88.33 22.09
11 Government services 147 4.69 1.239 838 11.88
12 Private non-profit 
institutions
13 0.40 27 0.18 46.49
13 Total (10+11+12) 3.042 96.9 14.314 96.90 21.25
14 Import duties 98 3.13 459 3.10 21.42
15 GDP in purchasers' 
value(13+14)
3.140 100 14.773 100 21.26
Source: State Institute of Statistics (DIE), 1996, cited in Karaman and Levent, 2001, p. 10-11.
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As we have seen in Chapter Two, in its original formulation, the political economy 
of the global city formation has been based on a few assumptions (Friedmann 1986 
and Sassen 1991). Capital is global, and its spatial organisation is hierarchical. The 
global cities are the places where the control functions of capital are located and they 
accommodate the labour force working for the advanced producer services. This 
model assumes a post-industrial development where manufacturing employment 
declines and producer services expand.
Istanbul has undoubtedly experienced a similar kind of transformation in this regard, 
and one of the most important components of this transformation in the last two 
decades has been the sectoral change in city’s economy. Keyder underlines that;
‘There is a flourishing service sector including marketing, accounting and 
management, telecommunications, banking and finance, transport, insurance, 
computers and data processing, legal services, auditing, consulting, 
advertising, design, and engineering’ (1999, p. 19).
The transnational companies have penetrated this sector through joint ventures, direct 
investment, and licensing. ‘Among the important FIRE (finance, insurance and real 
estate) services, employment has grown by one hundred thousand jobs between the 
years of 1980 and 1990’ (ibid.).
‘This economic transformation is also reflected in urban land use where the city 
centre has been occupied mostly by producer services in recent years’ (Berkoz, 1998, 
cited in Erkip, 2000, p.372). These producer services are all located in the newly 
developing business districts with their tall and smart high-tech office buildings. All
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this fast development in the 1980s, however, is slowed down by uncertainty, 
ambivalence, and lack of legislative and physical infrastructure in the 1990s.
The manufacturing industry in Istanbul, on the other hand, started to decentralise 
throughout the Marmara Region1 while FIRE activities are developing in the central 
areas quite rapidly. On the one hand, some sectors, with their flexible structures, 
could adapt to the transformation process, on the other hand, some others had to give 
up or change activity. The manufacturing industry has basically started to decrease 
its growth in the 1970s, and this trend continued in the 1980s. The industries that 
have scattered in the central parts of the city over the years have been taken away 
forward to the east and western fringes of the city. ‘Some of the manufacturing sector 
such as tanning and leather industry have moved to Kurtkoy and larger size sectors 
including metal and chemical industries moved out to Gebze and Izmit along the E-5 
highway (See Figure 5.2)’ (Karaman, 1998, cited in Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.7).
Instead of manufacturing, some other sectors such as construction, trade and finance 
started to increase rapidly from 1970 onwards with parallel growth with the immense 
enlargement in the informal sector. Manufacturing started to choose the cities in the 
region of Marmara to locate, and left the urban core since 1980s mainly due to high 
land prices, increasing rents and the pressure of finance and service activities for the 
central locations. The state incentives of the national government given to the 
adjacent cities in the region both to decentralise industry in Istanbul and to expand 
the industrial investments in the region have also influenced this trend.
1 -Marmara Region is one of the 9 geographical regions in Turkey including Istanbul.
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Istanbul has also experienced a rent boom of land, of housing and of office space in 
the 1980s because of the economic approaches based on rent instead of productive 
areas. Particularly in the districts of Levent and Maslak on the European side of the 
city, and Kozyatagi and Bostanci on the Asian side, lots of new office towers started 
to develop, and these developments put further pressure on rents. Thus the attraction 
of industrial investments for the capital has shifted towards land and building 
speculation in the physical space.
Figure 5.2 Specialized Suburban Areas and Centres of Attractions in Istanbul
MARMARASEA
Note: The map has been cited from Karaman and Levent, 2001.
During the 1980s, private sector investments have shifted towards housing and 
tourism mainly, while public investments have shifted towards transportation, 
communication and energy. Thus, the power of industry to create employment has 
disappeared. From 1980 to 1990 manufacturing employment rate in Istanbul’s
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employment structure has decreased, but when compared to Turkey, Istanbul was 
still growing faster in industry. ‘In 1980, 27 of every 100 employment in industry 
throughout the country were in Istanbul, while in 1990 this number has increased to 
30’ (Sonmez, 1996). ‘Manufacturing employment rate of 32.8 % in 1990 was also 
almost 3 times of the country average, which was 11.9 %’ (ibid.).
All these changes have also affected the socio-spatial structure of the city. According 
to Erkip:
‘Middle and upper income groups have been attracted by suburban 
development following global examples, although Istanbul has a unique 
character with historical and cultural inheritance in the urban core’ (2000, 
p.372).
However, due to the transformation of economic activities and consequent land-use 
of the city, most of the popular residential neighbourhoods with historic and 
authentic characteristics have been prone to the invasion of non-residential use, as in 
the case of Eminonu, which is one of the oldest central district areas in the city. 
There has been ‘a mix development which has created a lively and even pleasantly- 
congested urban environment of business, trade, tourism and culture, at the expense 
of authentic community life there’ (Akpinar et al., 1998)’. The following table 
presents an example of that mix land use in Eminonu. Figure 5.3, on the other hand, 
shows a map including all central and peripheral districts in the city.
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Table 5.2 The distribution of predominant activities in the traditional centre, 
Eminonu (shown with number 01 in the following district map)
ACTIVITY AREA (ha) (% )
Trade 81.3 17.10
Residential 69.6 14.65
Institutional-administrative 66.7 13.53
Parks-sports 55.4 11.68
Education 29.2 6.16
Religious 18.5 3.90
Workshops 16.3 3.48
Open space 12.1 2.54
Offices 9.0 1.89
Storage 0.9 1.66
Hotels 3.3 0.70
Health 1.6 0.32
TOTAL 474.1 100.00
Source: Akpinar, A. et al. (1998), cited in Erkip, 2000, p.373. 
Figure 5.3 District Map of Istanbul
[{umtce
*1 Ej i m MMI I I  U * n t< »  21 l * ) n m p * i
•2  Fatih I?  S»mw 22 FhckIo« Beotia I) tk>U I) CtiatfJm.
04 ZouatMM 14 fcfaha :« IU*vd*
0) E\4p 15 K jtul 25 feh p cb p k t
Oft ( u 'w w u n p i i *  I *  r e u * » \ t  2 *  K t ic a h e tb n c c c  
07 fe ll  17 M*)kiv 27 V k^jb
51 M cm fct 
CHwoA."
5.1
54 Y m k C r a
55 Sftfifvt
Note: The map has been taken from Erkip, 2000, p.373.
146
Another related dimension for the global positioning of a city is the informational 
infrastructure, serving the bridging needs that establish reliable conduct between the 
nodes of the global system of information flows (Castells, 1989). According to 
Keyder:
‘the central government’s reluctance and inability to undertake privatisation 
in transportation and communications sectors damaged Istanbul’s chance in 
the global arena. Although keeping up with the technology in these two 
sectors is essential, public agencies have proved inadequate in both’ (1999,
p. 16-21).
In addition, negative conditions have also affected incoming foreign capital to the 
city. Since foreign investors have been cautious, investment by trans-national 
companies fluctuated and was not sufficient to provide a self-sustaining process in 
Istanbul. ‘Despite geographic advantages and the access to European markets 
provided by the customs union, inflow of foreign capital has fluctuated below the $1 
billion mark, and reached $1.1 billion in 1996, representing 0.3 percent of the world 
flow’ (Keyder, 1999, p. 16-21). Hence, ‘the formal economy remained predominantly 
oriented to secure domestic markets, and its restructuring along the expectations of 
economic globalisation has been much below the potential’ (ibid.).
In general, the indicators at the beginning of the 21st century show that Istanbul’s 
transformation has lagged behind in terms of expectations of the global city model. 
First, the international role of the city has remained limited. Secondly, the city 
continued to serve predominantly to its national hinterland. Then, information 
technology has generally advanced slowly. Finally, financial services have not
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become a leading sector accounting for significant accumulation or employment 
creation.
5.4 Political Aspects of the Economic Globalisation Process in Istanbul
The liberalisation and deregulation programme of Turkey in the 1980s was 
politically managed by a centre-right alliance of interests under the umbrella of the 
Motherland Party (ANAP), and in terms of economic policies, the party supported a 
continuation of the liberalisation strategies (Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.398). The 
economic transformation without a doubt led to greater integration with the world 
economy, and ‘the new political strategy became increasingly focussed upon major 
metropolitan centres as both showcases of the new era of internationalism and as the 
most likely basis of its clientelistic networks and electoral appeal’ (Keyder and Oncu, 
1994b, p.41). As a result, the city of Istanbul emerged as the main centre of 
attraction. According to Keyder and Oncu:
‘The export drive was successful, resulting in the establishment of a large 
number of world-market oriented concerns in Istanbul. More importantly,
foreign companies were persuaded by the liberal rhetoric of the
government to invest and to open offices in Turkey’, (ibid.)
The city began to take in this transformation and to reflect it in its spatial and social 
change. Istanbul, also, started to benefit from changing central government attitudes 
related to urban autonomy. Two parallel trends of globalisation and decentralisation 
actually led to local government acquiring funds to invest in the city. As we will see
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in Chapter Six in a more detailed way, ‘Istanbul received a major influx of state 
funding in the 1980s, which was much more than at any time in the Republic’s 
history’ (Heper, 1987; Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.397).
The liberal mayor of the ANAP government between 1984 and 1989 was Bedrettin 
Dalan, and he expectedly followed the entrepreneurial approach to implement some 
urban policies. The main target of his urban renewal projects was to create the 
framework for the transformation of Istanbul from a national primate city heavily 
affected by rapid immigration into a world city.
On the one hand, large areas of the 19 century inner-city neighbourhoods were 
cleared, and small manufacturing establishments were evicted from their centuries- 
old quarters in the city centre. On the other hand, massive projects requiring large- 
scale investment such as avenues were built along the Golden Horn and the 
Bosporus. Istanbul was rapidly becoming a city designed for cultural consumption, 
with a well-defined tourist area containing monuments and heritage sites in the form 
of restored neighbourhoods, readily accessible from the newly built hotels. An 
internationalised business district was also shaping up, with modem office towers 
designed to accommodate global functions. In other words, Istanbul emerged as the 
vanguard signalling for Turkey’s new era of integration into the world scene 
(Keyder, 1999, p. 17).
The liberal mayor Dalan, however, disregarded the overwhelming electoral weight of 
new immigrants; in welcoming the entrepreneurial dimension the popular was 
forgotten (Keyder, 1999). In the election of 1989, the social democrat candidate,
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Nurettin Sozen became the new mayor of Istanbul. He was quite suspicious of the 
discourse of globalisation, and ‘he rejected the entrepreneurial style of his 
predecessor, preferring to satisfy his core constituency’ with a populist approach 
(Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.415). During his time, ‘resources of the urban 
government were mostly allocated towards bringing services to shantytown dwellers 
and new immigrants’ (ibid., and Keyder, 1999). Istanbul’s increasing problems were 
not solved at all in his five years tenure.
Then, in 1994 local elections the candidate of the Islamic Welfare Party (RP), in 
1999 local elections the candidate of the Islamic Virtue Party (FP), and in 2004 local 
elections the candidate of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a plurality 
with 26, 28 and 45 percent respectively. All three parties can actually be included in 
the same ideological faction consisting of the people with religious sentiments. The 
mayor between 1994 and 1999, Recep Tayyip Erdogan , who is the prime minister 
today, was the most charismatic one among three and ran on a platform of 
anticorruption, public morality, and social justice. The other two, Ali Mufit Gurtuna 
and Kadir Topbas have in general followed similar approaches to Erdogan’s. Their 
stance towards the entrepreneurial dimension of the globalisation alternative was 
ambivalent at the beginning. During the 1994 election campaign, for instance, the 
WP candidate for mayor, Erdogan was the only one to be able to distance himself 
from the global city project. His party’s organisation superiority in the shantytowns 
and its anti-cosmopolitan stance was interpreted as another instance of embracing the 
popular against the global city project (Bora, 1999).
2 Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been the prime minister of Turkey since the beginning o f2003, and he is 
the leader of governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) which was found by the people who 
broke out from the Welfare Party in 2002.
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According to Bora (1999), the belief that the global city project could no longer be 
revived became widespread at the beginning of the Islamic RP and FP’s local 
administrations. ‘The pessimist prognosis expected that there would be a reversal of 
Istanbul’s modernisation, a turning inward that would delink the city from the world 
economy, leading to cultural “provincialisation”’ (ibid.).
However, the attainment of power changed many things, and the logic of economic 
rationality started to take the priority again and soon altered the Islamist local 
governments’ thinking about the city as a business enterprise. According to Bora 
(ibid., p.56), ‘as the Islamic movement seeks to come to an understanding with the 
Turkish bourgeoisie, it also has to accept the global city project of big capital’. He 
adds that ‘the Islamic administrators of today also bow to economic logic and to the 
requirements of the global city project by leaving their anti-systemic radicalism that 
was so prominent during election periods’ (ibid.).
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that at the beginning of the 21st century, global 
Istanbul is a common ideal of all political parties ranging from liberals to 
conservatives with religious tendencies. All political parties are quite aware of the 
fact that Istanbul has already been fragmented in an irreversible manner and needs 
managerial and financial strategies to survive under the conditions of the global 
world.
In the next section of this chapter, changing local politics in Istanbul during the last 
two decades will be examined in a more detailed way.
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5.5 Changing Local Politics in Istanbul
5.5.1 Effects of the New Model of Metropolitan Governance in the 1980s
Starting from the 1980s, Turkey adopted a new approach to local government which 
clearly represented a break away from her centuries-long tradition of a highly 
centralized style. As a result of this, municipalities were granted a greater degree of 
both administrative and financial autonomy. ‘Their laws and decrees ensured that 
local governments had at their disposal reliable and sufficient sources of revenue to 
carry out the services expected of them’ (Esmer, 1989, p.46). ‘Until the 1980s, local 
politics in Istanbul had centred on the distributive capacities of the municipality, 
which became the prize of competition among rival interests, and thus, clientelism 
and patronage served as the dominant mode of generating and maintaining political 
support’ (Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.417). However, staring from the 1990s, after a 
decade of growing integration into the world, the metropolitan municipality of 
Istanbul increasingly focused on the creation of the necessary urban infrastructure for 
purposes of the global position of the city. ‘This was also because the new system of 
a metropolitan municipality with a subordinate tier of district municipalities has 
shifted the traditional levers of patronage politics down to local districts’ (ibid.).
The creation of a new model of metropolitan governance for the largest cities has 
been one of the most important components of ANAP’s policy package in the 1980s. 
Keyder and Oncu underline that;
‘the progressive trend since the 1950s had been towards administrative 
fragmentation of metropolitan areas with the major city authority surrounded
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by dozens of small municipalities. The need to coordinate the unwieldy 
network of local and provincial governments, public and semi-public 
agencies, each fighting for its own prerogatives, was acknowledged by 
experts and politicians alike since the early 1970s’ (ibid., p.404).
Numerous alternative proposals for new administrative legislation had been stalled in 
political negotiations over questions of jurisdiction and authority. ANAP enacted a 
new law which amounted to a total politico-administrative overhaul of the existing 
confusion in 1984. This new government model involved a two-tier system, designed 
to centralize major metropolitan functions and place them under direct authority of 
the metropolitan mayor. ‘In the case of Istanbul, a host of agencies ranging from the 
Master Plan Bureau to the Water Supply and Sewerage Authority, formerly attached 
to various central ministries in Ankara, were brought under the direct control and 
power of the metropolitan mayor’ (ibid.). The new system suggested administrative 
action together with new financial resources. The legitimacy of the metropolitan 
municipality increasingly depended on carrying out the investment activity designed 
to promote greater investment, and on creating the appropriate climate for 
entrepreneurship, since the main concentration was on investment activity in the new 
era.
According to Keyder and Oncu:
‘in addition to creating an all-powerful metropolitan mayoralty, the new 
model also introduced a second tier of “district municipalities” each with its 
own elected mayor and municipal council. A range of municipal services, 
from refuse collection, street repairs and maintenance to surveillance
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activities were devolved to these district municipalities. Of greatest political 
significance among these, was the decentralisation of detailed land use 
planning, building control, and building permits’ (ibid., p.405).
Another very important and related development coming with the new model of 
metropolitan governance has been the increasing financial resources for local 
authorities, and Istanbul metropolitan government seemed the one who benefited 
most since the 1980s.
5.5.2 New Financial Resources for the Metropolitan Government of Istanbul
As a result of the new approach in the metropolitan government, ‘the neo-liberal 
ANAP government began to progressively increase the proportion of total tax 
revenues allocated to municipal administrations starting with 1983’ (Keyder and 
Oncu, 1993, p.21). ‘In 1983, 6.4 per cent of the national taxes were received by local 
governments, and by 1990, this proportion had risen to 13.3 per cent’ (ibid.). ‘In 
addition, new legal provisions allowed metropolitan governments to levy and/or 
increase local taxes, fees, and charges on a variety of activities ranging from sports 
and entertainment to advertising’ (Keles, 1986, cited in Keyder and Oncu, 1993,
p.21).
Keyder and Oncu emphasise that;
‘for Istanbul’s metropolitan government, so far confined to incremental 
additions and repairs to the city’s progressively deteriorating physical
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infrastructure, the immediate consequences of the expansion in revenue in the 
1980s were crucial’ (1994, p.400).
For the first time in over two decades, the increase in Istanbul’s revenue base 
outstripped current expenditures necessary for the maintenance of a municipal 
bureaucracy and basic services to allow for major infrastructural investments. 
Additionally, ‘its enhanced revenue base allowed the city to tap into foreign credit 
markets abroad in order to finance specific projects’ (ibid.). The liberalisation 
policies of the central government together with the opening up of Turkish economy 
indeed had a very significant role in this process. ‘Between 1983 and 1989, Istanbul 
was able to raise an estimated $900 million in loans from abroad, and was able to 
purchase a new fleet of buses and to import passenger ships in order to ease inner 
city traffic congestion’ (ibid.).
On the other hand, as Keyder and Oncu emphasise that;
‘in assessing the political significance of the direct transfer of revenues to 
metropolitan governments, it is important to keep in mind that Istanbul’s 
population growth remained at a level exceeding 300,000 new inhabitants 
annually. Thus, the demand for basic municipal services invariably exceeded 
actual capacity. Although substantial in absolute terms, the increase in 
municipal revenue did not even come close to meeting the accumulated 
demand for physical services’ (ibid., p.401).
Istanbul continued to be a city where nearly all basic services such as water, sewage, 
electricity, road, public transportation and garbage collection were in chronic short
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supply and in need to be improved. Despite this, the liberal mayor Bedrettin Dalan’s 
choice was mostly in favour of increasing the accumulation potential of the city 
through investment-inviting projects designed to enhance the global image of 
Istanbul.
The construction of many high-rise office buildings, deluxe hotels and modem 
plazas, the second bridge on the Bosporus, and the fast sea bus project can be given 
as examples of the developments in Dalan’s tenure. ‘Those ambitious infrastructural 
investments and urban renewal projects were for the first time since the 1950s, and 
the ensuing building activity transformed the urban shape and permitted the exercise 
of a significant degree of entrepreneurship toward globalisation of the city by the 
then mayor and business groups who supported him’ (Keyder and Oncu, 1994, 
p.402).
However, the things started to change in the 1990s. After the 1989 local elections, a 
process of different parties and ideologies being represented in central and local 
governments began. Because of the political opposition, the central government’s 
support to local administrations governed by opposition parties considerably 
decreased. This situation has mostly had an effect on the city of Istanbul. Both the 
central government in Ankara and metropolitan government of Istanbul preferred the 
populist approach and tried to satisfy their core constituencies. Under these 
conditions, there was a competition rather than a co-operation among different levels 
of government, and Istanbul was deeply affected from this situation. Both public and 
private investments reduced speed when we compare with the pre-1990 period, and 
therefore, the globalisation project of the city started to be slowing down.
156
The final turn in terms of obtaining financial resources, on the other hand, has 
become after 2004 local elections in which the conservative AKP took hold both the 
central government and local government in Istanbul. Since the prime minister 
Erdogan came from the Istanbul municipal mayoralty, the central government’s 
financial and administrative support to local administration in Istanbul considerably 
increased. Under these conditions, Istanbul started to become popular once again and 
global concerns took the stage back. Both public and private investments started to 
be directed at the city parallel to the world city project of the government.
5.5.3 Urban Entrepreneurship
Urban entrepreneurship and the effects of strategic groups on decisions have become 
important issues in the new era of urban governance. Global positioning of the city 
and increasing infrastructure investments made urban entrepreneurship phenomenon 
even more important in the last decade. For some colleagues, ‘it is strategic groups 
within cities which have the capacity and the potential for implementing projects in 
accordance with their interests’ (Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.415). ‘The guiding 
concern in the account is to investigate the feasibility and the conditions of success 
of urban entrepreneurship’ (ibid.). ’While the general principle that geo-political 
opportunity and entrepreneurship have to be combined in order for Istanbul to 
successfully position itself in the new world-economy is correct, the descriptive 
account of the city’s recent transformation suggests a need to further investigate the 
notion of urban entrepreneurship’ (ibid.).
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On the one hand, urban entrepreneurship and interest group pressure have been 
factors balancing the populism dictated by electoral politics. ‘Managing the city is 
today an art of balancing between the services that the new immigrants require and 
investing for the purposes of acquiring a certain status in the globalising world 
economy’ (ibid., p.418-419). ‘With limited municipal resources this choice between 
populism and growth confronts urban administrations with an insuperable dilemma’ 
(ibid.).
As Keyder argues that, ‘the globalisation that has occurred since 1990 has not been 
assisted by urban entrepreneurship in Istanbul’ (1999, p. 10-11). ‘The ambivalent 
stance towards the entrepreneurial dimension of the globalisation alternative .... has 
been one of the elements preventing the emergence of a vision that might allow the 
city’s different interest groups to engage in effective urban entrepreneurship’ (ibid.). 
With reference to the potential for globalisation, the inability to commit resources 
and rhetoric to a globalisation project has led to a passive stance on the city’s part 
during the 1990s.
Despite this unwillingness to continue with the global positioning strategy, it was the 
turn of ‘strategically placed groups’, which have been sufficiently integrated into 
global networks, to exert pressure on elected officials. The candidacies of Istanbul to 
host the Olympic Games, and the big support behind that are actually good examples 
to show the common ground in both national and local policy areas of being more 
global and living in it. We will see this in a detailed way in Chapter Eight.
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5.6 Conclusion
There has been a significant transformation in the economic structure of Istanbul 
parallel to increasing globalisation trend in the last two decades. Istanbul has 
certainly benefited from the rapid economic liberalisation process started in the 
1980s. As examined in Chapter Four, the administrative decentralisation and 
increasing financial sources coming with the liberalisation process have also given 
some impetus to the city in global competition. Istanbul received some important 
amount of state funding, and international loans to rebuild the city during this period. 
The liberal mayor’s political power and the central government’s entire support made 
the 1980s relatively successful period for Istanbul. However, this rapid development 
slowed down in the 1990s with changes in the political arena. Since most of local 
governments kept their traditional role of local administration in national politics, 
ignoring local and global dynamics, they became incapable of providing 
requirements of global capital.
Various local governments used differing approaches of local politics for the 
globalisation project of Istanbul. Those political approaches have been represented 
by completely different political agendas in the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul. On the one hand, the liberal approach entirely shaped its policies in favour 
of the globalisation project in the 1980s. On the other hand, the social democratic 
and Islamic right-wing approaches mostly preferred the populist alternative ignoring 
globalisation in the 1990s. The new Islamic conservative attitude since 2003, 
however, appeared to be attached to the globalisation project of world capital, 
although they were reluctant at the beginning. In general, because of the lack of a
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continous globalisation policy for the city in the last two decades, Istanbul has not 
been very successful in global competition in terms of attracting the inward 
investment.
Although various local governments in Istanbul suggested a range of global city 
ideas and gave priorities to diverse objectives in their policies since the 1980s, the 
common nature of those policies was their inability to solve urban physical and 
socio-economic problems on the way to advance the city in the global arena. When 
they endorsed the globalisation project, it appeared that real urban problems of the 
city were often missed for the sake of investments to attract foreign investment. 
When they preferred to ignore globalisation, they were unsuccessful in creating 
alternative solutions.
According to Keyder:
‘the city is prevented from playing a global role by constraints imposed by the 
political sphere. The continuation of populist politics and the reluctance to 
institute a liberal framework at the national level, and also the lack of 
coherent and unifying entrepreneurial vision at the local level have limited the 
chance of Istanbul in the globalisation rivalry’ (1999, p.23).
The lack of an effective urban entrepreneurship and the inability to commit resources 
and rhetoric to a globalisation project in the 1990s has led to a passive stance on the 
city’s part. As a result, the social and economic development level of Istanbul has 
lagged behind when compared to other world cities. The adjustment to the new 
economic system in the 1980s was not able to make a good progress so far, and it
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appears that the adjustment process will take a long time since the social and 
physical infrastructure need to be developed yet. In other words, in terms of evidence 
of being a world city, Istanbul has not been in front among various other cities in the 
world.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, new concepts, procedures and tools of planning at 
different levels have emerged as responses to growing economic and political 
globalization. Urban planning strategies and policies, in this manner, have also been 
considerably affected by globalisation leading to increased competition for global 
investment between world cities. In relation to this, next chapter will be 
concentrating on the process of planning and changing urban policies in Istanbul as a 
reaction to new global formations in the city.
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Chapter Six
The Process of Planning in Istanbul
6.1 Introduction
The metropolitan city of Istanbul has been located in one of the geographically 
strategic locations in the world. Its two sided urban settling along the Bosporus 
which separates Europe and Asia gives the city a unique characteristic. The 
Bosphorus connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara passing by the city. The 
old city is located at the southeastern tip of the European side. The Golden Horn 
which is an inland body of water divides the European part into two: one is the old 
imperial section called the historical peninsula on the south bank, and the other is the 
port quarter of Galata on the north bank, which has expanded to Taksim business and 
cultural district in time.
The urban development pattern of Istanbul shows a linear form on the east and west 
directions. The city has been expanded for more than sixty kilometres along the 
Marmara shores on each side of the harbour. The Istanbul metropolitan area is spread 
over 6500 square kilometres, bordering town of Tekirdag in the west and Gebze in 
the east, extending from the Black Sea coast in the north to Yalova in the south, 
thereby having a population of more than 10 million people. Its population and 
industry are divided almost equally between two sides of the city. Istanbul, which
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boasts about one fouth of the country’s urban population, has become the most 
important financial, trade, tourism and cultural centre of Turkey.
Figure 6.1 The Geographical Map of Istanbul
iSTANBUL
MAP
Note: The rectangular area shows the central business district area in Istanbul.
These geographical and economic characteristics of Istanbul are determining factors 
in the planning process of the city. In the first section of this chapter, the planning 
process in Istanbul will mainly be explored. First of all, developments in the planning 
process will be examined from an historical perspective by separating the process 
into four periods. This historical process will start with the conquest of 
Constantinople by the Ottomans, will continue with the early Republic period, and is 
going to come until the present situation. Then recent master plans of Istanbul will 
briefly be examined. Implications of those plans in the city will help to understand 
the globalisation approach of various local governments in recent years. The third
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section of this chapter will present governmental actors having important roles in the 
planning process of the city. After that, in the following section, changing urban 
policies under the conditions of globalisation will be taken into account. This section 
is going to draw the general framework for the following two case study chapters. 
Finally, the conclusion section will summarise all the issues came out in this chapter.
6.2 Planning in Istanbul
The planning process of Istanbul will be taken into consideration under four periods 
in this section. While the pre-Republic era is examined in the first part, subsequent 
three parts will consist of three periods of the post-Republic era starting from 1920s.
6.2.1 The Pre-Republic Era
After the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453, groups of people 
from Anatolia and conquered lands were settled in various parts of the city in order 
to increase its population. During this time, the most important criterion for 
settlement was containment of Muslim and non-Muslim populations within certain 
areas. Therefore, borders that defined settlement reflected various ethnicities. As the 
population of the city grew in time, new areas of settlement were established in 
Galata and Uskudar districts and on the Bosporus. Since the city became spread over 
two continents, the problem of transportation started emerging.
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Urban planning that was to effect the development of the city gained speed in the
th19 century as relations with western countries increased. The first overall city plan 
was prepared by Moltke at the beginning of the 1800s. ‘The most important feature 
of the plan was that the streets were designed to provide transportation in certain 
directions in a city where means of transportation were quite limited and which had 
peculiar traffic problems’ (Gorgulu et al, 1996).
‘During periods when efforts for westernisation were dominant, the Imperial Edicts 
of Reform of 1839 and 1856 were issued also as a response to internal pressures that 
were applied to the government partially by ethnic minorities’ (Gorgulu et al, 1996). 
As a result of these efforts, the conventions that had determined the macro level 
settlement patterns, particularly in Istanbul, have disappeared, thereby making the 
boundaries that used to delimit Muslims and non-Muslims extinct. This is also a 
period during which the administrative, organizational and governmental structure of 
the Ottoman Empire was being questioned, and concomitantly, reformed. One of the 
first things to be done as part of the reform package was the effort to develop 
institutionalization in order to keep change under control.
As one of the most important results of westernization movement, which impacted 
both the administrative system and legislative structure, new organization models 
and regulations were established for the planning of urban areas. These laws imposed 
a grid pattern on the otherwise traditional organic pattern of the city. ‘In 1848 the 
Ebniye Nizamnamesi (Regulation of Buildings) was issued to be in effect only in 
Istanbul, thereby establishing the legal basis for development in the sense of 
buildings’ (Gorgulu et al, 1996). ‘The regulation allowed expropriation and
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demolition in order to widen streets; specified maximum dimensions for streets and 
buildings; introduced the obligation of obtaining permits for building; and required 
the construction of certain sections of houses in bricks and stone’ (Ersoy, 1992, 
p.336).
As an experiment for the rest of the city, in 1854, the newly established mercantile 
upper class came established the first western type of municipal organization. This 
experiment resulted in legislation that provided the establishment of a new municipal 
organization, called, Sehremaneti. This organization was given the responsibility of 
development actions such as enlarging the streets, opening park areas, providing the 
masonry construction of the buildings, keeping the city clean, inspection of shops 
and markets, and collection of taxes for the state. Tasks were basically related to the 
administration of city. This new local administrative structure tried to integrate the 
European municipal concepts into the traditionally accepted practices, and was in 
charge until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
In 1858 a regulation related to the streets was also issued Sokaklara Dair Nizamname 
(Regulation of Streets), which was a compilation of the articles of previous 
regulations. A new regulation dated 1864 was called Turuk ve Ebniye Nizamnamesi 
(Regulation of Roads and Buildings), making the previous one ineffective. ‘Ebniye 
Kanunu (the Law of Buildings) was put into effect in 1882, thereby making the 1864 
regulation ineffective’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.336). According to some researchers, ‘this law 
provided quite a comprehensive and logical framework for construction legislation 
and it was a turning point in the history of Turkish urban planning’ (Turksoy, 1988, 
cited in Ersoy, 1992, p.337).
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‘The Law of Buildings banned the construction of cul-de-sacs, imposed compulsory 
planning for areas that experienced conflagration and gave citizens the right to object 
to the plans’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.337). ‘More significant was the obligatory transfer of 
parts of land subject to development for public use, in the case of conversions from 
agricultural to urban use’ (ibid.). ‘With this code, new organizations were introduced 
for city squares and open areas; widths of roads were specified, certain proportions 
were introduced between street widths and the height of buildings; and detailed rules 
were initiated relating to plot shapes and proposed buildings’ (ibid.).
In 1857 the Sixth Municipal Office, the first municipality in Istanbul was founded to 
administer the district. This particular name was chosen because a municipal 
administration with the same name had been established in a modem and elite 
section of Paris (Gorgulu et al., 1996). Many projects related to inter-city 
transportation were developed but not put into practise in the nineteenth century, 
(ibid.). Despite the fact that these projects were not realized, local development 
projects that were not in harmony with the nature of the city were prepared by 
engineers for areas destroyed by fire. The railroad and harbour facilities at Galata 
and Sirkeci docks are also important examples of the efforts made during this period. 
New technologies in transportation facilitated the growth of the city, and also 
affected the macrostructure of the city, resulting in an expansion of the residential 
areas.
The historical part of Istanbul and the westernized part of the city had reached an 
equilibrium point by the end of the last few years of the Empire. Additionally,
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important demographic changes took place in the city after World War I and the War 
of Independence in 1922. Western population who had been living in Pera left the 
country, and the Greek minority, who was not an Ottoman subject, was displaced 
during population exchanges (Gorgulu et al, 1996).
6.2.2 The Early Republic Era: 1923-1960
Istanbul started to witness a decline during the early republican period when Ankara 
was proclaimed as the new capital of the new republic in 1924. During this period 
many intellectuals decided to leave Istanbul with the idea of developing Anatolia.
The effects of 'etatism' in the economic sphere made themselves felt in Istanbul as it 
was no more the centre of consumption that was based on nationwide surplus and 
imported goods, nor was it the centre of various movements concerned with 
development. Tax revenues had now been collected and distributed throughout the 
whole country, with the idea of decreasing interregional disparities.
Economic policies and population movements in this period brought the city a socio­
economic deterioration. Another factor that hindered economic prosperity in Istanbul 
was the fact that the country was in economic difficulties between two world wars. 
According to Keyder and Oncu:
‘in the political and economic matrix of the inter-war years, Istanbul suffered 
a dramatic decline. During the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the 
end of World War I and the subsequent four years of nationalist struggle,
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Istanbul lost a substantial part of its past network of commercial relations. 
The consolidation of the Republican regime in the new political capital, 
Ankara, left no room for the revival of Istanbul-based interest organizations’ 
(1993, p.15).
This slowdown in the development of the city obscured the problems in functional 
spheres such as employment and housing. Consequently, attempts to develop the city 
focused on the idea of the beautification (Gorgulu et al., 1996), and no serious efforts 
were made in relation to municipal affairs and urban development until the 1930s.
Ersoy underlines that;
‘the most important attempt in urban development activities during this 
period was the effort towards creating a capital city of Western standards that 
would serve as a model for the whole country. However, no need was felt to 
prepare a new and comprehensive urban development law nor to modify the 
legislation, which was an Ottoman residue. An important development was 
the requirement of urban development plans as a function of the Directorate 
of Urban Development in Ankara, which was established in i928. Two years 
later, with the Law of General Public Health, this requirement was extended 
to cover all municipalities with populations over 20,000’ (1992, p.337).
By the 1930s the new republican regime started to be interested in local 
administration, ‘a new urban development law had been enacted’, and ‘the purpose 
of the new republican administration was once again the creation of the Western 
image’ (ibid.). ‘The Law on Buildings and Roads, which came into effect in 1933
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introduced very detailed and rigid urban development rules, which had a strong 
potential for constraining planning decisions’ (ibid.).
On the other hand, in response to the increase in urban population and administrative 
difficulties, a new administrative system was set up for Istanbul in 1930. Istanbul 
was identified as a single municipality, divided into ten sections, and was connected 
to the governor’s office, an arm of the central government. This integrated 
administration continued until 1955. Before the Second World War, a few foreign 
specialists had been appointed advisers to the municipal councils at a time when 
there was no real possibility of foreseeing the future development of Istanbul 
(Kuban, 1996, p.42).
The central government and planning authorities in Ankara, moreover, gained some 
important experience with their efforts to develop the capital city, Ankara as a 
modem and healthy environment. This experience that was gained while working 
towards that goal was a major impetus behind the planning efforts in Istanbul to 
make it a modem city. One of the most important issues for planning efforts in this 
period was the requirement of a new Municipal Law for municipalities over a certain 
size to develop their own urban plans. But because of legal restrictions, the 
experience of Ankara was followed for Istanbul, and urban plans started to be 
developed by invited competitors.
During this period, Istanbul undertook a major planning process dominated by Henri 
Prost whose planning decisions had a great influence on the future development of 
Istanbul. Prost was invited in 1934 to prepare a plan for Istanbul. His plan was put
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into practise in 1939, and he conceived of a 15-year development scheme consisting 
of three 5-year sub periods (Gorgulu et al., 1996).
On the other hand, the Prost Plan had been prepared when the population of the city 
was rather fixed in approximately 1 million, and the Plan obviously became 
ineffective as Istanbul started to get migration from Anatolia, and the metropolitan 
area began to grow very rapidly. The structural transformation of the Turkish 
economy which began to develop in the 1950s integrated the city into the overall 
economy, and also initiated a process of rapid transformation. After a period of 
stagnation and no development in the 1930s, Istanbul again became the focus of 
economic dynamism as a result of economic policies that sought to open up the 
national economy to the world markets.
Nevertheless, together with industrialisation and increasing employment 
opportunities rapid rural-urban migration in the 1950s resulted in very fast growth of 
urban population that in turn started to generate housing shortage in the city. The 
emergence of the gecekondu (shanty towns or illegal buildings built overnight) was a 
parallel development that also contributed to the demise of the Prost Plan, after 
which it became necessary to revise it.
Increasing immigration to the historical peninsula specifically resulted in 
deterioration of conditions there as well. ‘The population in the metropolitan area 
rose from 975,000 in 1950 to 1.400.000 in 1955 and 2,141,000 in 1965’ (State 
Institute of Statistics, DIE, and Tekeli, 1994a, p. 102). ‘This was due to a combination 
of natural growth, incoming migration and to the spatial expansion of the
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metropolitan area’ (Tekeli, 1994a, p. 102). The industrial development started to 
grow beyond the municipality borders. The central business district including 
Eminonu, Sirkeci and Grand Bazaar started to expand to the north towards Aksaray, 
and this changed the internal business structure in the city.
Rapid industrialisation and population increase in the city introduced some important 
problems such as housing and transportation. As a result of these developments, 
measures were taken in 1956 to expand the city limits, to increase the city’s authority 
in creating houses, to allow for government’s financial support for housing, and to 
encourage multi-dwelling housing by extending property rights for apartment owners 
in such buildings. ‘Following a long preparation period, a new urban development 
law (no.6785) was put into effect in 1956’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.338). The new law did not 
go into the details of development conditions and chose to solve them with reference 
to by-laws. On the other hand, ‘the legislation provided a wide range of possibilities 
for planners, and the professional practice was given a very powerful device to create 
plan rules, which could serve to achieve harmony with the characteristics of the area 
being planned’ (ibid.). In spite of their positive sides, these measures were not 
adequate in responding to changes that occurred in the structure of the city, and to 
those problems that were seen in the physical environment.
In short, as Ersoy argues that,
‘the outline of the urban development procedures, as enacted in 1956, had the 
approach of “a flexible urban development concept”. However, subsequent 
by-laws and their general implementation, instead of dealing with the basic 
problems, tended to freeze the contents and shape of urban development plans
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and restrict the power of local governments in the preparation of plans. 
Hence, the most flexible planning law prepared so far was not utilized to 
create a new understanding in planning practice, taking into consideration the 
local differentiations. The responsibility for this tendency belongs not to the 
law but to political factors, on the one hand, and to the administration and the 
related bureaucrats and technocrats on the other. Briefly, central rather than 
local powers continued to shape urban planning practice in the country’ (ibid., 
p.339).
6.2.3 1960-1980 Period
The 1960 Constitution transformed the country into a multi-party system and brought 
a more liberalist economic policy. The administrative independence of Istanbul was 
initiated after the Constitution was ratified and a mayor was elected. With the first 
local elections in Istanbul, in 1963, the city entered into a new phase. Istanbul had 
been unprepared for new immigration since the 1940s. Squatter housing had 
developed without government oversight as a solution to the settlement and housing 
problems of the newcomers. However, since additions to the squatter developments 
meant new votes for the political parties, new urban nucleuses were generated in the 
city.
Following the military intervention of 1960, studies were done in order to prevent 
unplanned growth, and Piccinato’s work on a 1/1000 scaled plan got underway.
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Population growth that occurred during this period started to move outside the city, 
and about 45% of the population was found in these areas (Gorgulu et al, 1996). This 
phenomenon marks the beginning of the tendency to scatter around in of 
metropolization process.
The formation of shanty towns that started in the 1950s later became more 
accelerated and larger in scale, going through different phases. Again during this 
period the area circumscribed by the city walls in the historical peninsula changed its 
nature significantly, and lost its traditional structure. Thus for the first time, in order 
to keep these developments under control, regional mapping was done within the 
framework of regional planning for settlement, and an open linear map was later 
utilized to decentralize the city’s macrostructure instead of radio-concentric 
development that had been adopted earlier. During the same period, an office for 
regional planning was established by the Ministry of Development and Settlements, 
to be followed by studies on regional planning. A scaled industrial plan was also 
prepared in addition to regional plans that were also expanded to include whole 
Marmara region.
In 1966 Greater Istanbul Planning Office was founded and became operational. At 
this point an important development that affected the macro form of the city was the 
decisions related to the beltways and the first Bosporus Bridge. Upon this decision, 
the bridge and the beltways were completed in 1973. This caused a change in 
functional relationship of the time-distance matrix for the city. According to Tekeli, 
‘this initiated a new restructuring process in the urban space of the city, changing the 
hierarchy of prestige areas in the urban context, opening new areas up to speculative
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activities and creating a new hierarchy of business centres’ (1994a, p. 168). Both the 
Bosporus Bridge and the electrification of the Haydarpasa railroad gave a new 
dimension to the city enlarging it eastward toward the Asian side. The development 
of the city is described as growth resembling an oil stain - transforming itself into a 
radial concentric city form.
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Istanbul metropolitan area expanded to reach the 
borders of Silivri and Gebze, to be found in a circle with a radius of 40-45 km from 
the centre, transforming agricultural lands into urban areas. Two characteristics of 
this period were, first, that people belonging to high income groups developed a 
tendency to look for alternative residential areas; and secondly, the shanty town 
phenomenon made itself acceptable and legitimate.
As the conventional city centre continued to grow, residential areas turned into 
business areas, while at the same time buildings for business purposes were being 
renovated, usually resulting in increased density along the perpendicular axis. This 
renovation at the plot level, however, started to destroy the existing structure in the 
historical peninsula, due to its centrality. Some functions in this area tended to move 
out of the centre while some others to become denser. Industrial relocations were 
also taking place during this time. Depending on the kind of industry and size, 
certain agglomerations were eventually formed.
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6.2.4 From 1980 to Present
As mentioned in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, fundamental changes happened in 
Turkey in the 1980s following the world oil crisis, and economic and political 
problems of the 1970s. The 1980 military coup was a turning point for the country 
which would lead important socio-economic and political changes. The 1982 
Constitution was prepared by the 1980 military regime, and the subsequent 
governance of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal opened a new era for Turkey. This neo­
liberal policy introduced by the new liberal government gave priority to economic 
integration with the world.
Rapid economic growth in the 1980s has, on the other hand, imposed enormous 
pressures on the urban services and infrastructure of cities. The metropolitan area of 
Istanbul with a population of more than 5 million and having the largest share of 
urbanization in the country has been heavily affected from these pressures. Although 
a Master Plan in 1/50,000 scale for the Istanbul Metropolitan Area was approved in 
1980, long-range planning activities have not been managed easily, since central and 
local politicians and bureaucrats have tried to cope with immediate needs of a rapidly 
growing population. Traffic congestion, lack of services, loss of amenities and open 
space, water shortages, and air pollution are all familiar costs of rapid urbanisation to 
Istanbulites. Since the 1980s, infrastructure and transportation policies requiring 
heavy investments were given high priorities, and then telecommunication 
investments which are seen necessary for the information society followed them.
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Various legislative changes have had significant results for the city in this period. 
‘The new Urban Development Law numbered as 3194 gave municipalities the 
authority to make and approve urban development plans’ (Ersoy, 1992, p.339). 
However, ‘it also introduced a very rigid practice with respect to options provided 
for the by-law’ (ibid., p.340). ‘Law no. 3194 imposed restrictions on the flexibilities 
given to both local governments and urban planners, as compared with the previous 
legislation, and all municipalities had to abide by urban development by-laws 
prepared by central government’ (ibid.). In other words, ‘the rigid centralistic 
approach of the 1930s has been resumed in urban development activities with 
centrally prepared regulations’ (ibid.).
On the other hand, new administrative institutions were results of a process to 
decentralize the administrative structure. As we have seen in Chapter Five, a part of 
these developments was the establishment of a two-tier administration model 
including district and metropolitan municipalities in 1984, and start of the 
metropolitan planning activities. What characterized this new period in management 
of city was operational policies and determination. This new kind of management 
and the accompanying methods that had never been used before in the country drew 
a lot of attention and praise, gaining supporters and occupying a certain place in 
media. With parallel to the developments in the Turkish economy in the 1980s, the 
metropolitan administration’s main goal was not just to meet the basic needs of the 
population, but to revitalise the city as well as to re-establish it as a great 
international centre for trade, finance, tourism and culture.
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Once again, there has been a strong focus on the physical infrastructure and 
appearance of the city: new bridges, motorways and inner-city arterials to improve 
the flow of traffic; a modem wastewater system to clean up the waters of the Golden 
Horn; a natural gas network to reduce the use of more polluting coal and lignite; and 
the removal of industries and dilapidated warehouses from along the shoreline of the 
Golden Horn to make way for parks and open space. These efforts to renovate the 
urban fabric have not been without controversy. The ‘greening’ of the Golden Horn 
involved the clearance of older neighbourhoods; the creation of an inner-city freeway 
required the demolition of large sections of the old city centre, Beyoglu; the new 
highway along the Bosporus cut off the older villages from their natural links with 
the water. With the process of modernisation and improvement, some of the social 
and economic inequalities have become more visibly entrenched in the urban 
landscape. Thus the deluxe hotels and conference centres and the luxury villas along 
the Bosporus stand in sharp contrast to the generic blocks of apartments and the 
temporary housing and unpaved roads of the newer squatter settlements.
Moreover, the producer sector activities started to replace the residential population 
in the central areas and pushed them towards the periphery. Residential areas, 
however, started to be determined according to the car ownership, dynamic of 
transportation and income levels. Poly-centricity also became important in the 
formation of residential settlements.
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6.3 The Role of Governmental Actors in the Planning Process
Istanbul is a highly urbanised city, accommodating about 15 percent of the Turkey's 
total population. The city has been growing rapidly, and ‘it is estimated that by the 
year of 2010 the present population of 9.057.747 (State Institute of Statistics, DIE, 
1998) will reach up to 13 million’ (Greater Istanbul Municipality, 1995). This 
indicates that the population, labour force and economical activities will be even 
more dispersed within the metropolitan boundary which will extend to nearly 100 
km. distance.
As the largest metropolis of Turkey, Istanbul carries most of the population and 
performs cultural, financial, commercial, industrial, tourism and service functions 
simultaneously. Because of the agglomeration of local and international economies, 
‘it produces 26 percent of the gross added values of the Turkish economy’ (Greater 
Istanbul Municipality, 1995). All branches of economic activities are represented in 
the metropolitan areas or sub-region of Istanbul.
This geographical and economic scale makes the city difficult to be administered. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, Istanbul is a metropolitan city which has a two- 
tier administrative system with a metropolitan municipality under which district 
municipalities function according to their limited power, and a provincial 
government which is the local organisation of the central government. The 
metropolitan municipality performs the duty of making, organising and 
implementing master plans within the metropolitan area, and in this way, helps to 
organise the socio-economical potential of the city within the framework and policies
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described in master plans. The provincial government, however, is a mediating 
organisation between central and local government. The functions of the provincial 
government organizations can be grouped as health and social assistance, public 
works, culture and education, agriculture and commercial functions.
Because Istanbul is a very large metropolitan city including many districts and sub­
districts, this local administrative system has created a very complicated structure 
involving many people and institutions. Table 6.1 summarises this complicated 
government structure with involving people and organisations.
Table 6.1 Governmental Actors in the Local Administration of Istanbul
Adm inistrative
Organization
Provincial
Government
M etropolitan
M unicipality
District
M unicipality
Sub-district
M unicipality
Villages
Head o f  the 
organization
A governor 
and 32 heads 
of districts
A metropolitan
municipality
mayor
32 district
municipality
mayors
41 sub-district
municipality
mayors
173
headmen 
of villages
Assem bly
organization
A Provincial
General
Assembly
A Metropolitan
Municipality
Assembly
32 District
Municipality
Assemblies
41 Sub-district
Municipality
Assemblies
173
Village
Assembly
Appointm ent
Process
The governor 
and heads of 
districts are 
appointed by 
the central 
government, 
but members 
of PGA are 
elected
Both the mayor 
and assembly 
members are 
elected
Both mayors 
and assembly 
members are 
elected
Both mayors 
and assembly 
members are 
elected
Village 
headmen 
are elected
Note: The information on the Table has been taken from the Istanbul Governorship.
As presented in the Table, the city of Istanbul and its districts are governed by a 
governor and 32 heads of districts. All of these district governors are on duty in the 
metropolitan municipality borders, although five of them have just been inserted 
within the administrative territory of the Istanbul metropolitan municipality
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according to the new Metropolitan Municipality Law in July 2004. There are in total 
74 municipalities together with the metropolitan municipality and 74 municipality 
mayors including the mayor of metropolitan municipality in Istanbul.
These 32 District Municipality Assemblies, a Metropolitan Municipality Assembly, 
and a Provincial General Assembly as local decision-making organisations govern 
the city of Istanbul. The members of these assemblies come into power after a 
general election. We also have to add the local, provincial and regional organizations 
of the central government into this Table, because they often involve the local 
decision-making process as the representatives of the central government.
The consideration of all the parameters in the generation of master plans and in the 
implementation of them helps to integrate all urban policies because there are many 
actors and organisations involving decision making process. It is not easy to say that 
this has been done in this way as far as the implementation phase of the plans is 
concerned. Although the local government and institutional actors are mostly 
sensitive enough to control the development according to master plan's visions, a 
combination of factors creating a tendency for the government organisations to 
function independently from each other, poses threats to the urban sustainability.
Table 6.2 briefly presents the organising capacity of Istanbul in terms of the actors' 
role. As we can see from the Table, the central government is still the most powerful 
organisation in local decision making process, and involves urban policies sometimes 
bypassing municipalities. The provincial government has very limited power, and 
mostly mediates central government and municipalities. The Metropolitan
181
Municipality has the responsibility of organising and implementing policies and 
master plans within its boundary. It has also certain power of staging the interaction 
between related interest groups involved in policy making and projects in public and 
private domains. This capacity is demonstrated only at the level of providing location 
and permission to the development. District and sub-district municipalities have also 
some limited responsibilities for preparing and implementing plans in their own 
boundaries framed by the Metropolitan Municipality.
Table 6.2 Actors Organising Capacity in Istanbul
Actors
Organising
Capacity
Central
Government
Provincial
Government
M etropolitan
M unicipality
District
M unicipality
Sub-District
M unicipality
Adm.
Organiz.
Makes policy 
framework, 
involves local 
decision 
making heavily 
bypassing local 
government
Implements 
policies with its 
own boundary
Responsible for 
organising, 
approving and 
implementing 
policies and 
plans within 
master plan 
boundaries
Responsible for 
implementing 
local plans 
approved by 
the
Metropolitan
Municipality
Have the power 
to prepare and 
implement 
their own local 
plans in their 
boundaries
Strategic
Networks
Generates
policies
Mediates actors 
in managerial 
level
Mediates actors 
through master 
plans
Have less 
initiative
Initiate through 
land use plans
Leadership Dependent 
upon the vision 
of political 
parties
Plays a staging 
role in the 
implementation 
of policies
Dependent 
upon the vision 
of the
institutional
framework
Dependent 
upon the 
mayors’ 
personal 
capacity
Dependent 
upon the 
mayor’s 
personality
Spatial-
Economic
Condition
Generates 
policies at the 
national level
Mediates 
between central 
and local 
government
Has the power 
to organize 
with plans
Have no power Have power for 
some local 
choices
Vision and 
Strategy
Initiates the 
potentials 
through 
policies
Has the power 
within its legal 
boundaries
Has the power 
and capacity
Have less 
initiative
Have the 
freedom to 
generate, but 
less capacity
Note: Modified from Karaman and Levent, 2001, p. 17.
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Some conflict areas between various governmental actors should also have been 
mentioned at this point. According to the Metropolitan Municipality Law (No.3030) 
dated as 1984, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has only an authorization to make 
plans in the municipality borders, which is about one third of the Istanbul provincial 
administrative area. The other areas are under the authorization of the central 
government organisations: the Governorship and the Ministry of Public Works and 
Resettlement. On the one hand, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is obliged to 
serve 95 percent of the population living in the Istanbul provincial administrative 
borders. But, on the other hand it only has authorization to make plans for about 40 
percent of the all Istanbul administrative area. In the remaining 60 percent area, 
which is mostly forest, agricultural, river-basin and rural areas, or other district 
settlement areas, there is a large amount of uncontrollable unplanned developments.
Moreover, according to the Metropolitan Municipality Law, the detailed land use 
plans of the district municipalities have to be made in accordance with macro-plans 
prepared by the metropolitan municipalities. This seems to be necessary to provide 
the consistency of macro-scale decisions and integrity of the metropolitan system. 
But, although the Metropolitan Municipality Organization is supposed to take large 
scale planning decisions which are compatible with the district plan and local 
policies, it is today difficult to say that there is any coordination in making plans and 
taking decisions. Because of this lack of coordination and cooperation, there are not 
many successful planning examples in Istanbul.
The central government, on the other hand, also has the authorization to make plans 
inside the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality borders and its responsibility areas, by
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using some special laws related to tourism, industry, privatisation or free trade zones. 
This situation creates an obstacle in front of the goals and objectives determined by 
the local government for the whole sections of Istanbul, and it is against the entirety 
of planning decisions, contemporary urbanization philosophy, and also the principles 
of subsidiarity and decentralization.
Finally, the pressures of global capital are sometimes so demanding and so fast in 
choosing location of investment that the contradiction between spatial and 
economical visions is also inevitable. While the location of shopping centres, for 
instance, may pose threats to green zones on the north, the density of residential 
developments may challenge with earthquake zones or the location of high rise 
towers may contradict with the unique silhouette of the historical districts. The city 
government is becoming more and more careful about the consequences of the 
developments without clearly defined objectives, means, models and actors.
6.4 Master Plans of Istanbul
The first plan of Istanbul was a 1/5000 scale master plan, and it was prepared by the 
French urban planner, Henri Prost. His plan including the historical peninsula and 
Beyoglu district was put into practise in 1939. Between 1937 and 1950 Prost 
prepared various other plans; a scaled plan covering 6000 ha, a development plan for 
3000 ha, and a detailed plan in an area of 650 ha (Gorgulu et al, 1996). His 
development plan for Istanbul laid down major guidelines for many years to come.
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Prost attempted to direct developments in line with the city’s own dynamic. In his 
work:
• There was no linear progression,
• Decorative areas of social and technical importance were proposed,
• Medium-scale commercial and industrial activities were moved to the 
Golden Horn, and
• Transportation was designed to accommodate private vehicles (ibid.).
Moreover, structural transformation of the Turkish economy which began to 
accelerate in the 1950s integrated the city into the overall national economy, and also 
initiated a process of rapid transformation. The Prost Plans have naturally became 
ineffective as the metropolis started to grow up very rapidly. After the military 
intervention of 1960, various planning studies were done to be able to control the 
urban growth in Istanbul. During this period, Piccinato prepared a metropolitan plan 
based on a regional planning perspective.
Following the development strategies of previous plans, the Master Plan for 
Metropolitan Area was approved in 1980, and this plan targeted to provide a 
structure reconciling the production function with conservation of natural and 
historical values in Istanbul (Keskinok, 1997, p.89). In other words, while the plan 
was emphasising issues such as conservation of natural resources and historical 
values, it also included public sector’s active involvement in organization of new 
development areas together with decentralisation of industry and reorganisation of 
CBD. This active involvement obviously lead to the centrally controlled and 
unplanned urban development in the 1980s. According to Keskinok, most of the
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industrial units including Ddtelli Organised Industrial Centre and Istanbul Dry Food 
Producers Centre were established on unplanned lands in violation of planning 
procedures in this period (ibid.). Dry Food Producers Centre, for example, was 
established on lands which were initially assigned to green functions such as 
“forested area” and “city park” in 1/50000 scale Master Plan for Metropolitan Area, 
and this has been managed through deformation of planning procedures (ibid.).
The succeeding 1995 Master Plan, however, was the plan which mostly shapes 
current planning activities in Istanbul. The first target in the 1995 Plan has been 
decided as ‘obtaining the world city status which integrates with Istanbul’s historical 
and cultural identity, protecting historical, cultural and natural values of the city in 
the global level’ (Greater Istanbul Municipality, 1995). The main policies to realize 
this target have been presented as:
• ‘clearing the traditional city structure from so-called harmful functions such 
as industry, production and storage,
• taking decisions on use of areas within the whole of the metropolitan area 
sub-district for international sports, culture, trade activities and services,
• rendering functions related to cultural and social activities sufficient within 
urban ranking,
• determining urban prestigious sites within the historical peninsula, planning 
housings and services for tourism purposes, raising infrastructure quality and 
standards,
• developing projects for international conferences, congresses halls, art and 
culture centres, entertainment and exhibition centres in order to ensure
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Istanbul’s being an international world country, forming museums and 
archives, and
• drawing urban development pressure to the eastern and western poles of the 
city over the historical peninsula and the Bosporus by forming Side 
Attraction Centres’ (ibid.).
Figure 6.2 Land Use Map of Istanbul According to the 1995 Master Plan
UG4N0
Karaman and Levent underline that,
‘The metropolitan municipality, with this plan, favours co-operativeness 
between public and private sectors to implement the objectives of the 
development plans. This has been clearly stated in the notes of the master 
plan, in target and policy statements. Sixteen targets and related policies put 
forward means and actors which would carry the city's potentials to the 
international arena’ (2001,p.5).
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The second target in the Plan, for instance, reflects the globalisation aim of the local 
decision makers. To this target, Istanbul should be ‘a centre where governing and 
decision making mechanisms including all actors get together within the economic 
relations, integrate with the economic structures of the world and the region, and 
utilize intematioonal and regional opportunities’ (Greater Istanbul Municipality, 
1995, cited in Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.5-6).
‘To achieve this global economic target, five main policies were developed, and the 
first one states that by predicting the development of the primary centres of CBD, the 
investments and planning decisions can be directed accordingly’ (Greater Istanbul 
Municipality, 1995, cited in Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.6). Similarly other main 
policies to realise this target have been decided as follows:
• ‘encouraging specialisation by ensuring a balanced distribution of urban 
functions in the Metropolitan Area Sub Districts,
• improving communication infrastructure of Istanbul, ensuring that it becomes 
an important centre, and helping relevant activities,
• establishing the necessary infrastructure to ensure more effective use of 
computer systems throughout the whole city,
• improving tourism potential, and increasing the share of tourism in the city’s 
economy,
• guaranteeing the protection of the natural, historical and cultural structure, 
environment, tourism and recreation works in the metropolitan area sub 
districts, and
• improving the standards and quality of equipments and transportation systems 
in areas of tourism and recreation’ (Greater Istanbul Municipality, 1995).
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‘The third target also gives importance to be a world city and examine the potentials 
of it; “ensuring the growth and development of the metropolitan area in coherence 
with the national and regional progress in social, economic, cultural terms and 
increasing its influence and achieving the status deserved among the ranks of world 
metropolitan cities”’ (Greater Istanbul Municipality, 1995, cited in Karaman and 
Levent, 2001, p.6). ‘Five policies to support this target especially focus on 
“encouraging the service sector in the whole Istanbul Metropolitan Area while 
ensuring decentralization of industry both country-wide and regionally’” (ibid.).
Moreover, ‘the master plan of the city gives a special emphasis on the distribution of 
all economic sectors to be spatially meaningful, economically integral with the world 
economy and ecologically sustainable’ (Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.7). In target 
four of the master plan, ‘it is aimed the city to develop “special strategies towards the 
improvement of the quality of life, making the necessary special arrangements within 
the estimated period and structure, guiding the investing bodies for the infrastructure 
investments to be able to reach this target, and developing the necessary institutional 
structure and financial proposals to realize the plans’” (Greater Istanbul 
Municipality, 1995, cited in Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.7).
The decentralization of population and some economic functions in the metropolitan 
area and sub-regions has been determined as one of the main policies to achieve this 
target. The creation of attraction centres on both banks of the Bosporus, ensuring that 
certain economic developments will happen in these sub-centres is also an important
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strategy aiming to attain this policy. Maintaining a linear and multi-centred 
development is another policy supporting the decentralisation approach.
According to Karaman:
‘the [industrial] decentralization strategy has actually been going on since the 
1980s. Industries that have scattered in the central parts of the city over the 
years have been moved out to the east and western fringes of the city. In the 
western part of the city, about 80 large size industries have been settled along 
the E-5 motorway near Cerkezkoy. In the eastern part, on the other hand, 
small size industries have also been relocated. While tanning and leather 
processing industries have moved to Kurtkoy, larger size industries such as 
metal and chemical manufacturing moved out of Istanbul to Gebze and Izmit 
along the E-5 motorway’ (1998, cited in Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.7).
In general, the 1995 Master Plan of Istanbul targets to preserve the decentralised and 
linear development of its urban macro-form to protect forest areas in the northern 
part of the city. In additon, the Plan reinforces the world city status of Istanbul, 
revealing unique townscape, historical, natural and cultural identities of the city, and 
developing its economic prosperity.
The 1995 Master Plan of Istanbul had been prepared to manage developments until 
the year 2010. The current metropolitan municipality of Istanbul, however, 
established a new urban planning unit called the Metropolitan Planning Office of 
Istanbul in 2005, and gave the office the duty of making a new plan in 1/100.000 
scale. This new plan would include the whole of the extended territory of the city
190
with reference to the new law 5216 enacted in 2004. The new work entitled Istanbul 
Environmental Plan has recently been completed and made public in May 2006. The 
details of this new plan is subject to another research study.
However, when the 1995 plan shaping urban development of Istanbul in the last 10 
years has been examined in a detailed way, we can state that the world city idea has 
clearly been very dominant in the preparation of the plan and main targets and 
policies have been determined with global concerns. The answer to the question of 
whether or not the Plan was able to control rapid developments in Istanbul will be 
answered in the next chapter.
6.5 Urban Policies in Istanbul Under the Conditions of Globalisation
Although Turkish urban policy has never been welfare oriented, market and outward 
orientation has certainly not been more dominant than it has been since the 1980s. 
Not only various master plans prepared and implemented, but also many recent 
planning studies about Istanbul have shown that globalisation has been designated as 
a target for the city. A lot of investment has been made with this in mind, and 
different political parties in power have also provided support for this objective. The 
global position assumed for Istanbul by central government is perceived as almost 
the only condition for the country’s integration with the world economic system. 
However, various local governments occasionally went along with the central 
governments’ attitude, and from time to time opposed that due to populistic 
pressures, leaving this to the city’s own dynamics. National and international capital,
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on the other hand, appears to be after speculative gains which are supposed to be 
emerging in internationalised Istanbul.
Not only central and local governmental organisations, but also various pressure 
groups and civil organisations have been working towards a more globalised Istanbul 
at the end of the 20th century, albeit for varying reasons. A couple of examples can be 
given for various organizations which are related to urban policy and projects in 
different sectors, and have actually become quite successful from various points of 
view. Istanbul Culture and Art Foundation, for instance, has shown high level of 
institutional leadership in cultural ground. The Foundation has successfully 
organised the International Istanbul Festival for nearly 30 years which enhanced 
Istanbul’s competitive capacity in global arena. Various institutions such as the 
Union of Housing Cooperatives, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Emlakbank 
have also initiated and implemented various projects as partners with other public or 
private parties. According to Karaman and Levent:
‘Bahcesehir (Garden City) is one of the new towns realized in Istanbul by a 
consortium network of public and private co-operation. Emlakbank as the 
public part of the project is engaged to work together with 3 private partners 
including landowner, and two developers. The new suburban developments 
serving to middle and high-income groups may be given as good examples of 
projects, which are realised with a network where the district municipality is 
public, union of cooperative is semi-public and cooperatives are private 
parties’ (2001, p.6).
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As a more recent, and from some point of view, successful project, Formula One 
Istanbul Park has been constructed by a national company, Evren Engineering and 
Construction, together with a partnership with Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and 
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. The Istanbul Park 
racing circuit has been a project of national importance since it has attracted global 
interest, and has taken part in 2005 Formula 1 racing program.
Although a broad range of social segments has accepted the idea of a globalised 
Istanbul as an indisputable goal under the effect of particular success stories, there 
has not been an agreement on how services for ordinary people will be provided, or 
how they will be physically accommodated in the process of planning. The basic 
reason for this is that planning boards of local government are not equipped with the 
necessary tools to interpret the significance of globalisation, which involves a highly 
complicated network of relationships which are dynamic, fluid, and effective.
On the other hand, urban policies implemented by the central and local government 
can include only some degree of urban dynamics in Istanbul. The city, nevertheless, 
consists of both formal and informal settlements occupied by highly diverse 
economic, social and cultural groups (Koksal, 1993). The privatisation of urban 
service provision has even made the situation worse for especially poor settlements. 
Under these circumstances, formal urban policy of local government, most of the 
time, has been a mix of various models with different policy objectives and 
ideological standpoints as a result of incompatible urban problems and priorities. It 
appears that there has also been conflict over values and objectives within the city 
administration in Istanbul, when elected officials of metropolitan and district
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municipalities reflect different political choices of citizens occupying various 
jurisdictions. National decisions of the state appear to be more counted than those of 
the local government even for the formal sector. Local governments have often failed 
to transform their role from providing urban services that they cannot cope with, to 
urban management by incorporating the private sector’s strengths to the urban 
governance phase.
6.6 Conclusion
As examined in chapters Two and Three, the scene of globalisation has been cities in 
the world, and this highly affected the way in which urban policies are implemented 
in cities. Urban policy-makers have continuously been under the pressure of various 
national and international factors, and as a consequence contemporary urban policy 
and planning has been shaped by global concerns in the new era. As seen in Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five, on the other hand, there have been rapid economic and 
political developments both in Turkey and Istanbul within the last two decades 
parallel to intensifying globalisation. This has also brought about a consensus among 
various levels of government and other actors for the role of Istanbul in the new era. 
In relation to that, many urban policies planned and implemented by the central and 
local government started to aim at advancing Istanbul to the world city level. 
Business and non-governmental organisations as the representatives of relatively 
organised citizen groups have also been activated by the idea of Istanbul as a world 
city.
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The most concrete outcome of this enthusiasm has been the 1995 Master Plan of the 
city. As examined in this chapter, the 1995 Master Plan developed by the Greater 
Municipality of Istanbul with a timetable of completion by 2010 specifically aimed 
the city to be an international finance and tourism centre. The plan stipulated to 
develop Istanbul as a leading economic and cultural centre by preventing its rich 
historic and cultural identity. One of the major themes throughout the plan involved 
establishing a balance between conservation and development in the city. The plan 
presented that Istanbul will unite with the region and the world in terms of economic 
activities, if the city is able to use regional opportunities well, emphasizing its 
history, culture, science, art, politics, trade and services and assuming a pioneering 
role in the area including the Middle East, Balkans, and Eastern Europe. 
Additionally, the history of Istanbul is to be embraced so that the status of world- 
renowned city can be held once again, as it was in the past. Istanbul then can assure 
its place in the global rank of world cities while contributing to the world’s economic 
development.
On the way to become a world city, central and local governments have implemented 
various urban policies. ‘Among these policies are the creation of an international 
communication system, the provision of high quality infrastructure such as 
motorways, airports, international hotels and related facilities within certain services, 
the construction of an international conference centre, and the organization of 
international events of high standard like the Habitat II, and the International Cultural 
Festival of Istanbul’ (Tekeli, 1994b, p.519).
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As we will see in following chapters in a more detailed way, there are two other 
significant urban policies which have been implemented in Istanbul in the last two 
decades. These policies including the establishment of a new financial centre in the 
Levent-Maslak axis and the project of hosting the Olympic Games have obviously 
been prepared with global concerns. They also consist of numerous planning and 
construction projects in various parts of the city and they are supposed to be based on 
planning decisions of various master plans. As we will see in subsequent two 
chapters, however, the 1995 Master Plan of Istanbul, just like previous urban 
development plans, has quickly fallen short in guiding the ongoing development in 
the city with its concerns of the protection of natural and historical resources and 
control over the urban sprawl.
The problems among different levels of government organisations based on the use 
of authority in the urban space have had an important role in this failure. Within the 
provincial boundaries of Istanbul, the authority of provincial government, 
metropolitan, district, and sub-district municipalities has been divided within their 
planning boundaries. This situation has often created problems in implementing 
plans, and contradictions among the central and local government with respect to 
urban policies.
In this authority struggle, central government, most of the time, has been the stronger 
side, trying to keep the power in its hand. The Metropolitan Municipality and in a 
way district municipalities also have certain power of providing the interaction 
between related interest groups which are involved in policy and projects in public 
and private domains. This capacity has been demonstrated only at the level of
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providing location and permission for the development area as seen in practices such 
as the establishment of financial centre, free trade zones and private universities, the 
construction of the Olympic Village and facilities and the underground in the city.
Starting from the next chapter, political and governmental relations between various 
levels of government will be examined with reference to specific urban policies in 
Istanbul, and the policy of developing a new financial centre in one of the emerging 
CBD areas of the city will constitute the first case study of the thesis.
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Chapter Seven
Governing Relations with Respect to Urban Policies: 
Case Study of the New Financial Centre Development in 
‘Levent-Maslak Axis’ in Istanbul
7.1 Introduction
After having examined economic and political effects of the globalisation process in 
in Turkey and Istanbul in Chapter Four and Chapter Five respectively, governmental 
actors playing significant roles in the planning process of Istanbul and changing 
urban policies under the conditions of contemporary globalization were investigated 
in the last chapter. This and next chapter will consist of two case studies. The 
primary aim of these two chapters is to analyse the relationship between different 
levels of government with respect to specific urban policies implemented in Istanbul. 
The new financial centre development along the so-called ‘Levent-Maslak axis’ will 
firstly be examined in this chapter. The main focus is on various central and local 
actors having a role in the decision-making process of the development of a new 
financial centre in one of central areas of the city. In the next chapter, the city’s 
continual excitement to host the Olympic Games will be explored as the second 
urban development strategy example implemented in Istanbul. Since it is a very
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centrally controlled and executed project, roles of local government and various local 
actors for the achievement of this task will especially be questioned.
There are reasons why I have chosen these two examples. Although these urban 
policies appear to be quite distinct from each other, they actually share common 
peculiarities. As presented in Chapter Two, one of the most important aims for world 
cities, today, is to attract foreign investment to be able to compete in global arena. 
While world cities aim to this, they have various alternative policies. Two significant 
ones among many policies in the way to attract global capital have been either to 
create large international finance or business centres together with the provision of 
necessary high quality infrastructure or to compete for the organisation of significant 
global events such as international conferences, high standard academic and cultural 
organisations, and big sport events. For world cities, these policies are, in a way, the 
conditions of catching up the global economic development in the new era.
On the one hand, organisation of the Olympic Games, for instance, has been an 
important goal for cities to be able to benefit from global economic opportunities. In 
the new era, being a candidate for an important global event is a part of urban 
strategy, and central and local governments mostly apply this tool in order to build 
up cities economically and physically. On the other hand, diverting urban policies to 
be able to attract transnational investment and transforming cities to international 
finance, trade and tourism centres have been common approaches in today’s urban 
development planning. World cities such as London, New York, Paris and Frankfurt 
in developed world and Shanghai, Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo in 
developing world are giant financial centres rather than large industrial cores. In the
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light of these issues, the aim of this chapter will be to examine the particular urban 
policy of developing a new financial centre in Istanbul, and the focus will first turn to 
the restructuring process of Istanbul’s urban core in the new era.
7.2 Restructuring of Istanbul’s Urban Core in the New Era
Istanbul has been in the process of rapid economic and social transformation in the 
last two decades parallel to urbanisation and globalisation trends. Especially after the 
1980s, the metropolitan area of Istanbul has shown crucial change as industry has 
moved out from inner city areas and the city progressed to be an international 
financial centre where service sector activities started to occupy a notable amount of 
urban land even beyond the predictions of various master plans.
One of the most important indicators of Istanbul’s transformation in the new era of 
globalisation has been the increase of high-rise developments in central areas of the 
city. Arrival of a series of foreign banks and a new generation of domestic trade and 
finance banks in the 1980s has been an important role in this development (Keyder 
and Oncu, 1994, p.405). ‘The advent of these new banks, all specialised in 
international trade and finance operations, was bound with attempts to liberalise the 
Turkish financial system’ (Oncu and Gokce, 1991, cited in Keyder and Oncu, 1994, 
p.405). According to Keyder and Oncu;
‘Beginning in 1981, a series of policy measures were implemented with the 
cumulative impact of ending the historical monopoly of the Central Bank 
over foreign currency transactions. Thus, for the first time since the inception
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of the Republic, commercial banks were granted autonomy to operate in 
international markets. The parallel softening of restrictions on capital flows 
from abroad and the introduction of a variety of export encouragement 
schemes, convinced international banks, which until then had avoided 
Turkish financial markets, to open branch offices in Istanbul in order to 
explore new opportunities’ (1994, p.405).
Picture 7.1 High-rise developments in the city core
On the other hand, ‘a new generation of small and specialised banks of domestic 
origin rapidly established themselves, and employing aggressive marketing 
techniques to compete with one another and with foreign banks, they were able to 
take advantage of the export boom and the increased ability of the economy to 
borrow from abroad’ (Daly and Logan, 1986; Meyer, 1991, cited in Keyder and 
Oncu, 1994). Keyder and Oncu add that:
‘The rising headquarters of these new banks signalled the resuscitation of 
Istanbul as an international finance centre. Since the 1930s, the once famous
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Avenue o f Banks (Bankalar Caddesi) of the Ottoman capital had become 
progressively deserted as national banks constructed imposing new 
headquarters in Ankara’ (1994, p.407).
From the 1950’s onwards, when the growth of private banks began to gain 
momentum, Ankara had remained the choice location, next to the state-bureaucratic 
apparatus, and centrally located vis-a-vis the vast network of branch offices 
extending into the distant comers of Anatolia to collect deposits. ‘In the post-1983 
era of international operations, with the premium on flexibility, leanness, and instant 
access to world markets, Istanbul’s status was redefined’ (ibid.).
Another group of high-rise developments in the central business district area starting 
from the 1980s has consisted of luxury hotels. According to Keyder and Oncu, ‘next 
to international banks and trading companies, new arrivals in Istanbul’s city core in 
the 1980s included many new deluxe hotels constructed by special permission in 
choice locations overlooking the Bosporus’ (1993, p.28). They underline that:
‘All were beneficiaries of the post-1983 encouragement schemes to promote 
investments in tourism, doubling the five-star hotel capacity. Nearly all have 
been tall buildings, defining the new skyline of Istanbul. While land values 
and technological innovations in building construction and design provide 
sufficient motive for vertical expansion in most large cities, the timing and 
location of Istanbul’s new tall buildings underline the symbolism of the 
skyscraper’ (Keyder and Oncu, 1994, p.408).
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Before the 1980s, only four buildings exceeding twenty stories had been constructed 
in Istanbul; one housing the Istanbul Chamber of Industrialists, and three 
international hotels. In the post-1983 period, however, more than twenty new tall 
buildings were erected in ten years; all hotels or trade centres, symbolizing the
Picture 7.2 The changing visage of Istanbul: A picture from the Bosphorus
booming sectors of the economy in the new era of globalisation. This development 
accelerated in the 1990s and the city of Istanbul started to change the visage. As we 
will see in the following pages, new high-rise developments are on the agenda today 
and this creates new tension between the metropolitan municipality and civil actors 
in Istanbul.
7.3 Liberal Vision in the 1980s and the Transformation of the City Centre
As examined in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, Istanbul has experienced the liberal 
transformation in the 1980s and 1990s more than any other city in Turkey. Above­
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mentioned high-rise development in central areas was actually only one component 
of transformation of the city in the post-1983 period. As we have seen, ‘the 
significant increase in foreign direct investment and the arrival of, first, the 
headquarters of major multinational corporations, then, major producer service firms 
in accounting, advertising, marketing, fashion and entertainment, and finally 
dramatic growth in the hospitality industry started to transform Istanbul both socio­
economically and physically. On the other hand, ‘new wealth engendered new social 
groups: while the public sector professions such as teachers, writers, bureaucrats, 
trade unionists, suffered an identity crisis and loss of public confidence, the new 
private sector professions in engineering, journalism, marketing, and advertising 
experienced a dramatic growth of confidence’ (Gole, 1993, cited in Isin, 2001, 
p.361).
Moreover, according to Isin;
‘The spatial organization of the city changed dramatically as well. While its 
traditional polarization between the rich and the poor increased, it was 
obvious that the new rich were those connected with the internationalized and 
liberalized economy. The regeneration and renovation of the historic core of 
the city for both the tourist industry and the new chic quarters of the wealthy 
continued as poverty was increasingly suburbanized further and further out 
from the city’ (2001, p.361).
The person starting this rapid transformation has been the liberal mayor Bedrettin 
Dalan, who put his signature on Istanbul of the 1980s. He was a former businessman 
who joined the liberal central right party (ANAP) in the 1980s and remained a
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politically unknown entity until he actually took office in 1984. The following 
paragraph quoted from Keyder and Oncu best describes his liberal vision against the 
city:
‘He embarked upon transforming Istanbul from a tired city whose glory 
resided in past history, into a newly-imagined metropolis. Armed with the 
new executive capacity accorded to the mayoralty, and personal arrogance, he 
used the resources newly conferred to metropolitan municipalities in order to 
put into motion a series of urban renewal projects which had remained on the 
drawing board for more than three decades. Using an entrepreneurial style 
alien to the official mentality, with rapid action preceding bureaucratic 
paperwork, and little patience for legal procedure or for canons of historical 
preservation, he cleared large tracts of nineteenth-century inner-city 
neighbourhoods’ (1994, p.408-409).
Dalan made 30,000 dilapidated buildings demolished along the shores of the Golden 
Horn in a very short time, and evicted large numbers of small manufacturing 
establishments as well as more organized and powerful ones such as Istanbul’s 
wholesale fresh produce market in the same area.
According to Keyder and Oncu, ‘the mayor Dalan’s vision of an internationalized 
Istanbul for the twenty-first century, in its oft-advertised broad strokes, was very 
simple: the historical peninsula, cleaned of unsightly buildings and activities, was 
envisaged as an open-air museum of historical monuments and picturesque old 
wooden houses, now restored and cleaned up and within easy and rapid access from 
different parts of the city on newly-constructed throughways’ (ibid., p.409). In
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addition, the internationalized business centre to the north of the Golden Horn, which 
has been called the Levent-Maslak axis in this study, with its deluxe hotels, modem 
offices and wide avenues would host global functions concretized in conventions, 
businessmen, and tourists. Keyder and Oncu concludes that ‘what is remarkable is 
not the simplicity of this vision, but Dalan’s astounding success in actually 
implementing so much of i t .... in the five years of his mayoralty, fraught with legal 
battles, rumours of fortunes changing hands in the awarding of municipal works 
contracts, of unprecedented corruption in city hall, and feverish constmction activity, 
Istanbul emerged as the showcase for Turkey’s new era of integration into the world 
scene’ (ibid.).
7.4 Dynamics of the CBD Development in Istanbul
There has been some striking dispersal of the central business district (CBD) in the 
metropolitan area of Istanbul since the 1950s, as an inevitable consequence of the 
expansion of the whole metropolitan area. According to Tekeli;
‘Before 1950, the CBD consisted of three interrelated areas. The first one was 
the area encircled by Eminonu, Sirkeci and Kapalicarsi, the second was 
Karakoy, Persembe Pazari and the Bankalar street complex, and the third was 
the Istiklal street, Tepebasi and its environs. Other commercial and service 
activity concentrations such as Kadikoy, Uskudar, Besiktas, Aksaray and 
similar areas were distributed all over the city and functioned as local 
neighbourhood and district centres’ (1994, p. 138).
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Between 1950 and 1965, both the population and geographical size of the 
metropolitan area increased rapidly, and the CBD not only spread into new locations 
but also displayed internal differentiation. As a result of this expansion, the former 
residential areas had been surrounded by CBD functions. Moreover, ‘previous sub­
centres which had served as neighbourhood centres until then were modified to 
become part of the CBD’ (ibid., p. 139).
The CBD continued to expand linearly in the 1970s by following the lines of the 
topography and in the peripheral areas the expressways connecting main arterials. 
The level of topography has had its effect on the expansion of the CBD activities in 
the new areas. Eminonu district of the historical peninsula, Karakoy, the area 
between Tunel and Taksim Square, orientated along the main thoroughfare Istiklal 
Street, Osmanbey, Sisli and Mecidiyekoy are all connected to each other linearly. Of 
the districts listed, Eminonu and Karakoy can be noted as the most important CBD 
areas of the 1970s, and although they are separated physically by the Golden Horn, 
they are also connected by the Galata bridge. Istiklal Street in Beyoglu, links the 
historical centre to the newly developed ones, and still has the most lively and the 
densest CBD functions.
In the 1970s, there were nine centres spread within the city, each having their own 
special internal structure. In the size order, starting from the largest, these were 
Eminonu, Karakoy, Beyoglu, which is the area between Tunel and Taksim square, 
orientated along the main thoroughfare, Istiklal Caddesi, Kadikoy, Osmanbey, 
Besiktas, Aksaray, Mecidiyekoy and Uskudar as marked on Figure 7.1.
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‘While the CBD was diffusing into new areas, existing residential buildings at first 
assumed commercial functions and were latter demolished and replaced by shopping 
arcades and office buildings’ (Tekeli, 1994, p. 143). The spatial inequalities in the 
metropolitan area have been reduced by improved transport and communication 
systems so that traditional demands for centrality have become less important for 
most of the activities. However, service industries such as finance, insurance and 
banking, which require relatively large amounts of office space, still placed a higher 
premium on centrality than other urban activities, and they have been successful in 
forcing other land users to move from central to peripheral areas, occupying the city 
centre. The spatial restrictions in the historical city centre also had an important role 
in forcing local businesses to relocate in the less expensive and less congested 
peripheral areas.
Figure 7.1 The CBD areas of the 1970s in Greater Municipality of Istanbul
Note: The map was adopted from Kubat (2001); CBD areas of the 1970s have been 
marked as: 1. Aksaray, 2. Eminonu, 3. Karakoy, 4. Istiklal Street (Beyoglu), 5. 
Osmanbey, 6. Mecidiyekoy (Sisli), 7. Besiktas, 8. Uskudar and 9. Kadikoy.
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A study made in 1977 by the Planning Office of the Municipality of Istanbul gives 
some insights about different functions of the central business districts in Istanbul in 
the 1970s. The central business district areas in the study included both the old city 
cores such as Eminonu and Beyoglu, and the new centre development in areas like 
Sisli and Besiktas including the Levent-Maslak axis. The total number of 
administrative, business and service establishments in every district was investigated, 
and the findings have shown that;
‘32.6 percent of the administrative establishments were located in Eminonu,
54.4 percent in Beyoglu, and 10.1 percent in Sisli and Besiktas in the 1970s. 
On the other hand, 68.5 percent of business establishments were located in 
Eminonu, 24.3 percent in Beyoglu, and 4.4 percent in Sisli and Besiktas. 
Moreover, while 43.1 percent of service establishments were located in 
Eminonu, this ratio was 45.2 percent in Beyoglu, and 7.4 percent in Sisli and 
Besiktas. Finally, when we look into the total numbers of these three types of 
firms, while 55.2 percent of them were located in Eminonu, this percentage 
was 35.3 in Beyoglu, and 5.1 in Sisli and Besiktas in the 1970s’ (Dokmeci et 
al., 1993, p.32, translated by E. Zibel).
To sum up, ‘at the beginning of the 1980s, Eminonu district still maintained its status 
and function as the most important core of the CBD’ (Tekeli, 1994, p.219). However, 
the situation started to change dramatically in the 1980s. The construction of the two 
bridges, the Bogazici (Bosporus) and the Fatih Sultan Mehmet over the Bosporus 
stimulated more peripheral CBD developments in Istanbul. ‘These two passages 
between two continents, Europe and Asia, serving for both the European-Anatolian
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transit and the city’s inner urban traffic, encouraged motor vehicle use, and caused 
the development of the new CBD northwards to the Black sea coast’ (Kubat, 2001). 
According to Tekeli, ‘between 1965 and 1984, CBD functions reached Mecidiyekoy 
centre above Halaskargazi street and gravitated even further towards Gayrettepe and 
Maslak along the Sisli-Buyukdere Road’ (1994, p.222). ‘The importance of the 
Taksim-Sisli-Mecidiyekoy-Buyukdere Road and traffic density on it were increased 
especially after the Bosphorus Bridge and its belt-ways were opened to traffic in 
1973’ (Tekeli, 1994, p.223). This area will be called as the Levent-Maslak axis in 
this following parts of this study.
‘The extension of the CBD along Mecidiyekoy, Gayrettepe and Buyukdere Road 
began to specialize in insurance companies and as a location for the central offices of 
foreign banks, large holdings and multinational companies. Thus, the most important 
centres of control in the CBD became concentrated in that area. The high 
accessibility of the area for high income car owning groups via the bridges 
contributed to its rapid development’ (Municipality of Sisli, 1987, p.51-60, cited in 
Tekeli, 1994, p.223)
When we look at the location of firms as one of the variables to determine the sub­
centres in Istanbul between 1960 and 1990, we can see the highest percentage of the 
new firm location has been in Sisli and Mecidiyekoy area including the Levent- 
Maslak axis with 17.3% of new firms choosing to locate there during this period. 
This ratio was 14.2% in 1960. Although Sisli and Mecidiyekoy was in the periphery 
of the CBD in the 1950s, their population increased from 181.402 in 1960 to 250.478 
in 1990 (Dokmeci et al., 1993, p.25, translated by E. Zibel).
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Figure 7.2 and 7.3 show the recent data on the spatial concentration of producer 
services, banks and financial organizations in Istanbul Metropolitan area. According 
to this data taken from the Chamber of Trade in Istanbul, Sisli-Mecidiyekoy-Maslak 
area as well as the old city area in Eminonu-Beyoglu in the European side of the city 
have been main concentration areas for the producer service firms, banks and finance 
organisations.
Figure 7.2 Spatial distribution of producer service firms in Istanbul 
Metropolitan Area by districts
WAtlMRU 0 £l * t l
Note: Map has been taken from ITO (Istanbul Chamber of Trade, 2004-2005).
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Figure 7.3 Spatial distribution of banks and finance organizations in Istanbul
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Note: Map has been taken from ITO (Istanbul Chamber of Trade, 2004-2005).
To some colleagues, not only the number of producer service firms and total service 
employment, but also tax collected in Sisli-Mecidiyekoy-Maslak area has been the 
highest of Istanbul in the 1990s. The amount of tax collected in Sisli district has been 
$339 million in 1990, and this amount is 28.1 % of the total amount of tax collected 
in the city (Dokmeci et al., 1993, p.28, translated by E. Zibel).
As a result of economic restructuring policies started to be implemented in the 1980s, 
the city required even more modem buildings with access to international 
telecommunication systems to satisfy the demand for office space by multinational 
businesses in the 1990s. Istanbul’s growth and development during this period was 
enhanced by urban policies that recognise new demands for telecommunications 
technology on office design and transportation infrastructure. Many high-rise 
buildings have been constructed in the newly developing financial centre area and
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many others are still under construction. This development reflects both the demand 
for office space and the continuing attraction of the centre for international business 
activities. On the other hand, this high demand has also put further pressure on rents 
in the area, which were already the highest in the city since the 1990s. According to 
the statistics, office rents in the district of Sisli have risen up to US$25/m2/month 
recently, which is the highest in Istanbul (Dokmeci et al., 1993, p.28, translated by E. 
Zibel).
In conclusion, as the old CBD including Eminonu and Beyoglu has lost its primary 
role in the last two decades, the modem development of the new CBD in Sisli, 
Besiktas and Mecidiyekoy area including the Levent-Maslak axis gained more 
importance due to the sectoral change together with the economic restructuring 
process and intensifying globalisation trends started in the 1980s. As a result of the 
tremendous expansion of the centre, the city’s most urgent need became to improve 
its seriously congested transportation system. On the one hand, the constmction of a 
subway system was started to ease traffic problems as well as to increase the 
accessibility of new sub-centres. On the other hand, new major road arterials which 
converge towards the centre have provided some improvement in the flow of traffic 
and easy movement in and out of the centre’s immediate surroundings. Moreover, as 
a consequence of the improvements in infrastructure such as the constmction of a 
second bridge on the Bosphorus, an expressway connecting the bridges of the Golden 
Horn and the Bospoms, and some inner-city arterials, the area including Sisli, 
Besiktas and Mecidiyekoy as well as the Levent-Maslak axis started to gain some 
locational advantages.
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7.5 New Financial Centre Development along the ‘Levent - Maslak Axis’
Starting from the 1980s, together with the increasing transportation and infrastructure 
investments, which have actually begun with the opening of the first bridge passing 
over the Bosporus, new contemporary business districts started to develop in both the 
eastern and western sides of the city. These developments gained speed with the 
completion of the second bridge over the Bosporus in the 1990s. In the west side of 
the city, the expansion of the historical urban core reached to Mecidiyekoy-Sisli in 
the north, and the area called the ‘Levent-Maslak’ axis (see Figure 7.4), where a new 
finance and business district started to develop with many high rise office buildings 
and skyscrapers. While new business districts are continuing their progress, Istanbul 
also expanded very rapidly as a result of the high increase in its population and 
migration, and it had a multi central metropolitan structure in the 1990s.
What was noteworthy at this point is that the finance sector in Istanbul also followed 
this multi central structure and did not have to be clustered in one place, with the 
help of the developments in information and telecommunications technologies. 
While Levent-Maslak axis is developing in the western part of the city, a region 
along the Kadikoy-Altunizade line in the eastern part of the city also started to 
expand as a new financial centre.
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Figure 7.4 New CBD Area along the Levent-Maslak Axis
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During this process some urban land use and activities such as wholesale stocks, 
wholesale food market, manufacturing buildings, and ship repairing places causing 
negative effects for the city centre were also forced to leave the historical part of the 
centre, including Eminonu, Sirkeci and Beyoglu. One other reason of this process 
actually was to open some space for the new service functions like finance, banking 
and insurance.
Moreover, the connection line between the International Ataturk Airport and the first 
and second Bridges over the Bosporus has gained some importance for location 
decisions of some specialised functions in the city. As a result of this, large firms 
started to compete with each other to be able to locate their headquarters or office 
towers along the north axis of the Buyukdere Street (Gayrettepe-Levent and Maslak, 
Mecidiyekoy-Zincirlikuyu, Besiktas-Zincirlikuyu, Zincirlikuyu-Buyukdere Street
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and Ayazaga areas). The so-called ‘new plazas axis’, or the ‘Levent-Maslak axis’ 
today shows high concentration of finance corporations such as banks, finance and 
insurance companies (see Picture 7.3 showing the axis from the Asian side of the 
city). The new financial district that has come into being especially around the 
Buyukdere Street has attracted about twenty five bank headquarters, including the 
biggest private banks in Turkey as well as the headquarters of large companies like 
Sabanci Holding and IBM, and is now dubbed “the Manhattan of Turkey” by the 
middle of 1990s (Robins and Aksoy, 1996).
Picture 7.3 The new plazas axis between Levent and Maslak in Istanbul
Urban policies on Istanbul, special locational characteristics of the city, being a 
bridge between East and West, the tourism potential as a result of natural and 
historical beauties, economic and political effects of globalisation have given the city 
a multi-functional service city role, and this has also prepared convenient conditions 
for the developments stated above. However, all these developments have been 
rather unplanned. The 1980 Master Plan for the Istanbul Metropolitan Area and local 
plans of different municipalities having administrative responsibilities for the
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Levent-Maslak axis have been insufficient for directing the rapid growth in the area 
as a contemporary CBD.
The crucial role of the ‘Tourism Encouragement’ law in 1982 (No.2634) in the 
development of the Levent -  Maslak axis
Urban policy and developments particularly related to central areas of the city started 
to be controlled by the central government in the 1980s. The liberal Motherland 
Party (ANAP) government of that time developed a legal tool called ‘Tourism 
Encouragement Law’ in realising this policy. According to this strategy, the 
Ministries in Ankara were directly able to take specific planning decisions such as 
the declaration of some urban plots as ‘tourism areas’ in various cities with reference 
to the Tourism Encouragement Law. As we have also seen in Chapter Four, with the 
Tourism Encouragement Law enacted in 1982, urban segments subject to the Law 
can be exempted from the provisions of the Planning Law and regulations, and 
obviously from the control of local governments.
The first section of interviews as part of the case study has been allocated to the 
discussion about the Tourism Encouragement Law. Oktay Ekinci1, from the Istanbul 
division of the Chamber of Architects presents his opposition to the Law and points 
out that:
‘this Law [Tourism Encouragement], was passed in the Consultative 
Assembly [the supposed legislative body of the post-12 September military 
period] in March 1982 and went into effect upon publication in the Official
1 Ekinci was the head of the Istanbul division of the Chamber of Architects in the 1990s
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Gazette in the same year....in other words, from the beginning, this Law was 
“unconstitutional” [Turkey, under military rule, had no constitution at the 
time, the previous constitution having been suspended], and has managed to 
stay in force despite containing provisions which violate the 1982 
Constitution’ (interview with Oktay Ekinci, 11 July 2000).
Although the Law appears to be “unconstitutional”, the implementation of it has been 
very wide. Many public and private lands in the city, including a public park, 
previously a part of the Dolmabahce Palace, have been declared “tourism centres” 
and land use rights of these areas have been taken by the central government in 
contrast to related master plan decisions of the local government. It would be in a 
way acceptable if these tourism areas have included only the places having important 
tourism potential. But, regrettably these special tourism areas involved not only 
historical and natural sites or tourism facilities serving for hospitality sector, but also 
business skyscrapers accommodating global finance and banking sectors and 
producer services. According to Ekinci:
‘some striking examples of this process are the buildings that house “tourism 
and business centres”, only some parts of which are planned as hotels but 
which nevertheless take maximum advantage of the right to build skyscrapers 
in, and only in, tourism centres’ (interview with Ekinci, 11 July 2000).
Oktay Ekinci adds that:
‘in any case, the Park Hotel, the Swissotel and the Conrad, all notorious 
products of this law with their “incongruous” silhouettes against Istanbul’s
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skyline, make it clear what this law means by “tourism” without our even 
having to read it’ (interview with Ekinci, 11 July 2000).
Under this law, the Levent-Maslak axis and Sisli and Besiktas districts including the 
axis became important attraction points, and have been counted among special 
tourism areas together with some genuine natural and historical tourism areas such as 
Heybeli and Buyuk islands and Galata Tower. High rise building developments in 
the new financial centre of Istanbul have taken its legal status with the Tourism 
Encouragement Law of the centre government, although the rapid growth in this so 
called axis has not been stipulated in the 1980 Master Plan of the Metropolitan 
Municipality. Nurettin Sozen who was the mayor of the Metropolitan Municipality 
of Istanbul between 1989 and 1994, while answering questions about the Law and 
special tourism areas, has said that:
‘the declaration of special tourism areas has aimed to distribute urban rent 
between various business interest groups which are seeking monetary profits,
rather than to create tourism facilities in real terms as a result many
valuable places, urban plots, and various buildings have been used for this 
aim without any planning permission and also without any control of the
Istanbul metropolitan municipality behind all development decisions you
could see the hand of the central government in Ankara’ (interview with 
Nurettin Sozen, 15 July 2000).
Ekinci agrees to Sozen, and states that:
2 He has been the mayor of the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul between 1989 and 1994.
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‘the Tourism Encouragement Law has taken away the planning authority 
from municipalities both in Istanbul and in tourism areas of other cities, and 
therefore is completely against vital principles and aims of the Planning
Law this also shows that the central government, with this Law, prefers
some economic interests of business environment close to its political 
choices, rather than the planned development of cities’ (interview with Oktay 
Ekinci, 11 July 2000).
Sozen adds that:
‘even if there are some specific planning decisions to take related to some 
specific tourism areas in cities, these should be taken by municipalities 
together with, and as part of general development plan decisions. There is no 
need for central planning decisions of the Ministries in Ankara to plan the 
development in the city’ (interview with Sozen, 15 July 2000).
Senihi Kitapci, from the Chamber of City Planners, underlines another important
point in the interview, and says that:
‘while the central government, with its one hand, is giving some authorities to 
local governments with regulations in the Planning Law numbered 3194, it is, 
with other hand, taking back them with such a Law [Tourism 
Encouragement]. Why?’, and then answers his own question: ‘to open the 
speculation paths which have been plugged...’ (interview with Senihi 
Kitapci, 2 September 2000).
3 Kitapci was the head of the Chamber of City Planners in the 1990s
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Kitapci also points out that:
‘who would be kept responsible from all those urban problems in centres of 
these cities, where the municipality has been authorised in one side of their
roads, and the Ministry in the other who invented this kind of a planning
approach?’ (interview with Senihi Kitapci, 2 September 2000).
The liberal government, on the other hand, ignoring all kinds of reactions, has 
declared 28 special tourism areas in Turkey until 1989, giving the Ministry of Public 
Works and Resettlement the authority of making plans, their amendments, and 
approving them in those areas, and this authority was supposed to be used by 
municipalities according to the Legislation. To Senihi Kitapci:
‘this peculiarity of special tourism areas was definitely not fitting to the 
Urban Planning Law that the central government decision was based on, and 
to general purposes of the Tourism Encouragement Law’ (interview with 
Senihi Kitapci, 2 September 2000).
The central government declared 18 more special tourism areas in various cities, and 
the total number of them exceeded 40 in 1990. These special tourism areas mostly 
consisted of urban spots in the centre of large metropolitan cities, and coastal 
regions, and they were often occupying urban plots rather than regions. Ekinci also 
points out this and says that:
‘Between 1984 and 1991 alone, close to 40 sites in Istanbul, some of which 
were mere Tots’ while others were entire zones, were declared “tourism 
centres” by a decree of the Council of Ministers under law no. 2634’ 
(interview with Oktay Ekinci, 11 July 2000).
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Subsequent national governments in the 1990s also carried on this ‘Loot 
Encouragement Law’ (Ekinci, 1998, quoted from Cumhuriyet 28.09.1998), and 
continued to declare special tourism areas by distributing planning and development 
rights to particular individuals. A daily newspaper has also used the term ‘looting’ 
for this process, and given ‘the big looting in Istanbul’ headline in the paper. The 
news continued as follows:
‘the special urban lands in the Bosporus and conservation areas are being 
opened for the construction by the central government. Among these special 
tourism areas, which have actually been declared by the Council of Ministers 
in order to bypass planning restrictions, there are Mavramoloz forest in 
Sariyer which has been allowed for the use of the big business giant, Koc 
Holding, the Sultansahili area in Kurucesme which has been bought by the 
other giant Sabanci Holding in 1993. Both places are in the boundaries of 
conservation areas. The Council of Ministers, moreover, has also declared the 
Barboros Park in the Yildiz Palace conservation area, Istinye hills, the beer 
factory of Tekel Bomonti, Ataturk Anadolu highschool, the Sumerbank area 
in Zeytinbumu and the Atakoy - Kazlicesme coastal area as the special 
tourism area in order to bypass the planning restrictions. The Chamber of 
Architects and Planners showed severe reactions against the declaration of 
new tourism areas in Istanbul, claiming that this is a process of sharing the 
rent from urban land’ (Cumhuriyet4, 20.01.1998).
4 Cumhuriyet is a national newspaper published in Istanbul, and it is ideologically close to leftwing.
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The number of special tourism areas reached to 160 at the end of the 1990s, and as a 
result of this, the central parts of Istanbul, today, are full of skyscrapers, or, with 
Ekinci’s words, ‘ugly high rise monuments of a legal crime’ (1991, p.44), creating 
serious urban infrastructural problems for the city.
Rising infrastructural problems together with the new CBD development
The second part of conducted interviews aims to find out the consequences of the 
new CBD areas in city’s physical and infrastructural development. Various negative 
effects of these ‘nodal’ areas have been visualized in the over-loaded capacity on 
infrastructure, such as additional traffic load, loss of public/open spaces, forest areas 
and impaired artificial built environment that are not intertwined to the 
neighbourhood, both socially and aesthetically. Sozen argues that:
‘as far as building rights and conditions are concerned, these nodal areas are 
now regarded as “outside the scope” of the building and reconstruction plans 
in effect for those parts of the city; and the land owners and developers have 
consequently acquired the right to construct buildings of extra-ordinary 
density through the regional and “tourism centre building plans” that were put 
into effect with direct Ministry approval’ (interview with Sozen, 15 July 
2000).
According to Ekinci:
‘the many tall buildings called “plaza” or “business centre” which were built 
as part of the new CBD development process are today sprouting up all over
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Istanbul and destroying almost all aspects of the urban fabric’ (interview with 
Oktay Ekinci, 11 July 2000).
Rafet Bozdogan5, the director of the transportation division in the metropolitan 
municipality of Istanbul, moreover, mentions about the challenging characteristic of 
planning the development in the new financial centre, and says that:
‘the goal of city planners is to achieve a balance between continued viability 
of the CBD as the dominant office area on the one hand, and the growth of 
suburban office space in line with centrifugal growth of the population on the
other Office buildings in new financial centres of Istanbul including the
Levent-Maslak axis have a high density of employment, higher than for any 
other land use. These office buildings are therefore important traffic
generators, especially during peak hours It is necessary to supply the
transformation requirements of these new centres as well as the old CBD’ 
(interview with Rafet Bozdogan, 16 July 2000).
Bozdogan, however, appears to be highly hopeful about developments in the 
transportation sector, and adds that:
‘the construction of the new underground line between Taksim and Levent 
became quite helpful in solving the transportation problems around the new
financial centre district including the Levent-Maslak axis and in the
middle term, the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul is planning to 
construct an extension line between Levent and Ayazaga....by 2010 we are
5 He is the director of the Transportation Division in the Metropolitan Municipality o f Istanbul since 
1999.
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planning to reach 225-250 km railway system in Istanbul’ (interview with 
Bozdogan, 16 July 2000).
Yusuf Namoglu6, the mayor of the Municipality of Besiktas, explains projects of the 
Municipality, which is one of two districts (Sisli and Besiktas) including the entire 
Levent-Maslak area. He mentions about infrastructural problems in the Levent- 
Maslak axis in the interview, and says that:
‘whenever the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and the District 
Municipality of Besiktas finish all road construction works in the region, the 
road traffic congestion problems in the axis of Zincirlikuyu-Etiler-Levent- 
Hisarustu, the Buyukdere Street, the Nispetiye Street and the Akmerkez 
shopping mall will have been solved’ (interview with Yusuf Namoglu, 23 
July 2000).
Picture 7.4 Congestion as one of the most important problems in Istanbul
6 He is the mayor o f  the District Municipality o f  Besiktas in Istanbul between 1999 and 2004.
225
The infrastructure and transportation problems in the Levent-Maslak area often 
becomes subject to daily newspapers and their news. In one of those news, it has 
been said that:
Tets think about how the traffic problem in the Zincirlikuyu (Levent)-Maslak 
line, which will turn to a tower field in the next years, will be solved? If the 
metro (underground system) cannot save the area (from the congestion 
problem), all the expenditures for a modem Turkey profile will be wasted, 
and all news agencies will be announcing this flashy news to all the world: 
“traffic congestion was not able to be opened for days (in Istanbul)....!”’ 
(Hurriyet7, 14.01.1999).
Another news from a daily paper is also worth to mention since it also presents the 
incapability of the state bureaucracy with respect to urban policies:
‘the new road between Etiler and Zincirlikuyu (in the the Levent-Maslak 
area), which is the most congested road in Istanbul, has at last come to the
construction stage the project of the road, which would have jointly been
constmcted by private sector, the Metropolitan Municipality and the 
Municipality of Besiktas, has been completed 11 years ago, but because it had 
faced to some bureaucratic obstacles, it could not have been finished until 
today’ (Hurriyet, 18.12.2000).
Although central business district areas already have some serious infrastructural 
problems, local governments have sometimes attempted to establish new 
entertainment or shopping complexes within those areas, as an approach to improve
7 Hurriyet is one of the biggest national daily newspapers published in Istanbul
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Qthe attractiveness of downtown office locations. Sinan Bolek , from the Directorate 
of Urban Planning, who has been interviewed in the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul, gives an example for this and says that:
‘in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, we are trying to locate some 
theatres to the central and historical district of Beyoglu in order to create new 
attraction points....the re-establishment of the traditional tramway on the 
main artery is also a part of the plan to attract more people to this nostalgic 
area’ (interview with Sinan Bolek, 5 August 2000).
Growing urban infrastructural problems often bring about the necessity for a new 
Master Plan to control rapid developments in the city. Since the 1980 plan shortly 
became inadequate against those developments, the new Master Plan for the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Area was approved in 1995. Developments in Istanbul were so rapid 
that the time of this Plan also became very short, and the Metropolitan Municipality 
of Istanbul prepared a new Plan in 2006 as seen in Chapter Six. However, since the 
1995 Master Plan has been the main scheme to shape CBD areas in the last 10 years, 
it will be examined with reference to its approach to CBD developments in Istanbul.
A new plan, an old story: 1995 Master Plan and CBD development
The Master Plan developed by the Greater Municipality of Istanbul in 1995 has 
targeted the year 2010 for the completion as we mentioned in Chapter Six. The aim 
of the 1995 Master Plan was, on the one hand, to deal with the rising infrastructure 
problems coming with the rapid developments in the city. On the other hand, as a
8 He is an architect, working in the Directorate of Urban Planning in the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul
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more general objective, realising the global economic development parallel to the 
country and region without forgetting the conservation of cultural, natural and 
historical characteristics of the city has also been put into the agenda. In other words, 
the Plan involved establishing a balance between economic and physical 
development, and history and conservation.
The previous 1980 Master Plan of Istanbul suggested a hierarchical structure for the 
CBDs. ‘The area remained south of the Bosphorus Bridge and its belt-ways on the 
Beyoglu side plus those quarters of the historical peninsula were designated as the 
core of the CBD, and it was estimated that this centre would extend from 
Zincirlikuyu towards the north, to Maslak via Buyukdere Road’ (Tekeli, 1994, 
p.211). According to the 1995 Master Plan the multi-centred structure has in general 
been encouraged in the city. In relation to CBD areas, various strategies can be noted 
from the 1995 Master Plan of the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and we can 
see those strategies in Table 7.1. Interviews with officials and planners in the 
Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul preparing the Plan have also revealed that 
recent CBD developments in the city are mostly against the 1995 Plan’s objectives as 
we can see in Table 7.1.
As seen from these strategies, the 1995 Master Plan did not bring any new idea for 
Istanbul. The Plan only encouraged current developments in the city. The strategies 
such as decreasing urban development pressures on the historical peninsula and the 
Bosporus by creating new attraction zones towards the east and west poles of the city 
were not new ideas at all. While the Plan confirmed world city functions of Istanbul
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Table 7.1 The 1995 Master Plan: Objectives-Outcome Matrix for CBDs
The 1995 Master Plan 
Objectives
Realisation
A linear and multi-centred development 
was emphasised
The result has been more concentration 
in particular CBD areas such as Levent- 
Maslak, Ataturk Airport, Beyoglu and 
Kadikoy
In order to achieve population 
decentralisation in highly populated 
urban areas, the development of sub­
centres was encouraged
This was to a certain extent realised 
with new housing projects in various 
parts of the city
The transportation and infrastructure 
system would support the linear 
development within the whole 
metropolitan area
Investments in these sectors just 
followed CBD developments in the city 
which followed non-linear path
The structure of the historical peninsula 
would be preserved
Although the development of CBD 
activities was not restrained in the area, 
the historical trade and tourism centre 
was preserved in historical zone. In the 
outer areas of the historical city wall, a 
world trade centre which is close to 
Ataturk International Airport was 
established in order to decrease the 
pressure on the existing CBD area
The physical development of sites along 
the Bosporus, Golden Horn, and the 
area inside historical walls which define 
the identity of Istanbul was to be 
controlled and protected from land uses 
causing high population
These areas remained under the 
pressures of dynamic physical 
development in neighbouring CBD 
areas. There have been some clearance 
of land uses such as storage, production 
and industrial activities in the area as 
well
The service sector in the metropolitan 
area of Istanbul would be encouraged 
whilst ensuring decentralisation of 
industries on both regional and country 
wide levels
Together with financial centre 
development in the city, service sector 
developed rapidly and manufacturing 
continued to decentralise
A balanced dispersal of centres in the 
entire metropolitan area was aimed
Because of CBD concentrations, it is 
difficult to talk about a balanced 
dispersal of centres in the city
The concept of concentric development 
would be avoided, as it was found to be 
the biggest danger that could destroy the 
historical uniqueness of the city
The historical character of the city is 
under danger because of the high scale 
developments in central areas
East and west sides were to be 
considered as individual regions, 
ensuring a balanced distribution of 
sectors for a preferable population- 
employment relationship
Employment and workplaces 
concentrated in the western part of the 
city. A balanced distribution of sectors 
was not able to be provided
229
and foresaw it as a future leading city in the region, it did not provide any new vision 
for the city’s economy and industry. The Master Plan targeted a linear development 
in Istanbul, refusing the concentric development with definite words. This means that 
the Plan ignores some rapid and unplanned developments within central areas of the 
city, and the best example of this is actually the new financial centre development in 
Levent-Maslak axis and its adjacent areas. The growth in the Levent-Maslak area has 
essentially become a development which encourages the expansion of the city centre 
into the north, threatening forest areas which are vital for the city. Reasons of this 
ignorance can be looked for in limitations of the Metropolitan Municipality in 
decision-making, planning and controlling process of this particular area, and also in 
involvement of the central government in local planning process.
Although globalisation is an objective according to the Plan, it generally does not 
bring any provisions other than locational allocation. Even in the location allocation 
it appears that there are some problems. While the 1995 Master Plan aims some of 
the present industrial areas to be transformed into service, tourism, administrative 
and financial centres, it also imports deficits in solving infrastructural problems. The 
insufficiency of infrastructure in new CBD areas, today, is one significant dilemma, 
which has been a product of the rapid socio-economic transformation started in the 
1980s.
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Continuing Political Struggle in the City
The 1995 Master Plan, in general, became far from controlling developments in 
macro scale. As we have seen before, economic policies of the central government in 
the 1980s and 1990s brought new functions and activities in urban agenda. There 
was an urgent need for office spaces in new central business districts to rapidly 
locate growing financial activities, and services, because there was not enough land 
in the old historical centre of the city. At this point, as we will remember, the central 
government’s declaration of special tourism centres with reference to the Tourism 
Encouragement Law, serviced to response those pressures. This decision of the 
central authority without any consultation with the local administration and NGOs 
was actually a preparatory stage of a long process which would end up many office 
towers to be built in several areas of Istanbul, and the Levent-Maslak axis has been 
the densest one among them. Many other areas in Istanbul have also been affected 
from the Law, when declaration of special tourism areas has given the land use and 
construction permit to central government bodies without any control or authority of 
the local government.
The most important aspect of this decision of the central government can be 
underlined as that the authorisation to make a plan, to change or approve it has been 
taken from the local government in Istanbul and various other cities, and given to the 
Ministry of Construction and Resettlement with the provision of consulting to the 
Ministry of Tourism. Through these authority takeovers in planning, local opposition 
has been ignored, although there have been some warnings to central government on 
possible negative consequences of centralized planning decisions at the local level.
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Central business districts have been developed as individual places disregarding 
surrounding areas, and local needs and problems in those areas. Since the central 
government's decision excluded local opinion and demands, and the overall context 
of place, local actors have often opposed this practice during the 1990s, although 
their voice has not been taken into consideration most of the time.
Under these conditions, there has been a continuing struggle between the local and 
central government since the 1980s. When these two government offices have been 
filled by politicians having opposing ideologies, the tension between two levels has 
even grown. Central government ministries such as the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism still continue to use their constitution-based legal authority to intervene in 
the process of local planning in Istanbul. While doing this, it claims that its 
intervention is to guarantee the maximum economic return to the public in an area 
with very strategic location values, such as tourism, retail trade and finance. 
However, this judgment was independently created from the participation of local 
government agencies, which are responsible for the supply of goods and services to 
local business and residents in the nearby area.
Recent examples of those interventions have been faced in projects such as Dubai 
Towers, Galataport or Mashattan. Table 7.2 presents recent high-rise building 
developments in Istanbul, and as we can see from the Table, the Dubai Towers 
project is the most important one and is worth to mention here (see Picture 7.5). With 
the encouragement of the central government, Dubai International Properties (DIP), 
recently decided to make an investment of US$5 billion in Istanbul, and the Dubai 
Towers project became part of that investment with US$500 million spending. The
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Towers will be built in a parcel of 46,000 m2 in Levent, and will accommodate a 5 
star luxury hotel, office spaces, an entertainment and shopping centre (quoted from 
Milliyet newspaper, 25/10/2005).
Dogan Tekeli, who is one of the well known architects in Turkey, also declared his 
opposition to the Dubai Towers project in one of his statement in a magazine. 
Although he is the architect of famous high rise buildings and shopping centres such 
as Metrocity in Istanbul, he thinks that ‘the Dubai Towers are inharmonious with 
their surrounding area, not appropriate for Istanbul’s silhouette and they must not be 
constructed in their current condition’ (Tekeli, 2005, p. 12). Oktay Ekinci also 
emphasises that ‘the European [planning] Laws which are based on themes such as 
urban culture and protecting urban identity does not allow towers like Dubai to be 
erected in this way’ (2005, p. 16).
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Picture 7.5 A Model of the Dubai Towers Project and its location on the picture 
(taken from Milliyet newspaper, 25/10/2005)
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Table 7.2 Ongoing high-rise buildings development in Istanbul
Name of the 
Building
Zone / 
Borough
Height / 
No of 
Floor
Construction
ends
Owner of 
the Project
Diamond of 
Istanbul
Maslak/Sisli 238 m. 
53 floors
2008 Hattat
Holdings
Istanbul Canyon 
I
Levent/Besiktas 118m. 
30 floors
2006 Eczacibasi / 
Tepe Groups
Istanbul Canyon 
II
Levent/Besiktas 22 floors 2006 Eczacibasi / 
Tepe Groups
Dubai Tower I Levent/Besiktas 101 floors 2009 Sama Dubai
Dubai Tower II Levent/Besiktas 81 floors 2009 Sama Dubai
Another example called Mashattan mainly is a housing project for high income 
groups working in the new financial centre of Levent-Maslak. The project also 
includes numerous social and cultural facilities and shopping areas for its inhabitants 
alongside 10 high-rise apartments having 33 floors each one. The project, obviously, 
has taken its name from Manhattan in New York, and the word Mashattan has been
Picture 7.6 A Model of the Mashattan Project (taken from Insaat Dunyasi- 
Construction World- Magazine, October, 2005)
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created to be able to give the message of ‘Manhattan in Maslak’. This project is also 
planned by a local construction company entitled Ta§yapi, with the support of the 
central government.
Examples of the central government’s intervention on urban policy and decision­
making process can be increased. The Galataport project including rent facilities 
between Galata and Kabatas, the Haydarpasa project containing international trade 
centre in Harem, and well known third bridge project across the Bosphorus can all be 
evaluated in this framework. According to Ekinci, ‘decisions for all these projects are 
being taken by the central government, for urban projects such as the Galataport and 
Haydarpasa the central government has enacted a special bylaw and we can not talk 
about transparency’ (2005, p. 16).
Although the current Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and its mayor 
particularly have no any opposition against these projects, there has been a conflict 
over the authority take over in previous times depending on political relations 
between central and local level governments. When the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul and the central government have been under control of different political 
parties and ideologies, this issue was frequently brought to the public attention. Then 
the local authority declared their opposition since they had excluded from decision­
making process while they were at the same time being expected to solve problems 
arising from these intense developments in the city.
In general, as summarised in this chapter, the decision-making process for urban 
policies in Istanbul in the last two decades has clearly showed the authoritarian
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approach of the central government which ignores the planning concept and the 
autonomous local administration principle. All these urban strategies and policies are 
not based on a healthy urban regime which includes various actors in the city. There 
appears to be a working coalition between the central government and business. In 
the last three or four years local government in a way participated to this coalition by 
remaining silent against harmful effects of rapid developments in the city. However, 
local civil organizations and local community have never been included in an urban 
regime although they have generally been the groups which have been affected most 
from the implementation of various projects in the very heart of the city.
7.6 Conclusion
As examined in Chapter Two, as a result of globalisation process, transnational 
capital concentrates in some particular locations called as world or global cities. The 
intensification of advanced producer services including finance, banking, legal, 
accountancy, advertising and consultancy is one of the distinctive features of these 
cities (Sassen, 1991 and Sassen, 1994). This new economic restructuring has had 
important effects on the spatial structure of world cities. According to Keyder and 
Oncu, producers services are often the most dynamic sector of the economy, 
providing investment and constituting demand; they employ a greater-than-expected 
share of the labor force; and their impact on the spatial and social structure of the 
urban area is disproportionately large’ (1994, p.389).
Chapter Three, on the other hand, revealed that the existence of some locations with 
a definite orientation to world market raises a question about their connection to
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nation states. We have seen that globalisation is also bringing about the necessity for 
decentralisation of governmental organisations. The reflection of this development in 
urban level has become the transformation of urban policy and strategies in world 
cities.
Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six then presented the case that the 
economic and political globalisation process has mostly affected the city of Istanbul 
in the Turkish case. According to some colleagues, this is very natural since ‘the city, 
with its geographical and strategic location, historical and cultural assets, dynamism 
and functional capacities carries on its process of transformation towards becoming a 
global city’ (Karaman and Levent, 2001, p.l). The spatial-economic conditions of 
Istanbul on the way becoming a world city started to be highly attractive for global 
capital and investments in the last two decades. A study made by Beaverstock and 
his colleagues (1999) also has confirmed this. According to this study, Istanbul 
ranges among 55 top world cities in an hierarchy of world cities. The study is based 
on the construction of an inventory of 122 cities with reference to their level of 
advanced producer services. While ‘global service centres are identified and graded 
for accountancy, advertising, banking/finance and law’ in this inventory, ‘the global 
capacity of cities is considered in terms of selected services they provide and defined 
empirically according to their scores as prime, major and minor global service 
centres’ (Beaverstock et al., 1999, p.445-446). The results of this inventory shows 
that Istanbul has been designated among major global advertising service centres and 
minor global banking and legal service centres (also see Appendix II).
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In the light of these arguments, this Chapter has confirmed that Istanbul has potential 
to be a world city. The physical transformation in the urban core of the city in the last 
two decades demonstrates that Istanbul is rapidly transforming into an international 
finance and banking centre. Developing a multi centred structure of Istanbul also 
helps the city to distribute some special functions in its sub-centres. As explained in a 
detailed way in this Chapter, there have been new central business district 
developments since the 1980s together with greater involvement of the central 
government in Ankara in urban policies. The most notable one of these developments 
has been in the ‘Levent-Maslak axis’. The transformation of the area to a global 
finance centre appears to be a promising attempt in taking Istanbul forward in global 
city competition. However, what this Chapter has also revealed is that all these 
developments in the Levent-Maslak area have not been based on a contemporary 
planning approach and a Master Plan of the local government. Instead, the central 
government behind these urban developments most of the time intervened local 
planning process, enacting special legislations, and trying to use its authority on local 
governments and local actors in Istanbul.
When the decision-making process behind urban policies such as new financial 
centre development in the Levent-Maslak axis has been examined, we can clearly see 
not only the central government’s cooperation with business and capital, but also its 
application of imposition and authority over local government. In other words, the 
new financial centre development policy in Istanbul is not based on an urban regime. 
Instead, civil actors have mostly been excluded from the process, and the local 
government’s participation has also been low and far from being satisfied. This 
situation has created both tension between the centre and local government and
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problems on urban area since central government’s specific decisions and 
legislations in various areas of the city have not been compatible with the Master 
Plan and urban policies of the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and district 
municipalities. The local government has mostly been the weaker side in this power 
relationship. On the other hand, companies and multinationals which have good 
relationship with the central government because of economic and political reasons 
have benefited from these policies based on specific legislations and made important 
amount of speculative gains as an outcome of spatial decisions in central areas of the 
city.
While these were happening, other significant urban planning objectives such as 
improving standards of living, increasing the quality of municipal services and 
protecting cultural, historical and natural heritage and environment have often been 
ignored under the conditions of globalisation.
To sum up, the examination of decision-making process behind recent important 
urban policies like developing a new financial centre in Istanbul has clearly shown 
that the authoritarian approach of the central government has most of the time 
ignored the concept of planning and the principle of autonomous local 
administrations. In the next chapter, another urban strategy of the central government 
aiming at making Istanbul more competitive in the global arena will be examined in 
a detailed way.
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Chapter Eight
An Urban Policy for Global Competitiveness:
Case Study of the Olympic Games Organisation Project
in Istanbul
8.1 Introduction: Hosting Olympic Games as an Urban Policy Tool
World cities have been ushered into a new era of redefined relations in the beginning 
of the 21st century under the powerful impact of globalization as we have already 
seen in previous chapters. The setting has been quite competitive. Cities are forming 
new urban systems and assuming new roles as they re-emerge beyond their national 
boundaries. Given this framework, many cities need large urban projects and 
comprehensive urban policies to trigger their strategic development and to compete 
in the global arena. ‘The more intense competition between cities manifests itself in 
competition for large-scale events, such as the Olympic Games, trade fairs, 
conferences and world expositions, and these prestige-laden events have led to a kind 
of ‘festivalization of urban development policy’ (Krantz and Schatzl, 1997, p.479). 
According to Thomley, ‘the particular image or vision adopted can determine policy 
priorities, and a typical emphasis is given on mega-events and developments that 
attract media attention’ (1999, p.4). Short and his colleagues also agree that ‘some of 
the most important global spectacles are sports mega-events such as the Olympic 
Games which reach a worldwide television audience and offer perhaps the best stage
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upon which a city can make the claim to global status’ (2000, p.320). They include 
that ‘as a factor in globalization, the Olympics and other global and regional media 
spectacles like the World Cup have an immense impact on the urban image, form and 
networks of the host’ (Short et al., 2000, p.321).
The goal of the large-scale event in general is ‘to reconstruct the city, mobilize 
endogenous potential, improve the city’s image in the world outside and identify the 
inhabitants with their city’ (Krantz and Schatzl, 1997, p.479). In this manner, the 
Olympic Games almost necessarily leave favourable footprints in the world cities 
and countries that take Games organization seriously and undertake the investment 
that the Olympics deserve. According to Burbank and his colleagues, ‘the appeal of 
hosting the Olympic games for a city ought to be obvious’ (2001, p.l). ‘The games 
last only a short time but promise many benefits, both tangible and intangible, and 
the real value of the games comes from being associated with the Olympic image’ 
(Burbank et al, 2001, p.l). ‘Hosting a premier event such as the Olympics or a 
world’s fair is central to the deliberate strategy for promoting local economic growth 
because city leaders are seeking not just short-term tourist revenues but to change 
their city’s image and perhaps even the city’s physical structure' (Essex and 
Chalkley, 1998, cited in Burbank et al, 2001, p.4).
The big world-event strategy has been used by city leaders for a long time. 
According to Burbank and his fellows, ‘various American cities have sought to host 
showcase events in the hope of making their city a tourist destination’ (2001, p.4). 
But, ‘in recent years, the mega-event strategy has taken on renewed prominence in 
cities as the result of the confluence of several factors: the success of the
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entrepreneurial Los Angeles Olympics, the demise of federal urban aid, and the rise 
of the global economy’ (Burbank et al, 2001, p.4-5). Therefore, ‘the event that 
triggered the contemporary focus on using the Olympic Games as an urban mega­
event has been the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics’ (Burbank et al, 2001, p.5). ‘For city 
leaders looking to refurbish their city’s image and get the attention of businesses 
around the world, hosting the Olympics now appeared to offer a perfect way to 
generate positive publicity for the city and its tourist industry and to attract trans­
national businesses with little cost to local taxpayers’ (Burbank et al, 2001, p.5).
Hosting the Olympic Games as a global urban strategy has been widely used since 
the 1980s in many cities around the world from the United States to South-east Asia, 
and from Europe to Australia. According to Burbank and his colleagues, ‘one of the 
most important factors that lead cities to embark on a mega-event strategy is the 
existence of an established growth regime in the city together with a desire to create 
or change the city’s image’ (2001, p.7). ‘A growth regime in this frame can be 
defined as a network consisting of public and private leaders that functions as an 
informal government within a city’ (Stoker, 1995 and Stone 1993, cited in Burbank 
et al, 2001, p.7). When we talk about the organisation of a big international event 
such as the Olympic Games, ‘the regime’s goal is to encourage growth within the 
city, its existence is vital to an Olympic bid, and without an established govemment- 
business network in place to provide authority and resources, the chance of an 
Olympic bid is very small’ (Burbank et al, 2001, p.7).
These kinds of networks or growth regimes between government organisations, 
business and NGOs have been established in many world cities, and the mega-event
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strategy has been used as a development tool in global urban competition. These 
established growth regimes mostly aim to change cities’ image by linking Olympic 
viability to long-term urban development policies. Additionally, social as well as 
physical and technical criteria have thus gained importance and entered into the 
selection process and choice of Olympic site locations.
In the light of these issues, this chapter will examine hosting the Olympic Games 
project of Istanbul in a detailed way. As we have seen previously in Chapter Five, 
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven Istanbul’s long-term planning strategies have based 
on its vision of competitive integration in global terms in the last two decades. 
Istanbul’s vision of the Olympic Games, therefore, is expected to be shaped by its 
long-term development plans, which in turn are guided by the Games as the single 
largest project that would improve the quality of life and contribute to social 
integration throughout the city.
Following parts of this chapter will examine the existence of such a vision of the 
city. The political mechanism behind the Olympic Games organisation project will 
be explored. Since it is a quite centrally controlled and implemented project, the role 
of various governmental organisations and civil actors in the city will be questioned 
for this specific mission. The main aim of this chapter is to find out growth regimes, 
if there are any, and power relationships behind this global urban policy. Before 
starting that examination, I will briefly look at the candidacy of the city for the 
Olympic Games organisation from an historical perspective in the next section.
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8.2 The Candidacies of Istanbul for the Olympic Games
The idea of hosting the Olympics flourished especially after the 1980s with the 
increasing globalisation, and reached its peak in the 1990s, when Istanbul resolved to 
bid for the Games. Sharing this resolution, the Parliament unanimously passed the 
Turkish Olympic Law on April 30, 1992, and the Turkish Olympic Law (No: 3796) 
went into effect on May 5,1992 after its publication in the Official Gazette. The Law 
established the Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee (IOBC), which soon decided 
on Istanbul's candidature to host the 2000 Summer Olympic Games.
Istanbul competed against Beijing, Berlin, Sydney and Manchester to host the 2000 
Olympic Games. These five cities were voted among the members of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) on September 1993, and since Istanbul was 
not able to get enough votes, it was eliminated in the first round of voting. At the end 
of four rounds, Sydney was elected to host the 2000 Summer Olympic Games by a 
margin of two votes. This first failure did not letdown the policy makers, and 
Istanbul announced its candidacy for hosting the 2004 Olympics right after the host 
city election in Monaco in 1993.
The city submitted its official candidature file in 1996 in accordance with IOC bid 
calendar. IOC rules for the 2004 Olympic Games involved a selection and an 
election process to determine the city to host the Games. The selection stage was 
mainly to eliminate some candidate cities and allow others to continue as finalists. In 
the 2004 Olympic race Istanbul's rivals were St. Petersburg, Buenos Aires, 
Stockholm, Cape Town, Rome, Seville, Lille, Rio de Janeiro, San Juan and Athens.
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Istanbul was eliminated in the selection phase together with five other cities in March 
1997. As finalist cities, Athens, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Rome, and Stockholm 
competed in the final vote in September 1997 in Lausanne, and Athens won the 
election by receiving 66 of the 107 votes cast by IOC members.
After the second failure, both national and local policy makers started to understand 
the toughness of the process and capabilities and limits of the city. To elect the host 
city for the 2008 Olympic Games, on the other hand, the IOC first called for 
applications for candidacy, with the successful applicant cities being eligible for 
running as candidates. There were 10 applicant cities for hosting the 2008 Games. 
The IOC Executive Board evaluated these applications in August 2000. As the result 
of such evaluation, five cities, Bangkok, Cairo, Havana, Kuala Lumpur and Seville 
was eliminated. Five cities, namely Istanbul, Osaka, Toronto, Paris, and Beijing were 
accepted as candidates. Thus, it was officially confirmed that Istanbul was capable of 
hosting the Olympics. This positive development encouraged the national and local 
policy makers and increased the expectations in the public even more. Then, 
Istanbul, Osaka, Toronto, Paris, and Beijing submitted their official candidature files 
to the International Olympic Committee in January 2001.
IOC Evaluation Commission visited Istanbul and four other candidate cities to 
review and discuss their projects on site. However, the result of all these efforts 
became another disappointment, and this time Beijing has been elected as the host 
city for the 2008 Olympic Games in the IOC Session in Moscow on July 13, 2001. 
While Beijing was winning the election in the second round by receiving 56 of the
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105 votes cast by IOC members, Istanbul was eliminated again by getting only 17 
votes in the first and 9 votes in the second round.
Figure 8.1 Logos Used in Istanbul’s 2008 and 2012 Candidacies
THE MEETING OF CONTINENTS
iSTANBUL 2012
APPLICANT CITY
Note: Figures have been cited from http://www.olympist.org
After three consecutive unsuccessful attempts, the government and the national 
committee decided Istanbul to be the candidate city once more for the 2012 Olympic 
Games, although they were not so enthusiastic on that time. Istanbul’s rivals this time 
were Havana, Leipzig, London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris and Rio de 
Janeiro. These nine cities have been voted in Lausanne on May 2004. Istanbul once 
again failed to make short list, and was not selected to the candidate list together with 
three other cities. As finalist cities, London, Paris, Moscow, Madrid and New York 
competed in the final vote of the IOC in July 2005 in Singapore, and London has 
been elected as the host city for the organisation of 2012 Olympic Games.
Istanbul's bidding for four consecutive times as a persistent ongoing effort can be 
evaluated as the sign of both the nation and city's determination and seriousness on 
the issue. Many other cities around the world have also applied more than once for
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hosting the Games, and will continue to do so. There are however some peculiarities 
that differentiate Istanbul's candidacy from other cities. Other candidates generally 
form a Bidding Committee each time they run, and prepare a new Olympic project 
from the beginning. Istanbul’s bid, on the other hand, has been a continuous process, 
and the city has a legally established Bidding Committee that is permanently 
responsible for the city's candidatures. This Committee is aimed to be transformed 
into the Organising Committee upon the awarding of the Games. Thus Istanbul has 
been able to build on its Olympic project continuously since 1992, and the central 
government has had a very important role in this ongoing process.
In relation to this, since the central government rather than the Metropolitan 
Municipality of Istanbul has predominantly involved in the process, the central 
government control in urban area has considerably increased because of the 
Olympics-related urban policy and projects. The local government once again has 
been excluded from the decision-making process in urban area and given minor roles 
such as basic administrative duties or land allocation. In the next section, the role of 
the central government in the process will be examined in a detailed way.
8.3 Support from the Central Government
The government support for the bid has unique characteristics since Turkey is one of 
the rare countries having a specific national Olympic legislation. The Parliament 
unanimously enacted the Olympic Law in 1992 and declared its active endorsement
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for the preparation process. Both the government in power and main opposition 
parties give strong political support for the bid.
The following points bear on the status of national and local government support: 
First, the IOBC benefits from top-level representation of central and the city 
government. The Minister of State in charge of Youth and Sports, who holds a 
Cabinet post as Deputy Prime Minister in the present Government, chairs the 
committee while the Governor of Istanbul, the Mayor of Istanbul and the President of 
the National Olympic Committee (NOC) are its vice-presidents. This committee of 
top officials and elected office holders directs Istanbul’s preparations to host the 
Olympic Games. The 13-member Preparations Committee includes experts from all 
ministries directly involved in the organization of the Olympic Games.
Secondly, Olympic legislation obliges all public bodies to support the IOBC in 
preparations for and the organisation of the Istanbul Games. The ‘Priority of Service’ 
clause states that ‘all public institutions including provincial administrations and 
municipalities will be obliged to give priority to the execution of any and/or all 
services that may be required by the IOBC during the preparations for and 
organization of the Olympic Games’ (retrieved from www.olympist.org). This 
noticeably gives central government considerable amount of authority, and also 
prevents any opposition that may sprout during the process.
Thirdly, the support from the Turkish government and parliament for Istanbul’s bid 
to host the Olympic Games was reconfirmed in June 2000, when the parliament ruled
t hto put into effect the government’s 8 Five-Years Development Plan for the period
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2001-2005, which decrees the continuation of the work to create the infrastructure 
necessary for hosting the Olympic Games (DPT -State Planning Organisation-, 
2000). A special commission entitled Physical Education, Sports and Istanbul 
Olympic Games in DPT was founded for this purpose and included the President of 
the NOC, General Director of IOBC, two IOBC members and the Chairman of the 
Preparation Committee.
Finally, both the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey often re-confirm their 
commitment to the bid, and meet members of the NOC Executive Board and the 
IOBC General Director to discuss priority matters on Istanbul’s Olympic agenda.
All these details draw attention to the level of support given to Istanbul's bid by the 
state. The IOBC has spent bulk of its financial resources guaranteed by the Turkish 
Olympic Law since 1992 in order to construct and upgrade sports facilities in 
Istanbul. The first part of interviews in this chapter has actually consisted of 
investments in Istanbul for the Olympic Games and possible benefits of those 
investments for the city. According to Sinan Erdem1, who is the first Chairman of the 
Turkish National Olympic Committee:
‘the total investment made by 1997 has been 150 million USS for Olympic- 
related projects without any guarantee of being awarded. Foremost among 
recent constructions is the 80,000-seat Ataturk Olympic Stadium in the 
Olympic park area, and the stadium will be inaugurated at the end of
2001 the Olympic Stadium as the first step of this project covers 30
percent of the whole area the stadium constituting the main component of
1 Sinan Erdem has been the chairman of the National Olympic Committee from the beginning o f the 
1990s until his death in 2003.
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the Olympic Park has been constructed irrespective of the outcome of 
Istanbul's consecutive bids to host the Olympic Games’ (interview with Sinan 
Erdem, 9 July 2000).
The National Olympic Committee officials added that:
‘more than 50 percent of the main infrastructure for the Istanbul Olympics
has been completed by the beginning of 2000 as an important part of the
Istanbul’s candidacy for the Olympics, the Olympic Park is in the stage of 
being founded upon an area of 584 hectares (6 million square metres) in 
Ikitelli area, and this land has been allocated by the Treasury of the State’ 
(interview with NOC officials, 9 July 2000).
The Olympic Stadium was at the designing stage during Istanbul's candidacy for the 
2004 Games, and the construction progressed very rapidly for the possible 2008 
Games organisation. The Ataturk Olympic Stadium was opened by October 29, 
2001, in the 78th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. This date 
miserably was the time when the city had just lost against Beijing in the competition 
for the organisation of the 2008 Olympic Games. Sinan Erdem also mentioned about 
some other physical developments related to the Olympic Games candidacy of 
Istanbul, and said that:
‘many developments have been achieved since Istanbul was the candidate 
city for the 2000 Olympic Games for the first time in Turkish 
history....various transportation and infrastructure projects such as the 
Ataturk Airport International Terminal and brand new Sabiha Gokcen
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International Airport in Kurtkoy have definitely been positive scores for 
Istanbul’ (interview with Sinan Erdem, 9 July 2000).
All facilities planned for use in the 2008 Games have been presented in Figure 8.2. 
Istanbul’s Olympic project for the 2012 Games can also be seen in Appendix 3A and 
3B.
Figure 8.2 Facilities planned for use in the 2008 Olympic Games
Note: The figure has been cited from http://www.olympist.org/2008e/indexl.asp.
Erdem believes that this investment will definitely return the country as benefit, and 
said that:
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‘hosting the Olympic Games would allow Turkey to improve education and 
training in sports for its young people, since the country has the youngest 
population among European countries’ (interview with Sinan Erdem, 9 July 
2000).
NOC officials also agreed to this and pointed out that:
‘Istanbul, with its history, natural wealth and cosmopolitan structure has 
many features to contribute to the Olympic Games....on the other hand, the 
Olympic Games will also open new doors for the country....who is going to 
benefit in return will be the city and its people again due to all those domestic 
and international investment which will be attracted to the city’ (interview 
with NOC officials, 9 July 2000).
As seen in other world cities, the Olympic Games can make some economic 
contribution to the country in short term by creating employment opportunities and 
attracting foreign investment and tourists. This contribution coming with the 
organisation of the Olympics can help to improve urban infrastructure and 
environment. When this was reminded to Sinan Erdem, he agreed that:
‘holding of the Olympic Games in Istanbul means a lot for the city and its 
people....that is why, it is time that we have to get into action at once and
rectify our deficiencies we have lost the competition two times so far, but
this does not mean we will not win ever....believing is halfway of winning, 
you know...’ (interview with Sinan Erdem, 9 July 2000).
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In the second part of interviews, questions objected to find out the chance of Istanbul 
in this global competition. Erdem stated that:
‘you cannot find a city, which does not have its own deficiencies. But, the 
important thing is to find out your faults and rectify them....In this respect, 
Istanbul, occupying a place where two continents meet, has at least an equal 
chance with other candidate cities’ (interview with Sinan Erdem, 9 July 
2000).
Yalcin Aksoy2, the general director of the Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee, on 
the other hand, admitted current problems of the city and said that:
‘Istanbul needs a lot of betterment. Environmentally the city is a disaster. The 
air quality is bad, the water quality is not good, the water treatment has 
started, but not enough. The city is more than 10 million now and it is 
increasing by 400,000 people every year. What a burden on the 
municipality...the existing infrastructure of Istanbul is not pleasing yet, and 
the situation is slowly getting better’ (interview with Yalcin Aksoy, 9 July 
2000).
Aksoy continued as:
‘you see...we have almost lost Istanbul...but winning the Games will be like 
winning Istanbul back....the Olympics would be Istanbul’s defining modem 
event, patching up its dichotomy, and perhaps helping Turkey enter the 
European Union...this is the ultimate goal of this society...in more than 75
2 Yalcin Aksoy is the general director of the Preparation and Organization Council in the National 
Olympic Committee.
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years we haven’t even come close to it, but we want to’ (interview with 
Yalcin Aksoy, 9 July 2000).
8.4 The Turkish Olympic Law (No. 3796)
As mentioned in the previous section, Istanbul’s candidature is endorsed by a special 
law, passed quasi-unanimously by the Turkish parliament on April 30, 1992, 
published in the Official Gazette and took effect on May 5, 1992. This Law actually 
made Turkey one of the rare countries enacted such a legal instrument. The Turkish 
Olympic Law (No. 3796) established the Istanbul Olympic Games Preparation and 
Organisation Council, also known as the Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee, and 
authorised it to take all necessary action in the pursuit and organisation of the Games. 
It recognises and respects the supremacy of the International Olympic Committee in 
all Olympic matters.
The law requires that all public institutions and agencies, as well as all local 
government bodies, give priority to the requests of the IOBC in relation to the pursuit 
and organisation of the Games. This law earmarked permanent sources of revenue to 
finance the preparations for and the eventual organization of the Istanbul Games, and 
ensured the Treasury's allocation of 584 hectares of land for Olympic Park 
development. It also enabled Istanbul to bid for the Olympic Games organisations 
between 2000 and 2012.
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This comprehensive law covers all Games-related matters, including organizational, 
financial, legal and auditing, and obliges all public bodies, administrative, national 
and municipal government offices to give priority to any and/or all services as may 
be required by the Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee. The twelve years of 
implementation has resulted in massive land allocation, investment in major sports 
infrastructure, and some collaboration with national and local authorities towards the 
organization of the Olympic Games in Istanbul.
Following sub-sections will give some details about the administrative structure of 
the Turkish Olympic organization, land allocation for facilities and the finance issue 
respectively.
Organisational Structure
There are three main organs related to the organisation of the Olympics Game bid. 
These are the preparation and organisation council, the executive committee and the 
preparation committee.
1. The Preparation and Organisation Council
A Preparation and Organisation Council for the Istanbul Olympic Games was 
established along with its affiliated Executive Committee and Preparation Committee 
to enable the fulfilment of the objectives included within the scope of this Act. 
Consisting of a total of 13 members, the Preparation and Organisation Council for 
the Istanbul Olympic Games (referred to as the Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee
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in all bid documents) is being chaired by the Minister of State in charge of Youth and 
Sports; and is comprised of, as its members, the Governor of Istanbul, an 
Ambassador to be appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mayor of the 
Metropolitan City of Istanbul and two members to be appointed by him/her, the 
General Director of Youth and Sports and two members to be appointed by him/her, 
the President of the National Olympic Committee of Turkey and two members to be 
appointed by him/her and the Secretary General of the National Olympic Committee 
of Turkey.
The Preparation and Organisation Council for the Istanbul Olympic Games was 
authorised and obliged to carry out any and/or all tasks, operations, transactions 
pertaining to the preparation, organisation and finalising of the Olympic Games. The 
Council may, in compliance with the provisions of or pursuant to this Act, set up 
service committees and administrative units; may transfer, in part, its powers and 
obligations to the Executive Committee.
2. The Executive Committee
The Executive Committee, consisting of a total of 5 members; two of which was 
appointed by the Mayor of the Metropolitan City of Istanbul, two by the General 
Director of Youth and Sports, and one by the President of the National Olympic 
Committee of Turkey; is held responsible to carry out any and/or all operations, 
render any and/or all services, and undertake any and/or all duties designated by the 
Preparation and Organisation Council for the Istanbul Olympic Games. The
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Executive Committee also appoints a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from its 
members.
3. The Preparation Committee
The Preparation Committee for the Istanbul Olympic Games consists of a total of 16 
members; where the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Finance and Customs, the Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing, the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Tourism each 
appoints one member; and the Mayor of the Metropolitan City of Istanbul, the 
General Directorate of Youth and Sports and the Presidency of the National Olympic 
Committee of Turkey each appoints three members. The Chairman and Vice 
Chairmen of the Preparation Committee is appointed by the Preparation and 
Organisation Council for the Istanbul Olympic Games, based on the 
recommendations of the Executive Committee.
The powers, duties and obligations of the Preparation Committee are determined in 
Article 8 of the Olympic Law. The Preparation Committee, subject to the approval of 
the Preparation and Organisation Council for the Istanbul Olympic Games and under 
the directions of the Executive Committee is held obliged to:
a) Locate and build up areas for the Olympic Games,
b) Assess the projects of all Olympic facilities and buildings; and arrange for 
the construction of those deemed appropriate,
c) Modernise and/or arrange for the modernisation of all existing facilities 
and buildings in accordance with the Olympic specifications,
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d) Cooperate with local and central authorities in planning and building of the 
Olympic Village as well as in the preparation of the infrastructure for transportation 
and communication services,
e) Employ the local and foreign personnel as may be required by the Olympic 
Games and specify their remuneration,
f) Accept any and/or all donations,
g) Assume the role of an institutional authority in international relations 
concerning the Olympic Games,
h) Purchase, provide and/or arrange for the provision of goods and services as 
may be required,
i) Manage, arrange for the management of, rent, lease, sell or purchase any 
and/or all facilities and buildings,
j) Carry out all other duties as may be designated by the Executive 
Committee (Olympist3, 1999).
Allocation of Land and Olympic Village
According to Article 9 of the Turkish Olympic Law, the land recommended by the 
Preparation and Organisation Committee for the construction of the Olympic Venues 
is, by virtue of a Government Decree, allocated by the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul, the Treasury or the Directorate of Private Administration of Istanbul to the 
use of the General Directorate of Youth and Sports. The Metropolitan Municipality 
of Istanbul finalised all transactions pertaining to the development of the said land.
3 Olympist is the official presentation book for Istanbul Olympic Games.
258
The Olympic village area is in close proximity to the Olympic Park and in an 
convenient location with respect to other Olympic sites. ‘The village site of Halkali 
is already served by municipal buses and commuter trains, and its planned 
connection via light-rail to the urban rapid transit system will be completed in the 
future when the Games organisation has been taken’ (Istanbul 2008 Candidature File, 
Vol.2, p.305).
Picture 8.1 The Olympic Stadium and the Olympic Village in Istanbul
‘The Olympic village has been conceived within the framework of an ongoing 
housing project carried out by the Housing Administration of Turkey (Toplu Konut 
Idaresi-TOKI)’ (ibid., p.307). ‘It has been constructed in the northern part of the 
extensive area that TOKI is developing in Halkali, where there is a very high demand 
for real estate’ (ibid.). ‘The Village within this new town of Halkali has been 
designed in accordance with Olympic requirements, as well as in consideration of 
end-user needs: Sporting, catering and medical facilities in the Residential Zone and 
other facilities in the International Zone of the Olympic village will benefit the whole 
of the new community following the Games’ (ibid.).
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As for environmental issues, which is one of the criteria of an Olympic bid, the 
Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee (IOBC) had the Olympic Park Master Plan 
drawn with the collaboration of a leading environmental group.
Finance
The Olympic Law guarantees a continuous flow of funds, both for the pursuit and the 
organisation of the Games. With reference to Article 11 of the Turkish Olympic Law, 
the revenues of the Preparation and Organisation Council for the Olympic Games 
consist of the followings:
1) one percent of the total revenue of the Sports Lottery,
2) five percent of the preceding year’s net earnings of the General Directorate 
of the National Lottery,
3) one percent of the monthly revenue of the Housing Fund,
4) annual allocation from the consolidated budget, the amount left to the 
discretion of the legislature,
5) one percent of the confirmed budget of the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul,
6) one percent of the total betting ticket sales for horse racing organised in 
compliance with the Horse Racing Act (No.6132), and other revenues (Olympist, 
1999 and 2004).
Moreover, the central government has been entitled to increase the above-mentioned 
funds up to five-fold. On the other hand, all broadcasting, publication, 
communication, advertising, sponsoring, marketing and urban planning services in 
connection with the preparation for and the organisation of the Olympic Games are
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subject to the approval of the Preparation and Organisation Council, and the rules 
and regulations set forth by the International Olympic Committee. The same Council 
also appoints the committees to render the said services.
8.5 The Role of Local Government
As seen in organisational structure, the local administration has quite limited role in 
the decision-making process for the policies related to the Olympic Games project, 
although these planning decisions completely require the responsibility of the 
Metropolitan and other local municipalities. According to the Olympic Law, the 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has only some representative roles and 
responsibilities for the allocation of land in the development areas.
The local municipality officials who have been interviewed also emphasise this 
situation, and ask from the central government for a more active role in planning and 
construction of infrastructure facilities, in works related to transportation projects and 
in presentation of the city in international arena. According to Sebnem Yuzer4, one of 
the Metropolitan Municipality officials:
‘in the current system, the roles of the metropolitan municipality and local 
authorities are very limited, and the local government in general does not 
have much initiative and authorization over decisions’ (interview with 
Sebnem Yuzer, 5 August 2000).
4 Sebnem Yuzer is an urban planner, and she was working for the Metropolitan Municipality of 
Istanbul at the time when she was interviewed.
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Sinan Bolek5, from the Directorate of Urban Planning in the Metropolitan 
Municipality, also emphasised that:
‘in this respect, the municipality appears to be only an official body 
represented in various committees, although the real owner of the work 
should actually be municipalities and local civil actors as it is in 
contemporary cities of the world’ (interview with Sinan Bolek, 5 August 
2000).
Bolek added that:
‘municipalities should be authorised and given more initiatives and 
responsibilities, so that they can participate in decision-making process, 
which may affect urban life and citizens’ (interview with Sinan Bolek, 5 
August 2000).
The Metropolitan Municipality officials also believe that local municipalities are in 
general doing their job well even under those restricted conditions with limited 
authority. The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, for instance, made an investment 
programme on the transportation sector in order to improve the quality of 
transportation infrastructure of the city. This investment will obviously rise the 
chance of Istanbul for hosting the Olympic Games organisation. The investment will 
be on the underground system, the light railway system, the streetcar system and the 
sea transportation for both short and medium terms. In short term for the next five 
years, the total cost of investments planned is about $2 billion (Istanbul Ticaret6,
5 Sinan Bolek was one of the officials in the Directorate of Urban Planning in the Metropolitan 
Municipality of Istanbul when he was interviewed.
6 Istanbul Ticaret is a weekly newspaper published by the Trade Chamber of Istanbul.
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April 13, 2001: p.2). According to Rafet Bozdogan, the director of the transportation 
division in the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul:
‘totally 36 underground, light rail, and rail system lines have been planned in 
the long run. The overall cost of those investments will be about $12 billion, 
and they will be completed until 2023 according to the plan’ (interview with 
Rafet Bozdogan, 16 July 2000).
The current chairman of the Turkish National Olympic Committee, Togay Bayatli7, 
on the other hand, was a little bit sceptical about the Municipalities’ support for the 
Olympic Games organisation. According to Bayatli:
‘the Municipality sees the Olympic Games as an event which takes out some 
national treasury money from their budget, and this thought should be 
changed immediately’ (interview with Bayatli, 6 July 2004).
Bayatli also emphasised ways to be successful in this global competition for the 
organisation of the Olympic Games:
‘it is necessary to develop the infrastructure of the city and to increase living 
standards of citizens first of all....beside investment and co-finance from 
national government and business, a productive co-operation between the 
central government, business and municipalities in the form of an urban 
partnership is very vital for a successful bid’ (interview with Bayatli, 6 July 
2004).
Togay Bayatli concluded that:
7 Togay Bayatli is the chairman of the National Olympic Committee since Sinan Erdem dies in 2003.
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‘although our job as a candidate city and nation is very difficult, we will 
continue to work on this until hosting the Olympic Games in Istanbul’ 
(interview with Bayatli, 6 July 2004).
While Bayatli were giving signals in the interview conducted in July 2004 for 
Istanbul’s candidacy for hosting the 2016 Olympic Games, his statement in a 
newspaper, that is “we will be candidate for the 2016 Olympics”, made clear that 
Turkey’s Olympics adventure will continue in the new era (Hurriyet newspaper, 
20.12.2005).
There are, on the other hand, some criticisms from local administrations about the 
candidacy for the Olympic Games and related investments. When we look into the 
total amount of public investments in Istanbul in 2000, the 37,4 percent of them goes 
to the Asian side, and the 62,6 percent goes to the European side of the city (Istanbul
o
Governorship, 2001). In the interview with the deputy governor Kamer Diribas , who 
is responsible person from local administrations, he said that:
‘there is no any division between the Asian and European side of the city 
while decisions about planning and distribution of public investments are 
taken in Istanbul’ (interview with Kamer Diribas, 7 August 2000).
However, the mayor of the largest Asian district of Kadikoy, Selami Ozturk9 
emphasised in the interview that we have conducted in the Municipality of Kadikoy 
that:
8 Kamer Diribas is the Deputy Governor of Istanbul, who has responsibilities for the relations with 
municipalities.
9 Selami Ozturk is the mayor of the District Municipality of Kadikoy, which is the largest district in 
the Asian part of the city.
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‘the Asian side of the city was already being ignored for years, but it was 
clearly seen with the candidacy for the Olympic Games that the European 
side of Istanbul has been given a priority in investments related to the Games’ 
(interview with Selami Ozturk, 8 August 2000).
Ozturk added that:
‘Istanbul is a candidate for the Games as a city where two continents meet, 
and is using “the meeting of continents” phrase with its Olympic Games logo, 
but in reality we do not see the Asian side in most of the investments....the 
underground system and the light rail system investment together with many 
sports facilities, cultural and entertainment investment have all objected the 
European side, and the Asian side of the city was almost forgotten’ (interview 
with Selami Ozturk, 8 August 2000).
It appears that investments related to the Olympics try to meet not only the 
requirements of the organisation of the Games, but also increasing infrastructure 
necessities due to rapid developments in particular areas of the city. In other words, 
the central government’s enthusiasm to go on bidding is because that provides some 
functions beyond the Olympics itself. In this way, the central government is able to 
divert investments according to its own considerations regardless of winning the bid.
After presenting diverse thoughts of people in local and central government 
organisations, reflecting various aspects of the candidacy of Istanbul for the Olympic 
Games, the ordinary people’s opinion on this centrally executed policy of the 
national government will be examined in the next section of the chapter.
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8.6 Public support for Istanbul's candidacy in the city and the country
Since Istanbul's first Olympic bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games, her candidature 
has enjoyed strong support from the general Turkish public and Istanbulites. Nation 
and citywide polls taken in 1992, 1996 and 2000 revealed that Istanbul’s project of 
hosting the Olympic Games has solid support of the general public. Findings of the 
IOC poll referred to in the IOC Evaluation Commission Report (April, 2001) also 
confirm strong support of the general public.
Two opinion polls, taken by Taylor Nelson-Sofres-PIAR at the end of November 
2000 (see Appendix 9 for the general framework of the survey), confirmed that a 
great majority of Turkey's and Istanbul's citizens favour the city's candidature for the 
Olympic Games organisation. The results of these polls have been publicised by both 
the national and local press.
One of these polls was conducted in 11 provinces in Turkey, statistically 
representative of the country’s entire over 18 years of age urban population, and the 
other among Istanbulites, sampled to represent all of the province’s over 18 years of 
age inhabitants. Five main topics, which the study covers have been determined as 
the overall perception of the Olympics, evaluation of Istanbul's candidacy, evaluation 
of benefits from the Games, tasks for different groups of people in hosting the 
Olympic Games in Istanbul, and the general interest in sports.
When specifically asked whether they want the 2008 Olympic Games to be held in
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Istanbul or not, results revealed that ‘88 percent of the general Turkish public, and 89 
percent of Istanbulites, support Istanbul's bid to host the Olympic Games’ 
(Hurriyet10, 22.02.2001).
Foremost among the reasons given by respondents for favouring Istanbul’s 
candidature was ‘the opportunity that playing host to the Games would offer for 
elevating the world’s perception of Turkey’ (Hurriyet, 22.02.2001). Other reasons 
can be lined up below in the order of importance attached:
■ ‘an increased popular interest and involvement in sports,
■ enhanced sports infrastructure and facilities,
■ diversification of sports other than football throughout the country’ (Hurriyet, 
22.02.2001).
In general, survey respondents attached a very high value to the importance of the 
Olympic Games as an international event. According to the statistics taken from the 
official web site of the Olympic organisation (http://www.olympist.org), for 60 
percent of Turkish citizens at large, and 61 percent of Istanbul's inhabitants, the 
Olympic Games exceed in importance all other international events that Turkey has 
ever hosted or may consider hosting in the future. The most important features, for 
respondents, that distinguish the Olympic Games from all other international events 
were:
■ ‘their contribution to a better knowledge of the host countries and cities all 
around the world,
■ the participation of almost all nations of the world,
10 Hurriyet is a national daily newspaper published in Istanbul.
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■ the upholding of a philosophy of peace, brotherhood, and unity between 
nations, and
■ the Olympic programme’s coverage of the widest possible range of sports’ 
(retrieved from http://www.olympics.org).
Even those respondents, in both polls, who seemed to withhold their support from 
Istanbul’s Olympic bid mentioned at least one aspect in which Turkey or Istanbul 
would benefit from hosting the Games. These include ‘the contribution to the city’s 
well-being and the creation of new job opportunities, the contribution to an improved 
infrastructure and transport system in the city, and the promotion of international 
cultural exchange’ (retrieved from http://www.olympist.org).
There is no organized opposition to Istanbul’s hosting the Olympic Games. 
Individual opposition to Istanbul’s candidature reflected in survey findings, on the 
other hand, was justified mainly on the grounds that:
■ ‘Istanbul currently lacks sufficient sports infrastructure to host an event of 
such size, and that Turkey does not have sufficient experience in international multi­
sport events, and
■ Istanbul’s problems in the area of urban transportation would make staging 
such an event difficult’ (Hurriyet, 22.02.2001).
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8.7 Conclusion
As mentioned in the literature review in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, there is an 
ongoing global competition between world cities, and new urban politics emerged as 
a result of this competition. One common strategy for urban governments in world 
cities in order to compete globally has been to implement such urban policies that 
can be used to attract foreign investment. While city governments are aiming at this, 
they have implemented various types of policies. One significant strategy among 
several alternatives in the way to attract global capital, as we have seen in Chapter 
Seven, has been to encourage finance sector and producer service activities to be able 
to create large international finance or trade centres together with the provision of 
necessary high quality infrastructure.
Moreover, another important strategy for world cities, as examined in this chapter, 
has been to organise significant international mega-events in order to attract inward 
investment, world attention and tourists. These international events may be academic 
conferences, high standard business and cultural organisations, international fairs or 
big sport events having media attention. This policy is strongly rooted in discourse 
about the competition between cities and the use of strategies for promotion. For 
many world cities, these strategies, in a way, have been tools of catching up global 
economic development in the new era.
The organisation of the Olympic Games, within this frame, has been an important 
goal for both national and local urban governments and politicians to be able to 
benefit from global economic opportunities. In the new era, the candidacy for the
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Olympic Games is a part of the urban strategy, and the central and local governments 
mostly apply this strategy in order to develop cities both socio-economically and 
physically. The situation for Istanbul within this regard has been indifferent from 
other world cities such as Barcelona, Beijing, Sydney or Athens.
When we look into Istanbul’s consecutive candidacies for the organisation of 
Olympic Games in the last two decades, one common inference can be underlined 
that all segments of the community have had an agreement on the issue. As Keyder 
and Oncu have also emphasized;
‘the attempt to sell Istanbul as a global venue received the full support of the 
national government and, seemingly, of the city’s public opinion, during the 
competitions for the organisation of Olympic Games’ (1994, p.416).
Istanbul was a relatively weak candidate against other cities such as Sydney, London, 
Paris, Beijing, Osaka and New York. However, central government and, in a way, 
the municipality collaborated to prepare a relatively credible case, all the while 
stressing the probable impact of the Olympics, and the preparatory investment, for 
the business potential of the city. On the other hand, according to IOC Evaluation 
Commission Report in May 15, 2001, Istanbul’s elimination has been justified as 
follows:
‘the Commission believes that there are uncertainties regarding the overall 
status and projections of Games finance. The time lines and costs for all 
necessary transport infrastructure could be difficult to achieve and these 
would be essential for the conduct of a successful Games....Despite the 
presence of some major new facilities, the Commission is not confident that
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the complex planning required for a Games has been fully addressed’ (IOC, 
2001).
In other words, the bid lost because the IOC Evaluation Commission apparently 
found urban problems such as traffic congestion, pollution and garbage collection not 
likely to be surmounted in the near future. According to Keyder and Oncu, 
nonetheless, ‘the attempt made a real contribution toward sensitizing the public 
opinion in favour of a global perspective on local problems. During the process of 
selection, the media treated the event as a popular match and beginnings of a civic 
consciousness were visible, even among the more recent immigrants in the city’ 
(ibid., p.417).
From the political perspective, however, this strategy also verified that the central 
government has a full control on the process, setting up special institutional 
arrangements for important development projects, establishing the framework within 
which the city and the Metropolitan Municipality operate, sometimes enforcing 
various urban policies, and most of the time bypassing the local democracy principle. 
While the central government with significant political and financial support was, on 
the one hand, dominating every step of the policy, the local government has, on the 
other hand, had a very limited representative role although it has also many interests 
on the implementation of the policy. Moreover, another important point should be 
underlined as well. Although the private sector and business organisations both in 
Istanbul and nationwide would be main beneficiaries from the implementation of the 
project if the Olympic Games organisation is taken by the country, their effort on this 
particular issue have been surprisingly inadequate. The reason of this may be
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explained in such a way that they do not have enough confidence about Turkey’s 
likelihood to organise an Olympic Games, and therefore, they do not want to spend 
more money, time and energy for an investment area in which the amount of profit 
seems quite uncertain.
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, urban regimes and different actors 
in these regimes are very important for the success of big urban projects. In the case 
of Istanbul, companies, business and non-governmental organisations, media and 
public have all supported the central government on this specific urban strategy. But 
it is difficult to talk about the establishment of an urban regime for the Olympic 
Games organisation project of the city. A sceptical business, a disgruntled 
municipality, a passionate but centralist national government and the lack of 
cooperation among them have all contributed to the failure of the project so far. For a 
successful bid, Istanbul needed an established govemment-business partnership or an 
urban regime providing authority and resources, and encouraging growth within the 
city. However, this kind of a regime did not exist in the city’s project for hosting the 
Olympic Games yet.
In relation to this, although Istanbul’s long-term planning strategies have recently 
based on its vision of global competitive integration, consolidating relations with 
new trans-national urban systems in international and regional terms, the city’s 
vision of the Olympic .Games has not been shaped by its long-term development 
plans. When the city and citizens started to face increasing infrastructure problems in 
various areas which has been developed aiming at the organization of the Olympic 
Games, Istanbul Olympic Bidding Committee had the Olympic Park Master Plan
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made. But since it was prepared late, even completed projects such as the Olympic 
Stadium have suffered from serious infrastructure problems. People were not able to 
access the Stadium because of the transportation and parking problems. In 
conclusion, the organization of the Olympic Games and the implementation of urban 
projects aiming at this mission have remained disintegrated with other urban 
development policies in the city, just like an island in the middle of an ocean.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
This thesis examined the changes in urban policies in the new era with reference to 
the ongoing economic and political globalisation process affecting the state and cities 
globally. The political aspects of globalisation process contain highly complex issues 
and generate differing interpretations. It is a huge area of research, and it has many 
different, but at the same time interconnected sub topics. The main question of this 
research study, however, was to establish to what extent the economic and political 
globalisation process has affected the state and its sub-levels, and how this process 
has changed the way in which urban policies are implemented by these various levels 
o f government in Turkey.
In order to be able to answer this question, the globalisation discourse has been taken 
into consideration initially. As Chapter One and Chapter Two have outlined, 
globalisation has various dimensions; the economic and political ones are especially 
well known. First of all, it is commonly asserted that economic globalization is an 
inevitable and universal force that undermines political regulation in general and 
transforms nation-states in particular. Notwithstanding the need to understand 
globalization as a political and discursive construction, it is important to examine the
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complexity of the hollowing out of the nation-state. Multiple scales of regulation 
emerge in the context of economic globalization, and new political spaces have been 
created through such transformations. It is also important to recognise that there is 
considerable variation in the form and degree of state intervention and the mode of 
social regulation from one country to another; the outcomes of the processes of 
economic and political globalisation therefore vary between particular countries and 
especially particular cities.
Secondly, as a result of globalization and increasing economic competition, many 
world cities have redefined their roles, emphasizing entrepreneurial or proactive 
strategies in order to be competitive and market their cities in a global context. 
Attracting investment and local economic development have therefore become a 
prominent point of concentration for municipal government activity. Rupert states 
that ‘urban regimes have become emblematic of a shift from municipal welfarist and 
bureaucratic politics to that of a dynamic and entrepreneurial business leadership’ 
(2000. p.281). Harvey (1989b) also emphasises this turn on urban politics and 
potential gains from urban entrepreneurialism compared to the effective delivery of 
welfare services.
Thirdly, changes associated with the globalising international economy have had 
significant effects on the nature and functions of nation states. The process of 
globalisation has created a situation which we can call the "paradox of state power", 
in which the nation state has simultaneously been weakened and strengthened. 
Although, ‘much of the research on global capitalism has been premised upon the 
assumption that intensified globalization entails an erosion of state territoriality’
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(Brenner, 1998, p.8), in both relevance and effectiveness, the state remains central to 
processes of transformation at the national, regional and global levels. On the other 
hand, as a result of the location of significant decision-making authority at the 
regional and global levels, and also as a result of the changing policy environment 
associated with financial globalisation, the policy-making options available to 
national governments have significantly been diminished.
As Chapter Three made clear, globalisation has especially challenged the role of 
developmental states. In the early political economy of development, the state was 
assigned a key role in correcting market failures and ensuring economic efficiency, 
growth, macroeconomic stability and social development. With economic 
globalisation and new neo-liberal discourses, developmental states have been 
‘hollowed out’, i.e. their regulatory capacities have been diminished and transferred 
to sub- and supra-national institutions (Jessop, 1993 and 1994a). Simultaneously, 
neo-liberal development discourse has brought about a dramatic shift by refuting 
state regulation and promoting market liberalism as the most efficient development 
strategy within a global market system. This singular emphasis on deregulation has 
been modified recently through an additional emphasis on institutional reforms.
However, many world governmental systems, including the Turkish one, have shown 
strong centralism even up to the present day. Chapter Four stated that continuity 
rather than change characterizes Turkish political culture, and ‘there are several lines 
of continuity between Ottoman and Republican political traditions’ (Heper, 2000, 
p.63). On the one hand, ‘the Republican modernization effort, similar to the 
preceding Ottoman attempts, was elite and state driven’ (Barkey, 2000, p.89-90).
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Through their political and administrative influence on the state bureaucracy, the 
political elite wished to tightly control local government politics from the capital 
Ankara. ‘They wanted to concentrate power at the centre and to keep at bay the 
periphery through the distribution of patronage to local persons of influence’ 
(Erguder, 1987, p. 10). ‘An important consequence of the state tradition for politics in 
Turkey is that it has been strongly shaped by the concentration of power and rewards 
at the centre’ (Danielson and Keles, 1985, p.99).
Similar to the classical modernising elite of Ottoman origin, Turkey’s current 
political leaders are often characterised by their authoritarian, elitist and 
undemocratic behaviour. As party leaders they almost completely control the 
structures of their respective parties and hold the monopoly to distribute from top to 
bottom the material and legal resources that are acquired through the state 
institutions. Turkish parties are wide-spread patron-client systems, and in analysing 
them, Nimet Beriker came to the conclusion:
‘It is evident that politics in general has been reduced to a game of capturing 
public resources and then redistributing them through legal and illegal means. 
There is an almost complete absence of meaningful debate among the 
political elite’ (1997, p.449).
On the other hand, the modem Turkish state emerged in an environment in which 
there was no state-society interaction. ‘The new state had not inherited a strong civil 
society; on the contrary, the Ottoman Empire had discouraged autonomous civilian 
activity’ (Barkey, 2000, p.90). Heper also agrees that ‘the absence of civil society in 
Turkey was an inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, where political, economic and
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social power coalesced in the center’ (2000, p.78). In relation to this, ‘the Ottoman- 
Turkish political structure did not have a tradition of self-government, as well’ 
(Heper, 1986, p.7-36). ‘In the Ottoman structure the periphery was totally subdued 
by the centre .... in Ottoman patrimonialism the local notables did not have extensive 
political-territorial rights, and the system also lacked free cities’ (Heper, 1989, p.3).
The economic side of the story actually has complementary characteristics with the 
political side as we have seen in Chapter Four. Under the conditions of intensifying 
globalization, Turkey implemented a series of important economic reforms in the 
early 1980s including a stabilization and structural reform programme aimed at 
liberalising the Turkish economy, which had relied on the import-substitution 
development model for a long time. The most important aim was to integrate the 
country into the global world order. An important reflection of these developments 
on the state was that state power was simultaneously weakened at the global level, as 
a result of the restructuring in the global economy, and, strengthened at the domestic 
level as a result of the space created by the globalisation of the state for the 
consolidation of economic and political reform in Turkey. In other words, the 
Turkish state kept its centralist structure in the local policy area.
On the other hand, theoretical discussions in Chapter Two and Chapter Three showed 
that globalization has also brought some opportunities to world cities, and the only 
way to benefit from those opportunities is to establish new urban policies to attract 
transnational investment and capital and to supply international cultural and touristic 
events to the world. Chapter Four and Chapter Five made it clear that the 
administrative decentralisation and increasing financial sources coming with the
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liberalisation process in Turkey have given some impetus to Istanbul in global 
competition. However, since the local governance mechanism in Turkey has not been 
developed in a vigorous way, new urban policies have been shaped with global 
concerns. Those global capitalist policies implemented in the urban area of Istanbul 
mostly bypassed local planning principles and local claims as seen in Chapter Six. 
Although the nation-state is supposed to have an important intermediary function as 
a regulatory body between global capitalist interests and various local demands, this 
study did not exhibit this kind of a role in the Turkish state. Case studies in Chapter 
Seven and Chapter Eight showed that the central government mostly prefered to stay 
close to business interests and global capital rather than local demands. The financial 
centre development project in the Levent-Maslak axis, for instance, has shown how 
informal arrangements or so-called regimes easily filled the gap in urban policy area. 
The urban strategies determining developments in the new CBD area of Istanbul 
have been shaped by co-operation between the central government and local/global 
businesses excluding local municipalities and local actors in the city. On the other 
hand, the Olympics project of the city was completely owned and driven by the 
central government, and even local and global business, consciously or 
unconsciously, did not make much contribution during the competiton process.
9.2 From Government to Governance and Decentralisation
One important issue highlighted in this study has been that many analyses of state- 
local relations argue that there is a change under way from government to 
governance, implying a shift in the distribution of local power away from
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municipalities to other bodies. With this shift, local state and civil society have 
emerged as the arenas in which a host of objectives are to be achieved. ‘The term 
governance is now being used to denote the range of service delivery mechanisms at 
local level, and expresses the shift from provision by local and central government 
structures to a number of fragmented agencies within the public, business, voluntary 
and private spheres’ (Malpass, 1994). But as we have seen in the case study chapters; 
governance in the Turkish case has implied the shift in local power away from local 
governments and local people to business and global capital organised by the central 
government.
Chapter Three showed that since the early 1980s there has been a trend in most 
countries of the world towards decentralisation from national governments regarding 
responsibility for delivering services. This has paralleled a similar decentralisation in 
the private sector where strategic planning may be centralised but production and 
distribution are decentralised or spun off. Governmental decentralisation has 
sometimes taken the form of a national government delivering more of its 
responsibilities through regional offices or decentralised agencies. More frequently, 
in recent years, it has been through the privatisation of national agencies or services. 
In several European countries such as France, Spain, Belgium, and Italy, national 
powers have been decentralised to existing or newly created sub-national regional 
governments.
A significant result of this decentralisation has been the transfer of more 
responsibility to local authorities. In part this has come about because necessities can 
be more easily satisfied when services are delivered by agencies closer to their
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recipients. In part decentralisation of responsibility has been the result of fiscal 
constraints at national level. The trend towards the decentralisation of responsibilities 
to local authorities has brought both benefits and problems. While in cities in some 
parts of the world, new responsibilities and autonomy have led to creative responses 
to urban issues, in many others decentralization of authority has not been 
accompanied by adequate fiscal resources or capacities and the situation has become 
even worse, especially in developing countries.
As Chapter Four pointed out that the outcome in the Turkish case has also been 
unfavorable and no different from other developing countries. However, it is better to 
underline some Turkey-specific issues here. On the one hand, the rate of urbanisation 
particularly since the 1980s has been phenomenal in Turkey, even by today’s 
international standards. This has posed a great challenge to the expansion and 
maintenance of physical infrastructure, which falls mainly within the responsibility 
of local governments. Chapter Five and Chapter Six revealed that there has been 
massive investment in an effort to catch up with growth by expanding and 
modernizing the city’s infrastructure in Istanbul since the 1980s. The goal has been 
not just to meet the basic needs of the population but, as in the nineteenth century, to 
revitalize the city, and in the process to re-establish Istanbul as a great international 
centre for trade and finance. There has been a strong focus on the physical 
infrastructure and appearance of the city. These efforts to renovate the urban fabric 
have not been without controversy. In the process of modernization and 
improvement, some of the social and economic inequalities have become more 
visibly entrenched in the urban landscape. Thus, high-rise financial towers and 
‘deluxe hotels, conference centers and the luxury villas along the Bosphorus stand in
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sharp contrast to the generic blocks of apartments and the temporary housing and 
unpaved roads of the newer squatter settlements’ (Manners and Marcus, 2002, p.4-5).
On the other hand, in the mid-1980s the liberal Turkish government began a process 
of decentralization by devolving power and providing funds to local administrations. 
Those developments in the 1980s in the structure and financing of urban local 
government, particularly in the metropolitan areas, undoubtedly improved the ability 
of city administrations to respond to these challenges in Turkey. Events such as 
water shortages or earthquakes at the end of the 1990s, however, have called 
dramatic attention to the continuing inadequacy of planning and control of urban 
growth and the social and physical response to it.
9.3 Legislative Innovations and Inceasing Central Government Involvement in 
Urban Policies
A city's ability to serve a growing population clearly depends on its financial as well 
as legal and human capacity. Financial capacity depends in turn on both the 
adequacy of its revenue base and the efficiency with which this is utilised by city 
officials. The 1980s legislative reforms significantly increased the flow of national 
taxes into urban infrastructure, but the basis of distribution was too simplistic and 
arbitrary to distinguish adequately between the needs and revenues of individual 
cities in Turkey. In addition, the abovementioned liberal government decided to take 
some powers back in the late 1980s because of increasing inflation and the view that 
local governments suffered corruption and were irresponsible in their spending.
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There have been more recent reforms in the budgetary frameworks but continued 
progress has always been needed to encourage municipal governments to make the 
most productive use of what will always be limited resources. Since the beginning of 
the 1980s, different national governments, liberal, islamist or leftist, have all placed 
administrative reform proposals in their programmes. Although there has been a 
process of transferring responsibilities and financial resources to local authorities, 
most of the decisions even in local issues are still being taken by the central 
government today. The current government composed of the conservative Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has also taken the task seriously, and made another start 
in the longlasting decentralization process. It is necessary here to emphasise that 
according to the recent law passed by the Turkish parliament which has been under 
discussion for a long time, the decision making on most local tasks and services has 
been taken under the responsibility of local governments after determination of their 
main duty and functions by the central government.
It is also important to note the legal and constitutional frameworks underlying the 
local government system of the Turkish state. Article 127 of the 1982 constitution 
defines and regulates local authorities within the framework of a pluralist democratic 
process albeit with a strong emphasis on control by central authorities "where the 
protection of public interest requires it". This rather interesting arrangement under 
Article 127 permits the Minister of Interior, to suspend elected officials from their 
posts within the local administrative process as a provisional measure, pending a 
court decision relating to their conduct in office or with the performance of their 
functions. As we have seen in Chapter Four, the ‘Tourism Encouragement Law’ in
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1982 (no. 2634) has increased central government involvement in urban policies. We 
can go on to cite numerous examples of hindrances to an otherwise important 
arrangement that is aimed at promoting and consolidating democracy in Turkey. In 
this respect, the country needs more democratic openness and accountability 
enforced at the local level in order to benefit both the state and its citizens.
Another important discussion under the globalisation discourse being examined in 
this thesis has been that the massive transformations taking place in the global 
economy resulting from economic globalisation, trade liberalisation, privatisation, 
and enhanced telecommunications, which are possibly the biggest factors affecting 
the operating environment and placing the most constraints on all Turkish cities’ 
development. As we have seen in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, with 
globalisation, urban areas have become increasingly important; they form part of a 
global economy and are much more closely interconnected than they used to be. 
Globalisation has encouraged interaction between cities as a key element of the 
global economy since it relies on a network economy in which the cities are the 
nodes. Therefore, the city has become a functional, social, cultural and political 
interface between local and global levels. Many multinational companies now 
operate on the basis of global strategic decision-making with specialised components 
or processes being produced in far flung cities in different continents. Individual 
cities have become competitors as to which can be the most effective suppliers. 
Cities are not only engaged in ever more intense competition for capital and 
investment, but also increasingly dependent on each other. They are at the same time 
cooperating more as they attempt, through joint action, to strengthen their position 
and to limit the negative effects of competition. The response to the challenge of
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worldwide competition, and city-to-city cooperation and networking can, ideally, 
help boost the competitiveness of the entire world. The ability to network is thus one 
of the major factors contributing to cities’ success.
Furthermore, this competition among cities has forced local authorities to be 
constantly aware of their competitive strengths and weaknesses, and has constrained 
them from taking measures that could improve the local and global environment. The 
worldwide transformation in both economic and political areas has posed formidable 
challenges for local governments since the effects of economic liberalisation and 
globalisation are felt most sharply at local level. As we have seen in Chapter Two, 
globalisation has on the one hand provided new opportunities for devolved 
governments, which face the results of economic shifts that dramatically affect the 
economic health of their municipalities and the livelihoods of their residents. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, new concepts and procedures for planning at different 
levels have also emerged as a response to the growing trend toward economic and 
political globalization. Urban planning and policies have accordingly also been 
considerably affected by the conditions of globalisation which leads to increased 
competition for investment between world cities.
On the other hand, whilst many cities or localities have benefited from these 
processes via local policy and strategies such as new inward investment into local 
economies, the growing gap between rich and poor, with increases in absolute 
poverty levels in many places, has led to growing problems of insecurity, social 
exclusion and of environmental degradation. These negative impacts of globalisation 
are felt everywhere, but particularly in developing countries, and threaten to
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undermine the positive work of local authorities. Unsustainable production and 
consumption patterns likewise can also be added to these negative impacts.
In global competition there are inevitably winners and losers, since not all cities are 
equally competitive. Globalisation has therefore affected different cities in different 
ways. Despite the fact that some cities have benefited from the economic 
globalisation process and developed rapidly, others have shown a decline as a result 
of this process. This is one important issue that actually needs tackling while 
determining urban policy and strategies. Under these circumstances, as many studies 
have revealed, Istanbul has the potential to be a world city. But this study also 
presented that the city can compete in the global arena if only the problems imposed 
by the political sphere constraining the global position of the city can be overcome.
As examined in Chaper Seven, developments in the urban core of Istanbul in the last 
two decades have shown that Istanbul has rapidly transformed into an international 
finance and banking centre. The multi centred structure of Istanbul also helps the city 
to specialise in various functions in its sub-centres. There have been few new CBD 
developments since the 1980s parallel to urban policies directly implemented by the 
central government. Although the flourishing new financial centre development in 
the ‘Levent-Maslak axis’ seems one of the relatively few attempts to take Istanbul 
forward into global city competition, this urban policy has not followed a 
‘development with planning’ approach. In contrast, central government has most of 
the time intervened in the local planning process, enacting special legislation, and 
trying to use its authority over the local government and local actors.
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This situation has created not only tension between Ankara and local government, 
but also problems for the urban land of Istanbul since the central government’s 
specific decisions and legislation for some areas of the city have mostly not been 
compatible with the master plans and urban policies of the Metropolitan Municipality 
of Istanbul and different district municipalities. While the local government has 
mostly been the weaker side in this power relationship, private bodies and business 
organisations close to central government for economic and political reasons have 
benefited and made important speculative gains from specific decisions and policies 
arising from legislation such as the Tourism Encouragement Law (No. 2634) and the 
Urban Planning Law (No. 3194), as well as the 1982 Constitution.
On the other hand, as presented in Chapter Five, with economic globalisation the role 
of the city of Istanbul as the largest city and as the motor of the national economy has 
been highlighted, and the responsibility of the city for economic competitiveness has 
grown. There has also been a consensus among different levels of government and 
other actors on the role of Istanbul in the new era. Urban policies of government 
organisations also started to aim at making Istanbul a world city. Business and non­
governmental organisations as the representatives of relatively organised citizen 
groups have been activated by the idea of Istanbul as a world city. Istanbul today is 
an important promoter of growth sectors, including information technology, 
bioscience, media and culture. This has stressed the city administration’s ability to 
foster cooperation between universities, the business community and public 
administration. As shown in Chapter Eight, during the competition to host the 
Olympic Games between the years 2000 and 2012, attempts to sell Istanbul as a
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global venue received the full support of national and local governments, civil 
society and business organisations.
However, from the political perspective, this attempt and related urban strategies 
have also verified that the central government has full control over the process, 
setting up the special institutional arrangements for important development projects, 
establishing the framework within which the city and the Metropolitan Municipality 
operate, sometimes enforcing urban policies, and most of the time bypassing the 
local democracy principle. Moreover, one other important point is that the main 
target of attracting international capital has also been reflected in the influence of the 
private sector and business organisations in Istanbul.
By tailoring economic policies to exploit local capabilities, regional and city 
authorities are today more effective than central governments in meeting the 
challenges of tougher international competition. Moreover, devolution is more than 
just a transfer of power, it is also a new spirit of co-operation and networking 
between different levels of government and their civil society partners. On the one 
hand, the globalisation process requires harmonious relations between international, 
national and local actors. On the other hand, today’s development programmes seek 
to initiate economic and social development through local partnerships between state 
institutions, businesses, and different actors in civil society.
However, this kind of cooperation has mostly been the missing element in the local 
economic development efforts of different Turkish governments since the beginning 
of the 1980s. On the one hand, the central government has always had tutelage
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control over local government, and the use of discretionary powers over local 
government has even entered legislation via particular bylaws. Local governments 
have often been left without legislative or fiscal tools by the central government to 
deal effectively with local issues. The Turkish experience has consisted of struggle 
and conflict rather than cooperation in relations between the central and local 
government. On the other hand, local governments in Turkey have repeatedly failed 
to transform their role from providing urban services to ‘urban management’ by 
incorporating the private sector’s strengths into the urban governance phase. 
However, although the private sector and business organisations have stayed close to 
the central government in such areas as developing various city segments without 
planning restrictions to gain speculative benefits, their participation in urban policy 
and issues has been very limited. According to the Chairman of the Turkish National 
Olympic Committee, Togay Bayatli:
‘in a huge global project such as the organisation of the Olympic Games, the 
support from private sector including big holdings has not been as large as we 
expected when it is compared to other European cities’ (interview with Togay 
Bayatli, 6 July 2004).
9.4 Conclusion
At the close of this thesis, I would like to underline some important points to 
conclude the issues highlighted throughout the thesis. Given its history and 
geography, the city of Istanbul is in fact well placed to play a global role if the 
obstacles imposed by the political sphere constraining the global position of the city
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can be overcome. The local dynamics of Istanbul need to be analysed further as this 
may help to solve critical problems of the city. The city has today become divided 
into formal and informal settlements occupied by highly diverse economic, social 
and cultural groups. Urban politics of the government encompass only a limited area 
of urban dynamics in Istanbul. The decision-makers should be far more mindful 
when determining the priorities on urban policy and strategies under the effect of 
global pressures.
Local government administration in Istanbul is prone to political influences of the 
state and various power groups and needs to be re-established according to the 
changing and varying needs of its population. The experiment examined in two case 
studies has revealed that it is quite difficult to talk about the real existence of a 
growth regime in the case of Istanbul. There have certainly been some weak growth 
coalitions between various sectors of the social and political community. But, when 
we consider a mega-event or big project, these delicate partnerships were far from 
providing a comprehensive vision of the city, transforming the city’s image or 
increasing the chances of the city in global competition.
Global influences may support or distort the direction of metropolitan governance in 
Istanbul. Local government in Istanbul today appears to need a vision of devolved 
local economic development policies capable of responding to the challenges of 
globalisation. The key features in this vision are flexible and networked institutions 
and local strategies emphasising entrepreneurship, human capital and social 
cohesion. It is a priority for the local authority in Istanbul to recognise the trends and 
challenges the city brings, and to grasp the opportunities presented by the emergence
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of new roles for the city and its government. This requires the local government in 
Istanbul to work closely with its national government, local actors and the private 
sector in a concentrated effort to cope with the necessary transformations for the city.
The process of European accession will, gradually, provide Turkish civil society with 
a stronger voice and give it more self-confidence in its dealings with the state. The 
strenghtening of civil society will also lead to a stronger and more capable Turkish 
state by forcing it to divest itself from issues it has proven ill-equipped to handle. 
The Turkish state can learn from its European counterparts the contradictory lessons 
of globalisation. While globalisation has given rise to greater regionalism and a 
general decentralisation of state functions as regions and localities insist on making 
decisions autonomously and more efficiently, the state is becoming more efficient, 
better managed and more accountable as it sheds some of its powers. As Barkey 
underlined (2000, p. 105), ‘the challenge for the Turkish state and Turkish society 
now, is to adapt to the changes that are taking place in Europe and learn that strength 
and legitimacy does not come from controlling individuals, but rather from becoming 
more responsive and accountable to them’.
In conclusion, we can state that although accession to “world city” status due to 
globalisation has benefited many cities around the world, the lack of an effective role 
for local government and actors in the case of Turkey has prevented major 
developing cities such as Istanbul from achieving their full potential as a 
consequence of inferior urban planning policies. If Istanbul is to achieve its aim of 
becoming a more competitive city in the global arena, it needs an efficient system of
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urban governance which can provide a concrete strategic framework for the future 
development in the city.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I 
List of Interviews
Name
Selami Ozturk 
Kamer Diribas 
Nurettin Sozen
Oktay Ekinci
Rafet Bozdogan
Yusuf Namoglu 
Senihi Kitapci
Sinan Bolek
Sebnem Yuzer 
Sinan Erdem
Yalcin Aksoy 
Togay Bayatli
Title Date
Mayor of the District Municipality of Kadikoy 8 Aug. 2000
Deputy Governor of Istanbul 7 Aug. 2000
Ex-mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan
Municipality 15 July 2000
Head of the Chamber of Architects,
Istanbul Division 11 July 2000
Head of Transportation Division,
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 16 July 2000
Mayor of the District Municipality of Besiktas 23 July 2000
Head of the Chamber of City Planners,
Ankara Division 2 Sept. 2000
Urban planner in the Directorate of Urban 
Planning in the Metropolitan Municipality
of Istanbul 5 Aug. 2000
Urban planner in the Metropolitan Municipality
of Istanbul 5 Aug. 2000
Chairman of The Turkish Olympic Committee 
(From the beginning of the 1990s to 2003
when he passed away) 9 July 2000
General Director of the Istanbul 2004
Olympic Bidding Committee 9 July 2000
Chairman of The Turkish Olympic Committee
(After the death of Sinan Erdem) 6 July 2004
There have been other interviews with a few urban planners and various officials in 
the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul, the District Municipality of Sisli, the 
District Municipality of Besiktas and the Turkish National Olympic Committee in 
July and August 2000.
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Appendix II
A. Global Advertising Service Centres
Prime Major Minor
Chicago Amsterdam Auckland
London Athens Bangalore
Minneapolis Barcelona Bangkok
New York Boston Beijing
Osaka Brussels Bogota
Paris Caracas Bucharest
Seoul Copenhagen Budapest
Tokyo Dusseldorf Buenos Aires
Frankfurt Cape Town
Helsinki Dallas
Hong Kong Detroit
Istanbul Dublin
Lisbon Geneva
Los Angeles Hamburg
Madrid Jakarta
Melbourne Johannesburg
Mexico City Kuala Lumpur
Milan Lima
Prague Manila
San Francisco Miami
Santiago Montevideo
Sao Paulo Montreal
Singapore Moscow
Stockholm Mumbai
Sydney New Delhi
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Toronto Oslo
Vienna Rio de Janeiro
Zurich Taipei
Tel Aviv
Warsaw
Wellington
Source: Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith, 1999, p.453.
B. Global Banking Service Centres
Prime Major Minor
Frankfurt Bangkok Abu Dhabi
Hong Kong Beijing Amsterdam
London Bogota Barcelona
Milan Buenos Aires Boston
New York Caracas Bratislava
Paris Geneva Brussels
San Francisco Houston Budapest
Singapore Jakarta Cairo
Tokyo Johannesburg Chicago
Zurich Kuala Lumpur Colombo
Labuan Dallas
Los Angeles Dubai
Luxembourg Dublin
Madrid Edinburgh
Manama Glasgow
Manila Istanbul
Mexico City Lima
Miami Lisbon
Montreal Lyon
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Moscow Melbourne
Mumbai Montevideo
Prague Munich
Sao Paulo New Delhi
Santiago Osaka
Seoul Rio de Janeiro
Shanghai Rome
Sydney Tehran
Taipei Vienna
Toronto
Warsaw
Source: Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith, 1999, p.454.
C. Global Legal Service Centres
Prime Major Minor
Brussels Almaty Abu Dhabi
Chicago Bangkok Amsterdam
Hong Kong Beijing Athens
London Berlin Atlanta
Los Angeles Budapest Barcelona
Moscow Cleveland Boston
New York Dallas Bogota
Paris Frankfurt Bratislava
Singapore Geneva Brasilia
Tokyo Ho Chi Minh Buenos Aires
Washington Houston Bucharest
Kiev Cairo
Madrid Caracas
Mexico City Dubai
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Milan Dusseldorf
Minneapolis Guangzhou
Prague Hamburg
Riyad Hanoi
Rome Istanbul
San Francisco Jakarta
Sao Paulo Kansas City
Seattle Madrid
Shanghai Manila
Sydney Melbourne
Toronto Munich
Warsaw Philadelphia
Zurich Richmond
Rio de Janeiro
St Petersburg
Santiago
Stockholm
Taipei
Tashkent
Tijiana
Source: Beaverstock, Taylor and Smith, 1999, p.455.
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Appendix IV
Survey conducted by Taylor Nelson-Sofres-PIAR in Nov. 2000
• Questions asked:
- Concepts associated with the Olympic Games,
- News interests,
- Bidding cities,
- Attitude towards (support/opposition) Istanbul’s hosting the Olympic Games,
- Reasons for such support or opposition,
- Preparations needed for organizing the Games,
- Adequacy of Istanbul’s sport and general infrastructure to host the Games,
- Perceived positive and negative impact of hosting the Games,
- Istanbul’s bidding history,
- Level of interest in sports coverage by events/disciplines,
- Active participation in sports.
• Area covered:
- Istanbul,
- Turkey (urban).
• Date:
- November 2000.
• Samples and respective sample sizes:
- Turkey: 1002,
- Istanbul: 815,
- Turkish youth (14-22 years of age): 501,
- Amateur athletes: 212.
• Results revealed that:
- 88 percent of Turkish public,
- 89 percent of Istanbulites support Istanbul’s bid to host the Olympic Games.
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Appendix V
1995 Master Plan o f Istanbul
METROPOLITAN ISTANBUL SUB-REGION MASTER PLAN
LANOUSE
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